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Robert A. Anderson, ISB #2 124.
Mark D. Sebastian, ISB #6012
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP
C. W. Moore Plaza
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 7 0 0
Post Office Box 7426
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426
Telephone: (208) 344-5800
(208) 344-5510
Facsimile:
E-Mail: randerson@ajhlaw.com
Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

LESLIE WEINSTEIN, and LINDA
WEINSTEIN, Husband and Wife,
individually and as Guardians ad litem far
SARAH R. WEINSTEIN, and SARAH R.
WEINSTEIN individually

Case No. CV PI 0400280D

SECOND AMENDED ANSWER TO
PLAINTIFFS' FOURTH AMENDED
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR
TRIAL BY JURY

Plaintiffs,
VS.

PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY AND
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY and
PRUDENTIAL GENERAL INSURANCE
COMPANY and LIBERTY MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY and LM
PROPERTY AND CASUALTY
INSURANCE,
Defendants.

COME

NOW,

Defendants

1
PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY

AND

CASUALTY

INSURANCE COMPANY and PRUDENTIAL GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY and
LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY and LM PROPERTY AND CASUALTY

SECOND AMENDED ANSWER TO PLAINTIFFS' FOURTH AMENDED c o M P L A I N T Q Q B 2 1 3
DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY - 1

,J

INSURANCE, i n t h e above-entitled action b y and through their counsel of record,
Anderson, Julian & Hull, LLP, and hereby Answer Plaintiffs' Fourth Amended

Complaint and Demand for Trial by Jury (hereinafter, "Complaint") as follows:

FIRST DEFENSE
The Complaint fails t o state a claim against these answering Defendants
upon which relief can be granted.

SECOND DEFENSE
1.
Defendants deny e a c h and every allegation contained in Plaintiffs' Complaint
n o t specifically admitted herein.

2.
Defendants admit the allegations contained in paragraph 2 o f Plaintiffs'
Complaint.

3.
W i t h regard t o the allegations contained in paragraph 3 of Plaintiffs'
Complaint, Defendants admit only that Liberty Mutual lnsurance Company and LM
Property and Casualty lnsurance are insurance companies that are authorized t o sell
insurance in the State of Idaho and that Liberty Mutual lnsurance Company
purchased Prudential Property and Casualty lnsurance Company o n November 1.

2003.

900211

SECOND AMENDED ANSWER TO PLAINTIFFS' FOURTH AMENDED COMPLAINT A D
DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY - 2

4.
Defendants admit the allegations contained in paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 of the
Complaint.

5.
With regard t o the allegations contained in paragraph 7 of Plaintiffs'
Complaint, Defendants admit only that Sarah Weinstein was an occupant of the
vehicle driven by Linda Weinstein.

6.
Defendants admit the allegations contained in paragraph 8 of the Complaint.

7.
With regard t o the allegations contained in paragraph 9 of the Complaint,
Defendants admit only that the incident which occurred on September 30, 2002,
was an occurrence under the policy issued t o the Weinsteins, but deny the
remaining allegations contained therein.

8.
Defendants admit the allegations contained in paragraphs 10, 11 and 12 of
the Complaint.

9.
With regard t o the allegations contained in paragraph 1 3 of the Complaint,
Defendants only admit that an automobile collision occurred on September 30,
2002, that said collision qualifies as an occurrence under the Policy of insurance,
but deny the remaining allegations contained therein.

SECOND AMENDED ANSWER TO PLAINTIFFS' FOURTH AMENDED COMPLAINT A
DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY - 3

a00212

10.
With regard t o the allegations contained in paragraph 14 of the Complaint,
Defendants only admit that Sarah Weinstein received medical treatment, and that
the total amount of medical bills incurred by Sarah as described in the Complaint
total approximately $14,500, but deny the remaining allegations contained therein.

THIRD
-

DEFENSE

A t all times relevant t o the allegations for failure t o make multiple advance
payments under the uninsured motorist provision of the Policy, the answering
Defendants were relying upon the advice of counsel.

FOURTH DEFENSE
The Defendants have fully performed i n good faith each term of the
agreement between them and Plaintiffs.

FIFTH DEFENSE
In the event Plaintiffs recover a verdict or judgment against Defendants, then
said verdict or judgment must be reduced by the laws of the State of Idaho, by
those amounts which have been, or will, w i t h reasonable certainty, replace or
indemnify Plaintiffs, in whole or in part, for any past or future claims of economic
loss, for any collateral source such as insurance, social security, workers'
compensation or employee benefit programs.

SIXTH DEFENSE

SECOND AMENDED ANSWER TO PLAINTIFFS' FOURTH AMENDED COMPLAINT
DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY - 4

400213

Without admitting that there was an intentional or unreasonable delay or
denial of Plaintiffs' claim, any alleged delay or denial was fairly debatable or was
the result of an honest mistake.

SEVENTH DEFENSE
That a condition precedent of Defendants' obligations has not occurred
andlor that Plaintiffs may have violated or failed t o comply w i t h certain conditions
of the insuring agreement thereby discharging these answering Defendants from
obligations under the insuring agreement with respect t o the claims set forth in
Plaintiffs' Complaint.

EIGHTH DEFENSE
That the fault of Plaintiffs was equal t o or greater than the fault of
Defendants, if any, and that said Plaintiffs' fault was the sole, direct and proximate
cause of any damages andlor injuries suffered by Plaintiffs.

NINTH DEFENSE
Plaintiffs' actions have prevented the Defendants from performing their
contractual obligations, if any.

TENTH DEFENSE
Plaintiffs failed t o take reasonable steps t o mitigate the claimed or alleged
damages.

000214

SECOND AMENDED ANSWER TO PLAINTIFFS' FOURTH AMENDED COMPLAINT AND
DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY - 5

ELEVENTH DEFENSE
Plaintiffs' Complaint fails to state a claim for relief against the Defendants,
either separately or collectively,
accordance w i t h ldaho Code

§

entitling Plaintiffs t o punitive damages in

6-1 604.

REQUEST FOR ATORNEY'S FEES
Defendants request that they be awarded their attorneys fees and costs
incurred herein pursuant t o the provisions of ldaho Code

§§

12-120 and 12-12 1

and I.R.C.P. 54.

DEMEND FOR JURY TRIAL
Defendants hereby demand a trial by jury in accordance w i t h the previsions
of Rule 38(b) of the ldaho Rules of Civil Procedure.

WHEREFORE, having answered, Defendants pray that Plaintiffs take nothing
by their Fourth Amended Complaint, that the same be dismissed, and that the
Defendants be awarded their attorney fees and costs incurred herein.
DATED this 3)'day

of May, 2007.
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL

LLP

Attorneys for Defendants

0002.15

SECOND AMENDED ANSWER TO PLAINTIFFS' FOURTH AMENDED COMPLAINT AND
DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY - 6

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

39

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day of May, 2007, 1 served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing SECOND AMENDED ANSWER TO PLAINTIFFS' FOURTH
AMENDED COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY by delivering the
same t o each of the following attorneys of record, by the method indicated below,
addressed as follows:

James Risch
RlSCH GOSS INSINGER GUSTAVEL

407 W. Jefferson Street
Boise, ID 83702

[
[
[

I

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid

1

Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile

I

[Bl

a.i*

h k
Mark D. Sebastian

SECOND AMENDED ANSWER TO PLAINTIFFS' FOURTH AMENDED COMPLAINT
DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY - 7
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LN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRIJZ' OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR TJiE COUNTY OF ADA

LESLIE WINSTELN and LINDA
1
WEINSTEm, Husband and Wife,
1
individually and as Guardian Ad Litem for 1
SARAH R. WEmSTEm, and SARAH R. 1
WEINSEW, individually,
1
Case No. CV PI 04002301)
Plaintiffs,

1
1

SPECIAL VERDICT

j
)

PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY AND
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY
and PRUDENTm GENEiRAL
LNSURANCE COMPANY and LIBERTY
MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY and
LM PROPERTY AND CASUALTY
INSURANCE,
Defendants.

1
j

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
-1

We, the jury, answer the questions submitted to us in the special verdict as follows:

COUNT I
CLAIM OF BAD FAITH OF LINDA AND LESLIE WEINSTEIN
OWSTION NO. I: Was there a breach of contract on the part of the defendants as to the
medical payments provision of the insurance contract?

If you answered the above question "Yes," then please answer Question No. 2. If you

answered the above question ""No," then proceed to Question No. 3.
Did the defendants' commit bad faith in handling the medical
payments coverage which was the proximate cause of damage to Linda and Leslie Weinstein
d

YES

NO

i"

- Was there a breach

the part of the defen

the uninsured motorist provision of the insurance contract?

YES

/

*/Lbc.-

If you answered the above question "Yes," then please answer Question No. 4. If you
answered both Questions No. 1 and Question No. 3 "No", please proceed to answer the question
for Count III.
.QUESTION NO. 4: Did the defendants' commit bad faith in handling the uninsured
motonst provlslon
and Leslie Weinstein?

If you answered Question No. 2 and or Question No. 4 "Yes", then please answer
Question No. 5. If you answered the above question "No," then proceed to answer the questions
for Count Ln.
OWSTION NO. 5: What is the total
Weinstein as a result of defendant's bad faith?
d

ANSWER:$

2\01 boo

If you awarded damages in response to Que
Count 11, Punltive Damages.

COUNT 11
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

damages?

QUESTION NO. 2: If you answered "YES" to

t is the total amount

of punitive damges you award?
ANSWER $
Please now answer the question for Count HI, as to

COUNT I11
DAMGES AS TO SARAH 'WEINSTEIN
OUESTION NO. 1 What is the total amount of damages sustained by Sarah Weinsreln
as a result of the accident which occurred on September 30, 2002? You should include the total
amount of dmages and do n
court will make that calculation.

only the foreperson need sign. If the vote is less than unanimous but nine or greater, each person
voting in favor of the verdict should sign.

DATED this

day of

Foreperson

JAMES E. RISCW (ISB ii1224)
R. JOHN INSINGER (ISB if1678)
JASON S. RISCI-I (ISB #6655)
RISCH GOSS mSINCER GUSTAVEL
407 West Jefferson Street
Boise, Idaho 83702-6049
Telephone: (208) 345-9974
Facsimile: (208) 345-9982
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAI10, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
L,ESLIE WEINSTEPN and LINDA
WEINSTEN, Husband and Wife,
individually and as Guardian Ad Litern for
SARAH R. WEINSTEIN, and SARAH R.
WEINSTEIN, individually,

)

?
)

Case No. CV PI 0400280D

)

?

JUDGMENT

1
1

Plaintiffs,

?
vs.

)

PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY AND
CASUAL,TY INSURANCE COMPANY
and PRUDENTIAL GENERAL
INSURANCE COMPANY and LIBERTY
MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY and
LM PROPERTY AND CASUALTY
INSURANCE,
Defendants.

1
1
)

?
)
)

1
?

1
1

The above-entitled matter having been tried to a jury, and the jury having rendered its verdict;
Judgment is hereby entered in favor of LESLIE WEINSTEIN and LINDA WEINSTEIN,
plaintiffs, against LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE: COMPANY, defendant, in the amount of
\
two
.)p, h q c ~ h Dollars ($ 6, lo, o 00 00 ).

s;4

~~

IT IS SO ORDERED This

a

[ &day of October, 2007

HON. DARLA S. WILLIAMSON, District Judge

000221

Robert A. Anderson, ISB #2124
Mark 0. Sebastian, lSE3 #6012
ANDERSON, JULIAN & MULL LLP
C. W. Moore Plaza
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700
Post Office Box 7426
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426
Telephone: (208) 344-5800
Facsimile:
(208) 344-5510
E-Mail: randerson8 ajhlaw.com
Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
LESLIE WEINSTEIN, and LINDA
WEINSTEIN, Husband and Wife,
individually and as Guardians ad litern for
SARAH R. WEINSTEIN, and SARAH R,
W EINSTEIN individually

Case No. CV PI 04002800
MOTION TO CONTACT JURORS

(Oral Argument IS Requested)
Plaintiffs,
VS.

PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY AND
CASUALTY INSUWNCE COMPANY and
PRUDENTIAL GENERAL INSURANCE
COMPANY and L I B E R N MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY and LM
PROPERTY AND CASUALTY
INSURANCE,
Defendants.
COME NOW, Defendants in the above-entitled action, by and through their

counsel of record, Anderson, Julian & Hull, LLP, and, pursuant to the Court's order
entered on October 1, 2007, hereby move this Court for its order permitting Defense

counsel to contact jurors.
The Court should grant this motion for the foliowing reasons:

-

MOTION TO CONTACT JURORS I

u

000222
1 0 / 0 5 / 2 0 0 7 FRI 0 8 : 2 2
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a

u

-

r

vui

ur

U U .

uo

rAA

ANDERSON, JUL14W,

LUOJ

@004

-.

(I)

The Court has given 1DJi 1.I?,
instnrcting the jury that they need not speak to
either party, and to contact 'the Court if a party persists in attempting to
communicate with them;

(2)

Idaho Rule of Evidence 606 restricts the admission of evidence from jurors that
would tend to impeach a verdict;

(3)

Per Rufe 606,a party is pemiBed to inquire and obtain evidence as to whether
extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention
or whether any outside influence was impropedy brought to bear upon

(4)

Plainti~shotionimproperly prevented Defendants from communicating
jurors immediately following entry of the verdict, but evidence o
influence or prejudicial information is best raised in a motion for new trial, which
must be brought within 14 days of the entry of judgment, and therefore this
Court's prohibition has potentially prejudiced Defendants right to bring a motion
for new trial;

(5)

Oppos~ngcounsel has had notrce via the hearing and discussion on Plaintiffs'
October 1, 2007 motion to prohibit contact with the jurors, and through this
motion, of Defendants' interest in contacting the jurors; and,

(6)

Legal counsel should be permitted to inquire of the jurors in order to learn and
improve counsel's skills as an advocate.

-7

For these reasons, the Court should grant Defendants' motion and permit
Defendants to contact the jurors.

ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED,

DATED this

H 6 a y of October, 2007.
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP

a,/\

I

BY

Mark D. Sebastian, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Defendants
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1 HEREBY CERTIFV that on this
ay of October, 2007, 1 sewed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing MOTION
NTACT JURORS by delivering the same
to each of the following allomeys of record, by the method indicated below, addressed

as follows:
James Risch
RISCH GOSS INSINGER

[ ]

GUSTAVEL
407 W. Jefferson Street.
Boise, ID 83702

US. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile

Mark 0.Sebastian

-

MOTION TO CONTACT JURORS 3

Robert A. Anderson, ISB No. 21 24
Phillip J. Collaer, 1SB No. 3447
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP
C. W. Moore Plaza
2 5 0 South Fifth Street, Suite 7 0 0
Post Office Box 7426
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426
Telephone: (208) 344-5800
(208) 344-55 10
Facsimile:
E-Mail:
pcollaer@ajhlaw.corn

J- DAVID NiaVAhl

j

,

By J. EARLE
L-)EFIJ'P;

Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DfSTRlCT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND
FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

LESLIE WEINSTEIN, and LINDA
WEINSTEIN, Husband and Wife,
individually and as Guardians ad litern for
SARAH R. WEINSTEIN, and SARAH R.
WEINSTEIN individually,

Case No. CV PI 0 4 0 0 2 8 0 0

DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR NEW
TRIAL RE: JUROR MISCONDUCT

Plaintiffs,
VS.

PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY AND
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY and
PRUDENTIAL GENERAL INSURANCE
COMPANY and LIBERTY MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY and LM
PROPERTY AND CASUALTY
INSURANCE,
Defendants.

I

DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL RE: JUROR MISCONDUCT - I
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ORIGINAL

COME NOW the defendants, by and through their counsel of record, Anderson
Julian & Hull, LLP, and pursuant t o the provisions of Rule 59(a)(21of the Idaho Rules
of Civil Procedure, hereby move this Court for an order granting a new trial in this
action.
This motion is made upon the grounds and for the reason that juror misconduct
occurred during the course of voir dire examination during the jury triai in this case,
Such "misconduct" consisted of the failure of the juror Mark Barbo t o affirmatively
respond t o questions posed during voir dire that would have revealed that he was a
current policy holder of insurance policies issued by the defendants and that there was
a claims history with respect t o these policies.

Such information would have

warranted his removal for cause as had occurred with all other jurors who responded
affirmatively t o the question posed by the presiding judge.
This motion is supported by the affidavits of Janet Nolan and Phillip J. Collaer
and by the Memorandum of Law filed herewith.
DATED this

day of October. 2007.
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP

Robert A. Anderson, Of the Firm
Phillip J. Collaer, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Defendants

DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL RE: JUROR MISCONDUCT - 2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVlCE
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day of October, 2007, 1 served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL RE: JUROR
MISCONDUCT by delivering the same t o each of the following attorneys of record, by
the method indicated below, addressed as follows:

JAMES E. RISCH
RISCH GOSS INSINGER GUSTAVEL
407 West Jefferson
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 345-9974
Facsimile: (208) 345-9982
A ttorneys for Plaintiffs

[XI
[ ]

I1
[

1

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile

Phillip J. Collaer

-

DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL RE: JUROR MISCONDUCT 3

000227

Robert A. Anderson, ISB #2124
Mark D. Sebastian, ISB if6012
ANDERSON, JULIAN 2% HULL LLI"
C. W. Moore Plaza
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700
Post Office Box 7426
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426
'Telephor~e: (208) 344-5800
Facsimile:
(208) 344-55 10
E-hlail: randerson@ajhlaw.com
Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

LESLIE WEINSTEIN, and LINDA
WEINSTEIN, Husband and Wife, individually
and as Guardians ad litem for SARAH R.
WEINSTEIN, and SARAH R. WEINSTEIN
individually

Case No. CV PI 0400280D

DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
REMITTITUR OR, IN THE
ALTERNATIVE, NEW TRIAL

Plaintiffs,

[Oral argument IS requested]
vs.
PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY AND
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY and
PRUDENTIAL GENERAL INSURANCE
COMPANY and LIBERTY MUTlJAL
INSURANCE COMPANY and LM
PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE,
Defendants.

COME NOW, Defendants in the above-entitled action by and through their counsel of
record, Anderson, Julian & Hull, LLP, and hereby move this Court, pursuant to Rule 59 of the
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, for its order of remittitur or, in the alternative, a new trial as to
the bad faith claims related to the uninsured motorist claims handling, Sarah Weinstein's
ul~insuredmotorist coverage and damages, and the punitive damage award.

DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR REMITTITUK OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, N
TRIAL - 1

m0
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The motion for reniittitur is brought on the grounds that (i) the statutory cap on punitive
damages found at Idaho Code $ 6-1604 applies, limiting punitive damages to the greater of
$250,000 or three times the compensatory damages, (iij there are insufficient facts to justify the
award of compensatory damages to either Mr. and Mrs. Weinstein, or Sarah Weinstein, or the
award of punitive damages, and (iii) the punitive damage award is unconstitutional.
The motion for new trial is brought pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(a)(l ), (3), and ( 5 ) - (7) on the
grounds that (i) there were irregularities in the proceedings by which Defendants were prevented
from having a fair trial; (ii) there was surprise which ordinary prudence could not have guarded
against; (iii) the damages were excessive, and appear to have been given under the influence of
passion and/or prejudice; (iv) the evidence presented was insufficient to justify the verdict; (v)
there were nurnerous errors in law occurring at the trial. The specific facts supporting this motion
are set fbrth in the affidavit of counsel accompanying this motion, and the memorandum of law
in support, which are incorporated herein by reference.
This motion is supported by a memorandum of law and affidavit of counsel submitted
concurrently herewith.

AND-ULIAN

& HULL LLP

Attorneys for Defendants

DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR RERIITTITUR OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, NE
TRIAL - 2
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on thi
ay of October, 2007, I served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT
TION FOR REMlTTlTUK OK, IN THE
ALTEKNATIVE, NEW TRIAL by delivering the same to each of the following attorneys of
record, by the method indicated below, addressed as follows:
James Kisch
RlSCW GOSS INSINCER CUSTAVEL
407 W. Jefferson Street
Boise, ID 83702

[<

1
[ ]
[ ]

U.S. Mail, poslage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile

DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR REh1ITTITUR OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, NE
TRIAL - J
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JAMES E. RISCH (ISB #1224)
R. JOHN INSINGER (ISB ii1578)
JASON S. RISCH (ISB 116655)
RISCH GOSS INSINGER GUSTAVEL
407 West Jefferson Street
Boise, Idaho 83702-6049
Telephone: (208j 345-9974
Facsimile: (208) 345-9982
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRIC?.
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
)
LESLIE WEINSTEN and LINDA
WEINSTEN, Husband and Wife,
1
individually and as Guardian Ad Litem for )
SARAH R. WEINSTEIN, and SARAH R. )
WEINSTEIN, individually,
1
)

Plaintiffs,

1

Case No. CV PI 0400280D
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF
PLAINTIFF SARAH WEINSTEIN

)
)

vs.
PRUDENTIAL, PROPERTY AND
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY
and PRUDENTIAL GENERAL
mSURANCE COMPANY and LIBERTY
MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY and
LM PROPERTY AND CASUALTY
INSURANCE,
Defendants.

1
1
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

The above-entitled matter having been tried to a jury verdict and the Court having made appropriate
adjustments thereto; Judgment is hereby entered in favor of plaintiff SARAH WEINSTEIN,
against defendants LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY and PRUDENTIAL

JAMES E. RISCH (ISB #1224)
R. JOHN MSINGCR (ISB ti1678)
JASON S. MSCW (ISB Jf6655)
"79 RISCH GOSS INSTNGER GUSTAVEL
Attorneys at Law
C9 407 West Jefferson Street
--". , Boise, Idaho 83702-6049
_- - Telephone: (208) 345-9974
i
L - - J Facsimile: (208) 345-9982

.--,
-+*--+

#.--=.-

A
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

LESLIE WEI-NSTEIN and LINDA
WETNSTEIN, Husband and Wife,
individually and as Guardian Ad Litem for )
SARAH R. WEINSTEIN, and SARAH R. )
WEmSTEIN, individually,

1
Plaintiffs,

)

Case No. CV PI 04002802)

MOTION FOR SUPPLEMENTAL OR
AMENDED JUDGMENT IN FAVOR
OF SARAH WEINSTEIN

1
1

VS.

PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY AND
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY
and PRUDENTIAL GENERAL
INSURANCE COMPANY and LIBERTY
MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY and
LM PROPERTY AND CASUALTY
INSURANCE,

)

1
)
)
)

Defendants.
)

MOTION FOR SUPPLEMENTAL OR AMENDED JUDGMENT R\I FAVOR OF SARAH WEINSTEIN- Page I

000232

COME NOW, the plaintiffs above-named, and move for entry of a supplemental or amended
judgment to be entered in favor of Sarah Weinstein. Plaintiffs seek either a supplen~entaljudgment
entered in conjunction with, or an amended judgment superseding, the Court's October 19, 2007
judgment, in conformance with the October 15,2007Affidavit of R. John Insinger regarding interest,
and the October 15,2007 Memorandurn of Costs and Affidavit of Attorneys Fees.

Oral a r g u e n t is requested on this Motion.
DATED This 26'h day of October, 2007.
RISCH GOSS ZNSINCER GUSTAVEL
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

I hereby certify that on the 26Ihday of October, 2007,I caused to be served a true and correct
copy of the foregoingMOTION FOR SUPPLEMENTAL OR AMENDED JUDGMENT M FAVOR
OF SARAH WEINSTEIN as follows:
Robert A. Anderson
Phillip J. Collaer
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL, LLP
Attorneys at Law
G. W. Moore Plaza
250 S. 51h Street, Suite 700
P.O. Box 7426
Boise, ID 83707-7426

1
[ I
[

[ ]
[ 1

U.S. mail (postage prepaid)
Facsimile (344-55 10)
Hand Delivery
Federal Express

MOTION FOR SUPPLEMENTAL OR AMENDED JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF SARAH WEINSTEIN- Page 2

NO.

RM

Robert A. Anderson, 1SB ki2 124
Mark D, Sebastian, ISB #6012
ANDERSON, JULlAN & HULL r_r,p
C. W. Moore Plaza
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700
Post Office Box 7426
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426
Telephone: (208) 344-5800
Facsimile:
(208) 344-55 10
E-Mail: randerson@ajhlaw.com
Attorneys for Defendmts
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

LESLIE WEnt'STEIN, and LINDA
WEJNSTEZN, Husband and Wife, individually
and as Guardians ad litem for SARAH R.
WEINSTEM, and SARAH R. WEINSTEIN
individually
Plaintiffs,

Case No. CV PI 0400280D

DEmNDANTS' OBJECTION TO
P L r n I F F S ' MEMORANDA OF
COSTS AND FEES

I

VS.
PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY AND
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY and
PRUDENTIAL GENERAL INSURANCE
COMPANY and LIBERTY MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY and LM
PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE,
Defendants.

COME NOW, Defendants in the above-entitled action by and through their counsel of
record, Anderson, Julian & Hull, LLP, and hereby object to Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Costs
(Rule 54, L R. C.P.) As to Leslie and Linda Weinstein, and Memorandum of Costs and Attorney
Fees (Rule 54, I. R. C.P.) As to Sarah Weinstein as follows:

DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDA OF COSTS AND
FEES - I

000234

Rule 54(e)(l) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "[iJn any civil action
the court may award reasonable attorney fees ... to the prevailing party or parties as defined in
Rule 54(d)(l )(B), when provided for by any statute or contract." 1.RC.P. 54(e)(l) (emphasis
added). Costs may only be awarded to the prevailing party. 1.RC.P. 54(d)(l). Where a request
for attorney's -fees is unsupported by argment or authority, the court cannot award attorney's
fees. See ~ g . hminguerz
,
v. Evergreen Res., Inc, 142 Idaho 7, 121 P.3d 938, 945 (2005);

Myers v. W o r k m'§Auto
~
Ins. Go., 140 Idaho 495,5 1I, 95 P.3d 977,993 (2004).

Ir. mGmm
As discussed more fully below, Plaintiffs are not entitled to attorney's fees as to Sarah
Weinstein's claims because Plaintiffs have proceeded under the wrong statute in one ease, and
have not satisfied the requirements of the other statute. Sarah is also not entitled to certain costs
as more fully explained below. Plaintiffs also are not entitled to recover costs for Leslie and
Linda Weinstein's claims because they were not the prevailing party. Leslie and Linda Weinstein
also are not entitled to certain costs, as more fully explained below.

A.

PLAINTIFFS' ARE NOT ENTITLED TO THE ATTORNEY'S FEES AND
COSTS CLAIMED AS TO SARAH WlEINSmm.
Plaintiffs have claimed attorney's fees of $114,823.27 as to Sarah Weinstein's claims,

based on Idaho Code rj$ 12-120 and 41-1 839; as well as $2,958.15 in costs as a matter of right.
As more fully set forth below, (i) because Idaho Code

9

41-1839 is the exclusive statute for

attorney's fees in disputes between insured and insurers, Plaintiffs are not entitled to fees
pursuant to $ 12-120; and (ii) because Plaintiffs never submitted a proof of loss as to the
damages obtained through the suit, Plaintiffs are not entitled to attorney's fees under $ 41-1839.
Finally, Plaintiffs are not entitled to all of the costs claimed as a matter of right.

DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFFS' IMEMORANDA OF COST
FEES - 2

1.

NOT ENTITLED TO FEES P W U M TO IDAHO
CODE 5 12-120.

Plaintiffs are claiming attorney's fees on behalf of Sarah Weinstein pursuant to Idaho
Code § 12-120.' Such fees are not allowed in actions of this type. See I.C.

5 41-1839(4). The

statute m l ~ e remphasizes that "Section 12-120, Idaho Code, shall not apply to any actions
between insureds and insurers involving disputes arising under any policy of insurance." Id The
ldaho Supreme Court has also explained that "Idaho Code

5 41- 1839(4) provides the exclusive

remedy for the award of statutory attorney fees in all actions between insureds and insurers
involving disputes arising under policies of insurunce." Hayden Lake Fire Pro& Disk v. A l m n ,
141 ldaho 307, 3 12, 109 P.3d 161, 167 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted; italics in
original) (quoting I.C. tj 41-1839(4)). "This statute bars recovery of attorney fees under
alternative statutory provisions, including specifically, I.C.

5 12-120(3) .. .." Id

See also I d , 141

Idaho at 313 (discussing legislative history that indicated the purpose of subsection (4) was to
make

5 41-1839 the exclusive attorneys'

fees statute that applies to insurance disputes). In short,

Plaintiffs are barred from recovering attorneys' fees pursuant to Section 12-120.

2.

PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO FEES PURSUANT TO IDAHO
CODE 5 41-1839.

Plaintiffs are also claiming attorney's fees on behalf of Sarah Weinstein pursuant to
Idaho Code 5 4 1-1839. That section states:
Any insurer issuing any policy ... of insurance ... which shall fail
for a period of thirty (30) days after proof of loss has been
furnished as provided in such policy ... to pay to the person
entitled thereto the amount justly due under such policy ... shall in
any action thereafier brought against the insurer ... pay such
hrther amount as the court shall adjudge reasonable as attorney's
fees in such action.
I

Although not clear &om their pleadings, Plaintiffs presumably seek attorney fees under section 12-120(3) relating
to contracts and commercial transactions.

DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFFS' M1EMORAMDA OF COSTS
FEES - 3
m
2
3
6

I.C. # 41-1839(1). "'Before a plaintiff may recover aaorney fees under the stalute, it must be
shown that: (1) the insured has provided proof of loss as required by the insurance policy; and

(2) the insurance company failed to pay an mount justly due under the policy within thirty days
of such proof of loss." Martin v, State F a m Mutual Auto, Im, Ca., 138 Idaho 244,6 1 P.3d 60 1

There is no statutory definition of what constitutes a proof of loss. "'[Plroof of loss' is a
term of art in insurance law, meaning something more than notification of a potential claim."

Certain Uitdemraem at Lloyd's v. WoUeson, 141 Idaho 740, 742, 118 P.3d 72, 74 (2005). The
purpose for a proof of loss "is to allow the insurer to form an intelligent estimate of its rights and
liabilities, to afford it an opportunity for investigation, and to prevent fraud and imposition upon
it." Brinkman v. Aid Ins.Go., 1 15 Idaho 346, 349-50, 766 P.2d 1227, 1230-31 (1988) overruled
in part on other grounds, Greenougk v. Farm Bureau MJ&.Ins. Co., 142 Idaho 589, 130 P.3d

1127 (2006) (quoting 44 Am.Jur.2d Insurance

5 1323). Thus, "[tlhe insured, when required to do

so under his policy, should provide the information reasonably available to him regarding his
injury and the circumstances of the accident." BdmKman' 115 Idaho at 350.
The amount of information provided should be proportional to the
amount reasonably available to the insured. If the information
provided is insufficient to give the insurer an opportunity to
investigate and determine its liability, the insurer may deny
coverage. Otherwise, the insurer must investigate andor determine
its rights and liabilities. The documentation is the "proof." The
explanation of physical andor financial injury is the "loss." "Loss"
must be distinguished from liability. The insurer will determine its
liability with the knowledge that it must be fair and accurate or
suffer the consequences.

Id "[A] submitted proof of loss is sufficient when the insured provides the insurer with enough
information to allow the insurer a reasonable opportunity to investigate and determine its
liability." Greenouglt, 142 Idaho at 593. The Idaho Supreme Court has also indicated that a

DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION TO PLAINTWFS' MEMORANDA OF COST
FEES - 4
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expenses incurred on behalf of Sarah Weillstein through November 20, 2003" and indicated he
would be working on a proof of loss as to future medical losses in the coming weeks. Even so,
that notebook was incomplete, and a supplement was not sent to Defendants until May 20, 2004.
In the May 20 letter, Piaintiffskomsel noted that he was working on updating bills and records.
Neither the April 20, 2004 correspondence or the May 20, 2004 conespondence contained any
mention, let alone a demand or supporling information, as to noneconomic damages. Mr. Bistline
(or for that matter, current Plaintiffs' counsel) never forwarded a "proof of loss'hs to future
medical damages. In short, Plainties never satisfied the statutory prerequisite for attorney's fees
as to any future rneds (i.e., those exceeding the $14,500 incurred in 2002-2003) or to noneconomic damages, and for that reason are not entitled to an award of attorney's fees for
recovering those mounts.
As to the medical expenses incurred in 2002-2003, Plaintiffs admitted in their Third and
Fourth Amended Complaints that the total past medical bills totaled only $14,500 of which
$5,000 had been paid under the medical payments provision of the policy, leaving only $9,500
outstanding at the time of the April and May 2004 demands. As noted above, the April 2004
demand was incomplete and only updated by a letter dated May 20, 2004. Defendants tendered
$10,000 less than 30 days later, which tender was rejected by Plaintiffs. Thus, Defendants
satisfied their obligations under Section 41- 1839, and are not liable for attorney's fees.
Moreover, the Idaho Supreme Court has indicated that the timing and sufficiency of a
proof of loss is a question of fact. See Greettough, 142 Idaho at 593. The issue of whether
Plaintiffs had satisfied the requirements for attorney's fees under Section 41-1839 was never
presented to the jury-i.e.,

the jury was never asked if a sufficient proof of loss had been made,

DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFFS' MIEMO-A
FEES - 6

OF COSTS

oB239

or whether the Bekndmts had tendered payment timely. Accordingly, there is no factual basis
for awarding attorney's fees pursuant to Section 41-1 839.

Plaintiffs are requesting a total of $1 17,823.27 in fees (less an offset of $3,000) on a
$250,000 judgment. "When awarding aaomey's fees, a district court must consider the
applicable factors set forth in 1,R.C.P. 54(e)(3) and may consider any other factor that the court
deems appropriate." Hinm v. Hines, 129 Idaho 847, 855, 934 P,2d 20, 28 (1997). Rule 54(e)(3)
provides the following factors:
(A)

The time and labor required,

(J3)

The novelty and difficulty of the questions.

(G)

The skill requisite to perform the legal service properly and
the experience and ability of the attorney in the particular
field of law.

(D)

The prevailing charges for like work.

(E)

Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.

(F)

The time limitations imposed by the client or the
circumstances of the case.

(G)

The amount involved and the results obtained.

(H)

The undesirability of the case.

(I)

The nature and length of the professional relationship with
the client.

(J)

Awards in similar cases.

(K)

The reasonable cost of automated legal research (Computer
Assisted Legal Research), if the court finds it was
reasonably necessary in preparing a party's case.

(L)

Any other factor which the court deems appropriate in the
particular case.
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Id Based on these factors, Plaintiffs' request for fees is unreasonable for several reasons.
First, as noted earlier, where a request for attorney's fees is unsupported by argument or
authority, the court cannot award attorney's fees. See ~g.,Dominguez v. Evergreen Res., Znc,
142 Idaho 7, 121 P.3d 938,945 (2005); Myers v. Workmen's Aulo Ins. Co., 140 Idaho 495,5 1 1,
95 P.3d 977, 993 (2004). In this case, other than a brief statement that the Court can consider a
contingent fee arrangement, Plaintiffs fail to address any of the proceeding factors.
Second, the contingent fee arrangement of 40% of recovery is unreasonably high. CJ.,

Parsons v. Mu& ofEnuntclaw Zm. Co., - Idaho -, 152 P.3d 614, 619 (2007) (approving 113
contingent fee arrangement for fees awarded pursuant to I.C.

9

41-1839). A one-third

contingency fee is the standard and traditional rate.
Third, Plaintiffs are requesting $117,823.27 in attorney's fees on a $250,000 judgment.
This amounts to 47% of the award, which is interesting since Mr. Bistline's contingent fee
agreement was only 25% and Mr. Risch's was 40%. See A r i a of AtRomeys Fees Claimed as

Cos& as to Sarah Weinstein, pp. 2 and 4. With offsets, the Plaintiffs are requesting $1 14,823-27
on a $165,000 judgment.' This is 69.6% of the judgment. Again, this is well in excess of the
contingent fee agreements cited by Plaintiffs. Thus, the amount of fees requested is
unreasonable.
In short, Plaintiffs have not suficiently supported their argument for attorney's fees, have
requested an excessive contingency fee, and are requesting fees in excess of the already
excessive contingency fee. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs' motion for attorney's fees as to Sarah
Weinstein should be denied.
4.

PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO THE INTEREST CLAIMED.

3

No copy of this judgment was provided to Defendants prior to entry. This amount does not correctly calculate the
offsets because it does not include additional medical bills paid prior to the $80,00&some $2,900.
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First, Plaintiffs have demanded interest for the full amount of damages beginning at May
19,2004, and continuing through the current date. In Greenough v. Farm Bureau Mui. Ins. Co.,
142 Idaho 589, 130 P.3d 1127 (2006), the Idaho Supreme Court addressed the issue of when
interest begins to accrue on a judgment for money due under an insurance contract. The court
noted that Idaho Code § 28-22-104 allowed for prejudgment interest at a rate of 12% per annurn.

I d , 142 Idaho at 592. The court also noted that interest did not begin to accrue until payment
was due under the contract, which in that case was, per the contract, 60 days after receipt of a
sworn proof of loss. Id, 142 Idaho at 592 and 593. As discussed earlier, Plaintiffs have never
submitted a proof of loss as to Sarah's noneconomic damages or future economic damages
(including fbture medical care), even though such information was requested by the company
and promised by Plaintiffs. Thus, because Plaintiffs did not provide a complete proof of loss,
Plaintiffs are not entitled to pre-judgment interest.
Second, prejudgment interest is only allowable "where the amount claimed, even though
not liquidated, is capable of mathematical computation." Greenough, 142 Idaho at 592 (quoting

DiUon v. Montgomery, 138 Idaho 614,617,67 P.3d 93,96 (2003). In this case, the final damage
award to Sarah far exceeded the future value of possible surgery or past medical expenses
incurred, but includes non-economic damages such as pain and suffering and loss of quality of
life. In fact, the jury merely went along with the suggestion by Plaintiffs' counsel to award the
policy limits. The amounts of pain and suffering and loss of quality of life are not "capable of
mathematical computation." See Acevedo-Garcia v. Monroig, 35 1 F.3d 547, 57 1 (1" f i r . 2003)
("Damages for pain and suffering defy 'exact mathematical computation,' and 'are not
susceptible to proof by a dollar amount."') (citations omitted). Thus, Plaintiffs are not entitled to
pre-judgment interest.

DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDA OF COSTS AND
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Third, Plaintiffs interest calculations for post-judgment interest are based on the
interest rate of 12% under I.C. $ 28-22-104(1). See Afl ofAmountr Due to Pfainhg
Sarah Weimtein in Suppod of Judgment in Favor of P P t n t r r Sarah Weimtein, p. 4
(demanding $60.53 per day in interest since the day of judgment). However, once judgment is
entered, the post-judgment interest rate of 1.C.

4

28-22-104(2) applies. See Cr&Mor, Inc. v*

Butts, 109 Idaho 1020, 712 P.2d 721 (Ct. App. 1985). Currently, the rate on judgments is
10.00%. Thus, Plaintiffs have used the wrong interest rate.
5.

PLAINTIFF SARAH mINSTEIN IS NOT EWITLED TO ALL TJ3E
COSTS CLAIMED AS A MATTER OF RIGHT.

In item #6 of Exhibit A to Memorandum ofcosts and Attorney Fees (Rule 54,1R.C.P.)
As to Sarah Weinstein, Plaintiffs make a claim for $500 for "Costs for preparation of exhibits."

Rule 54(d)(l)(C)(6) permits the prevailing party to recover the "[r]easonable costs of the
preparation of models, maps, pictures, photographs, or exhibits admitted in evidence as exhibits
in a hearing or trial of an action, but not to exceed the sum of $500 for all of such exhibits of
each party." However, in this case, there is no receipts or other information supporting a claim
that such costs equaled or exceeded $500. Given the paucity of evidence on Sarah's future
medical expenses, Defendants question whether the costs of any necessary exhibits exceeded
$500. (In this regard, Defendants would note that Sarah's prior medical expenses were not at
issue, and the only purpose for those exhibits were to support her parents' claims of bad faith).
Accordingly, Plaintiffs are not entitled to the costs claimed.
In item #10 of Exhibit A to Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees (Rule 54, I. R. C.P.)
As to Sarah Weinstein, Plaintiffs make a claim for multiple depositions of Linda and Leslie

Weinstein, Nancy O'Connor, Anne Gorski, Judith Halverson, and Stephanie Abernathy. Mr. and
Mrs. Weinstein's depositions pertained to the bad faith claims, not the claims for Sarah's
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damages. Similasly, the depositions of Nancy OTomor, Anne Gorski, Judith Halverson, and
Stephanie Abernathy related to the bad faith claims. Accordingly, it is inappropriate for these to

be claimed as costs incurred in relation to Sarah's claims and, for that reason, should be denied.

B.

P L m I F F S ARE NOT EmITLED TO THE COSTS CLAIMED AS TO LESLIE
AND LINDA rnINSTEIET,
Plaintiffs have not claimed attorney's fees as to Leslie and Linda Weinstein. See

genera& Memorandum of Cosis: mule 54, I,ILC.P.) As to Leslie and Linda Weinstein.
Plaintiffs have made a claim for $16,098.81 in costs as a matter of right. Because Plaintiffs were
not the prevailing pasty, they are not entitled to costs as a matter of right. In addition, Plaintiffs
are not entitled to specific costs for the reasons set forth below.

1.

P L m I F F S ARE NOT THE PREVAILING PARTY AND, THUS, NOT
ENTITLED TO COSTS.

As noted, Plaintiffs are claiming $16,098.81 in costs as a matter of right as to the claims
brought by Leslie and Linda Weinstein. The rules provide that "[elxcept when otherwise limited
by these rules, costs shall be allowed as a matter of right to the prevailing party or parties, unless
otherwise ordered by the court." 1.RC.P. 54(d)(l)(A). Rule 54(d)(l) indicates that "[iln
determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and entitled to costs, the trial court
shall in its sound discretion consider the final judgment or result of the action in relation to the
relief sought by the respective parties." 1.RC.P. 54(d)(l)(B). W e r e one party prevails on one
claim, but the other party prevails on another claim, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that the
district court did not abuse it discretion in finding that there was no overall prevailing party, and
therefore neither party was entitled to an award of court costs and attorney fees. See Adam v.

hheger, 124 Idaho 7 4 , 856 P.2d 864 (1993); Znt'l Eng'g Co. v. Daum Indusk, Znc, 102 Idaho
363,630 P.2d 155 (1981).

DEENDANTS' OBJECTION TO PLAJ[NTIFFS' MEMORANDA OF COST
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Leslie and Linda Weinstein brought claims for bad faith relating to claims handling of the
med pay claims and the uninsured motorist (UM) claim. They did not prevail as to the bad faith

for the med pay claims handling. Even as to the UM claim, Plaintiffskounsel asked the jury to
award $75 million in punitive damages,4 but the jury only returned a verdict of $6 million in
punitive dmages. In short, Plaintiffs only prevailed as to one of two claims, and recovered only
about 8% of what they had asked for. Consequently, Plaintiffs are not the prevailing party and
not entitled to costs as a matter of right.

2.

PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO EXBIBIT COSTS.

Plaintiffs have asserted that they are entitled to $1,500 for "[c]osts for preparation of
exhibits." See Memorandum of Costs (Rule 54, LRC.P.) As to Leslie and Linda Weinstein,
Exhibit A. Rule 54(d)(l)(G)(6) permits the prevailing party to recover the "[r]easonable costs of
the preparation of models, maps, pictures, photographs, or exhibits admitted in evidence as
exhibits in a hearing or trial of an action, but not to exceed the sum of $500 for all of such
exhibits of each party." For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiffs are not entitled to the $1,500.
First, as with Sarah's claims discussed above, there are no receipts or information setting
out the actual costs. Thus, neither Defendants or the Court know if these represents amounts
actually incurred. Accordingly, the Court should deny the request.
Second, the total cost permitted under the rule is $500 per party. Plaintiffs conceded that
the bad faith claims only pertained to Leslie and Linda Weinstein, and that Sarah had no claim to
such damages. The jury verdict form reflected this. Leslie and Linda Weinstein have presented
the same claims and damages and, therefore, are a single party entitled to only $500 total.

Specifically, Plaintiffs' counsel had put on proof that Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. had a net worth of $7.5 billion,
and suggested to the jury that it award 1% of that amount as punitive damages.

DEFEMIANTS' OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDA OF C O m m S
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However, even if counted as sepaate parties, they are entitled to recover only $500 each, or a
total of $1,000.

Plaintiffs are claiming $2,000 in expert fees for Wayne Soward, as well as $370.15 and

$278.57 for a copy of his depositions, respectively. See Memorandum of Costs (Rule 54,
LILC.P.) As to Leslie and Lhda Weimtein, Exhibit A. The rules permit recovery of the costs of
"pleasonable expert witness fees for an expert who testifies at a deposition or at a trial of an
action not to exceed the sum of $2,000 for each expert witness for all appearances." 1.RC.P.

54(d)(l)(C)(8). The rules also permit "[c]harges for one (I) copy of any deposition taken by any
of the parties to the action in preparation for trail of the action." 1.RC.P. 54(d)(l)(C)(10).
Mr. Soward was Plaintiffs' expert, which Plaintiffs' voluntarily withdrew as a witness
prior to trial. In fact, Plaintiffs moved for an order in limine prohibiting any discussion
concerning Mr. Soward or his testimony. Thus, Mr. Soward's testimony was not necessary to
preparing for trial and, given the order preventing any mention at trial, it was as though Mr.
Soward had never rendered testimony or an opinion in this case. Accordingly, Plaintiffs are not
entitled to any costs related to Mr. Soward or his testimony, including expert witness fees or
deposition costs.

4.

PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO DEPOSITION COPY CHARGES
FOR MIKE LINDSTROM.

Plaintiffs have requested $332.00 for a copy of the deposition transcript of Mike
Lindstrom. The rules permit "[cJharges for one (1) copy of any deposition taken by any of the
parties to the action in preparation for trail of the action." 1.RC.P. 54(d)(l)(C)(10). Mr.
Lindstrom was originally named as a witness to support Plaintiffs' claims regarding
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extracontractual dmages to Linda and Leslie Weinstein" credit rating and finances. Plaintiffs

#
L

withdrew Mr. Lindstrom as an expert witness ostensibly because he was out of the country. In
any event, Mr. Lindstrom's testimony or &dings were never used at trial. Like Mr. Soward, an
order in litrzine was entered preventing any reference or use of Mr. Lindstrom's testimony.
Consequently, Mr. Lindstrom's deposition was not used in preparation for trial, could not be
used by Defendants at trial, and therefore, Plaintiffs should not be pemined to recover costs for
the same.
DATED this x'?%aa of October, 2007.
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP

' /

Attorneys for Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 27 %ay of October, 2007,I served a true and correct
N PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDA
copy of the foregoing D E m N D m S ' ~ C T I O TO
OF COSTS AND FEES by delivering the same to each of the following attorneys of record, by
the method indicated below, addressed as follows:
James Risch
RISCH GOSS INSINGER GUSTAVEL
407 W. Jefferson Street
Boise, ID 83702

9
-1
[ 1
[ ]
[ 1

KObert A.

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-De~~vered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile

Anderson
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Robert A. Anderson, ISB #2124
Mark D, Sebastian, ISB 556012
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP
C. LV. Moore Plaza
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700
Post Office Box 7426
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426
Telephone: (208) 344-5800
Facsimile:
(208) 344-55 10
E-Mail: randerson@ajhlaw.com
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Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
LESLIE WENSTEIN, and LINDA
WENSTEN, F$usbmd and Wife, individually
and as Guardians ad litern for SARAH R.
WENSTEm, and SARAH R. WEmSTEn\J
individually
Plaintiffs,
vs.

Case No. CV PI 0400280D

D E m m m S W S P O N S E TO
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
SZTPPLEMEWAL OR m m E D
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF SARAH
mINSTELN AND OaJECTION TO
ENTRY OF JUDGMENT LN FAVOR
OF SARAH WEINSTEIN

PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY AND
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY and
PRUDENTIAL GENERAL INSURANCE
COMPANY and LIBERTY MUTUAL
mSURANCE COMPANY and LM
PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE,
Defendants.

COME NOW, Defendants in the above-entitled action by and through their counsel of
record, Anderson, Julian & Hull, LLP, and hereby respond to Plaintiffs' Motion for
Supplemental or Amended Judgment in Favor of Sarah Weinstein. For the reasons set forth

below, Defendants object to the entry of judgment in favor of Sarah Weinstein because it does
not correctly include all amounts to which Defendants are entitled as an offset. Defendants also

DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUPPLE
M N D E D JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF SARAH[ WEINSTEIN - 1

oppose Plaintiffs' motion to m e n d the Court's October 19, 2007 judgment to conform to the
Affidavit of R. John Insinger regarding interest, and Memorandum of Costs and Affidavit of
Attorney? Fees for the reason that the interest has been calculated incorrectly, and Plaintiffs are
not entitled to attorney's fees.

I. P R O C E D W B A C K G R O W .
On October 15, 2007, the Court was presented with a blank judgment in favor of Sarah
Weinstein together with the Plaintiffs' pleading regarding interest- and attorney's fees arising in
relation to Sarah Weinstein's claims. On October 19, 2007, without consulting Defendants'
counsel as to the proper offsets to the damage award to Sarah, and prior to the hearing on costs
and attorney's fees, the Court entered a judgment in favor of Sarah of $165,000, presumably

representing the $250,000 awarded by the jury, less $5,000 received in medical payments and
$80,000 previously paid by Defendants. Plaintiffs have now moved to amend that judgment.

11. A R G r n W

A.

THE COURT FAILED TO INCLUDE ALL TEE OFFSETS TO WHICH
DEFENDANT IS OWED.
In addition to the $5,000 for medical payments, and the $80,000 payment, Defendants are

also entitled to an additional $3,072.71 in medical bills paid after suit was filed. Defendants are
entitled to this amount as an offset as well.

B.

PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO THE INTEREST AND ATTORNEY'S
FEES REQUESTED.
As set more fully in Defendants ' Objection To Plaint#s ' Memoranda Of Costs And Fees,

which arguments are incorporated herein by reference, Plaintiffs are not entitled to the interest or
attorney's fees demanded. More specifically, Plaintiffs are not entitled to the interest demanded
because (i) the Plaintiffs never submitted a proof of loss sufficient to trigger a contractual

DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUPPLEmNT
AMENDED m ~ m IN
mFAVOR OF SARAH mmsmm - 2
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obligation to pay the underlying sum, and (ii) Plaintiffs have incorrectly used the pre-judgment
interest rate to calculate post-judgment interest. Plaintiffs are not entitled to attorney's fees under

I.C. $$ 12-120 and 41-1839 because (a) (j 12-120 is superceded by (j 41-1 839 in suits between an
insured and insurer, and (b) Plaintiffs did not provide a proof of loss as required under

5

41-

1839.
C.

CONCLUSION.
Defendants object to the Judgment entered in favor of Sarah Weinstein because it does

not fully take into consideration the offsets owed to Defendants. Defendants' oppose Plaintiffs'
motion to supplement or amend Sarah's judgment because Plaintiffs are not entitled to the
interest or attorney's fees demanded.
!3
DATED this
day of November, 2007.

a

ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP

Attorneys for Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILMG
1 HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
correct copy of the foregoing DEFEND-

69day of November, 2007, I

served a true and

RESPONSE TO P L m m y S MOTION
FOR S W P L E m W m OR W m E D m G m N T IN FAVOR OF SARAH
WEINSTEIN by delivering the same to each of the fo1IoMiling attorneys of record, by the method
indicakd below, addressed as follows:

James Risch
RZSCH GOf S INSINCER GUSTAVEL
407 W. Jefferson Street
Boise, ID 83702

[ ]
[ I
[ ]

b]

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
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Robert A. Anderson, ISB #2124
Mark D. Sebastim, ISB #60 1 2
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP
C. W. Moore Plaza
250 South Fifih Street, Suite 700
Post Office Box 7426
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426
Telephone: (208) 344-5800
Facsimile:
(208) 344-55 I0
E-Mail: randerson@ajhlaw.com
Attorneys for Defendants
n\;i THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

OF THE STATE OF IDAI-IO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
LESLIE WEICNSTEM, and LINDA
WEINSTEW, Husband and Wik, individually
and as Guardians ad litern for SARAII R.
WEINSTEPN, and SARAH R. WEXNSTEIN
individually
Plaintiffs,
VS.
PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY AND
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY and
PRUDENTIAL GENERAL INSURANCE
COMPANY and LIBERTY MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY and LM
PROPERTY AND CASUALTY NSURANCE,

Case No. CV PI 04002801)

D E F E m M S ' MOTION TO
STRIKE THlE M m A V I T OF
JAMIES E. RISCH IN OPPOSITION
TO DEmmANTS9 MOTION FOR
ANEW TRIALRE: JUROR
MSCONDUCT
[Oral argument IS requested]

Defendants.

I. MOTION.
COME NOW, Defendants in the above-entitled action by and through their counsel of
record, Anderson, Julian & Hull, LLP, and hereby moves this Court, pursuant to I.R.E. 402 and

DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE THE AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES E. RISCH IN
OPPOSITION TO D E F E N D m S 7MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL RE: SURO
MISCONDUCT - I

-

802, t'or its order striking the ,4fidavit OfJames E. Risch In Opposition To Defendants ' Motion
For A Arew fiial Re: Juror Misconduct (hereinafter, "Asfidavit"), for the reasons set forth below.
Oral arguent IS reuuested.

11. DISCUSSION.
The AfJidavit of PlaintifPs counsel contains nothing but hearsay statements in paragraphs
4-6. Without those paragraphs, the remainder of the Afldavit is irrelevant. For this reason, the

AfJ;ciavit should be struck in its entirety.

I.R.E. 802 provides that ""Clearsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules or
other rules promulgated by the Supreme Court of Idaho." "Hearsay" is defined as "a statement,
other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence
to prove the truth of the matter asserted." I.R.E. 801(c). The rules contemplate that a prior
statement by a witness, or an admission by a party-opponent, are not hearsay. I.RE. 801(d). The
rules also include certain exceptions. See I.RE. 803.
The statements in Mr. Risch's Affidavit, contained in paragraphs 4 through 6 purport to
report comments made to Mr. Risch by Mr. Barbo. These statements were not under oath, and
are presented so as to establish the truth of the matter discussed in each statement. These
statements are quintessential examples of hearsay, without exception under the rules, and should
be stricken.
Paragraphs 1 through 3 are simply asserting Mr. Risch's basis for testifying as to
paragraphs 4 through 6. Because paragraphs 4 through 6 are inadmissible, paragraphs 1 through
3 are irrelevant, and, therefore, also inadmissible. See I.RE. 401 and 402.
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DATED this

-day of November, 2007.
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP

Attorneys for Defendants
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day of November, 2007, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE TJZE A-F'FIDAVIT
OF JAMES E. IUSCH IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR A NEW
TRIAL RE: JUROR MISCONDUCT by delivering the same to each of the following
attorneys of record, by the method indicated below, addressed as follows:
James Risch
RISCH GOSS INSINGER GUSTAVEL
407 W. Jefferson Street
Boise, ID 83702

[ ]

1

[ ]

yo]

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DIST I

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
LESLIE WEINSTEIN and LINDA
WEINSTEIN, Husband and Wife,
individually and as Guardian Ad Litem for
SARAH R. WEINSTEIN, and SARAH R.
WEINSTEIN, individual I y,
Case N
-o.

~

U

P

M

~

Plaintiffs,
DECISION AND ORDER ON
DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR NEW
TRIAL RE: JUROR MISCONDUCT

VS.

PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY AND
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY
and PRUDENTIAL GENERAL
LNSURANCE COMPANY and LLBERTY
MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY and
LM PROPERTY AND CASUALTY
INSURANCE,
Defendants.

I

Before the coun for decision is Defendants' motion for new trial based on alleged juror
misconduct. Hearings were held on November 7. 19 and December 13,2007. Attorneys James
Risch, John Insinger and Jason Risch appeared on behalf of Plaintiffs, with Mr. Risch arguing.
Appearing on behalf of Defendants were attorneys Roben A. Anderson and Phillip I. Collaer,
with Mr. Collaer arguing.

BACKGROUND:
This case arose out of the handling of claims for payment for medical expenses resulting
from an automobile accident. This motion for new trial based on juror misconduct arises out of
juror Mark Barbo's allegedly dishonest answer in voir dire regarding whether Defendant Liberty
Mutual was his insurance company.

Q

~

Voir dire was conducted on September 14, 2007. The venire was asked as a group a
number of questions, including whether anyone knew any of the parties personally. A few
prospective jurors raised their hands and indicated that they were policyholders of the Defendant
insurance companies. Mr. Risch suggested that such a relationship might present a problem due
to a business relationship. The court removed those who stated that they were policyholders of
the defendants to prevent potential conflicts of interest. Mr. Barbo did not raise his hand to
indicate that he personally knew any of the parties.
When asked about work conflicts, Mr. Barbo told the court that his presence was needed
out in the wildfires, where he worked as a manager of fire weather remote stations that give early
warnings for fire fighters. He said that he had orders for three fires at the time of voir dire, but
because he was in Boise his team could not go out. At the time of voir dire, several wildfires
were burning in Idaho. Mr. Barbo reiterated to the court that his work in the fires was very
important, and that he would rather be working in the fires than in court. Ultimately, Mr. Barbo
was selected to serve on the jury.
The weekend after voir dire, Mr. Barbo asked his wife who they were insured with. She
responded that their insurance company was Liberty Mutual. The next Monday before trial, Mr.
Barbo informed the other jurors in the deliberation room that he had discovered that he was an
insured of Liberty Mutual. He asked them if any one of them felt that his service on the jury
would be inappropriate, and the other jurors indicated that so long as he was honest about his
relationship, they did not have a problem with it. Mr. Barbo testified at the evidentiary hearing
held on November 7 that he thought the appropriate channel for resolving his discovery was
through asking the jury, because they had been sworn to hear the case. It did not occur to him
that he should inform the court. Likewise, no other juror informed the court although they were
all aware of this Mr. Barbo's status as one of Liberty Mutual's insureds.
On October 1, 2007, the jury returned a majority verdict (9-3) in favor of plaintiffs and
awarded damages. Mr. Barbo was one of the jurors who voted in favor of the Plaintiffs in this
action, as shown by the Special verdict form. The court permitted counsel for the defendants to
inquire from the jurors who heard the case, after juror consent was confirmed.
During the course of the juror inquiries one of the jurors informed Phillip J. Collaer, cocounsel for the defendants, that Mr. Barbo had told the jurors that he is a policyholder of Liberty
Mutual. Subsequent review of the business records of Liberty Mutual confirmed that Mr. Barbo
is a current policyholder of an automobile liability policy issued by Liberty Mutual, and has been

such since 1998. Records also revealed that he had made a claim against his policy

iQ18@256

When confronted wlth his omtssron, Mr. Barbo filed an affidavit in whlch he adm~tted

that hts wrfe takes care of all family insurance oblrgatlons, and so at the trrne of volr d ~ r ehe did
nor know the tdenttty of his automobtle ~nsurancecompany. Mr. Barbo stated that he d ~ dhave
an acctdet~tIn 2004, and that he and h ~ swrle f~leda clatm w~thLiberty. He said that he was
satisfied ~ l t hthe outcome of the cla~m,and had no blas against L~berty. Flnally, Mr. Barbo
assured the court that he had acted as an imparttal juror and had not allowed his discovery that he
was Insured by Llberty affect hls deliberattons or hls vote.
To rebut Mr. Barbo' s testtmon y, Defendants submitted affidavits s~gnedby Liberty
Mutual employees containing notations recording all contacts wlth the Barbos regard~ngthelr
~nsurance polley since 2001.

Based on those notattons, wh~ch are abbreviated and kept

electroi~ically,Defendants argue that Mr. Barbo was, in fact, the primary contact for his famlly.
Speclhcally, Mr. Barbo was the one who called to report h ~ saccident in 2004. Addtt~onally,
L~bertyMutual employees noted repeated contacts with "Mark" or "Mr." Barbo.

LEGALSTANDARD:
The decision of whether or not to grant a new trial based on juror rnlsconduct 1s within
the sound dlscretlon of the tnal court. Levinger

11.

Mercy Med Ctr., 139 Idaho 192, 196,75 P.2d

1203, 1206 (2003). The moving party must show juror misconduct by clear and convlnc~ng
ewdence. id. The court must then determine that the movant showed that prejudice reasonably
could have occurred. Id.
A party 1s entltled to a new tnal for juror dishonesty In voir dire ]fit shows that: 1) ajuror
failed to answer honestly a material questlon on volr dire, and 2) a correct response would have
prov~ded a valid basis for a challenge for cause. McDonough Power Equipnzerzt, inc. v.
Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 556 (1984). The Supreme Court emphasized that this standard
ensures that the jurors are impartial, while

recognizing

that a perfect trial

In

whlch all jurors

understand the voir dlre quest~onscompletely and have perfect knowledge and memory of the
relevant answers 1s unattainable. id. at 555 ("To Invalidate the result of a three-week trlal
because of a juror's mistaken, though honest response to a question, is to insist on something
closer to perfection than our judicial system can be expected to give."). The rule hinges on a
juror's dishonesty, as the court recognized, "the motives for concealmg information may vary,
but only those reasons that affect a juror's ~mpartlalitycan truly be sald to affect the falrness of a
tnal." id. at 556; see also State v. Reutzel, 130 Idaho 88, 95, 936 P.2d 1330, 1338 (Ct. App.

1997) (noting that a movant must show that the juror "did not glve an honest response to a
questlon dunng voir dire [as opposed to a response that was slmply mistaken]."). ~ h e t h & @ M 7
5

a juror was dishonest is a question of fact for the trial court. Fields v. Brown, 503 F.3d 755, 766
(9th Cir. 2007).
The Idaho Supreme Court adopted the McDotzough standard in the criminal context in
Stare v. Tolmun, 121 Idaho 899, 902, 828 P.2d 1304, 1307 (1992).' In that case, the court merely

assumed that the juror had failed to answer a material question honestly without analyzing that
issue, and instead focused on whether a correct response would have provided a valid basis for a
challenge for cause. Id. at 1307, 828 P.2d at 902. The Court determined that the juror did not
have a state of mind that "leads to the inference that he will not act with entire impartiality."

lil.'

Therefore, a new trial was not granted. The Idaho Supreme Court later applied this standard in
the civil context. kvirzger v. Mercy Med Ctr,, 139 Idaho 192, 196,75 P.2d 1202, 1206 (2003).
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has dealt with the McDonough standard repeatedly.
It has repeatedly held that juror dishonesty must be knowing and deliberate, rather than a mere
oversight or mistake. U.S. v. Edmotzd, 43 F.3d 472, 474 (9th Cir. 1994) ("The district court
abused its discretion when it concluded that [the juror's] simply forgetfulness fell within the
scope of dishonesty as defined by McDanough."). See also Coughlin v. Tuilhook Ass'n, 112
F.3d 1052, 1061 (9'h cir. App. 1997); Price v. Kramrr, 200 F.3d 1237, 1254 (9th Cir. 2000)
(holding that the district court did not err when it concluded that a juror's omission of an incident
from 14 years prior was an innocent oversight); Fields at 766 (holding that the district court did
not err in finding that a juror who described his wife's abduction and rape as an "assault" was not

dishonest).
Defendants urge the court to adopt the more exacting standard of the McDonough test
that is used by the Fourth Circuit and several others. Under the proposed standard, innocent nondisclosures during voir dire are treated the same as deliberate concealments for purposes of
determining juror misconduct. Jones v. Cooper, 331 F.3d 306, 310 (4th Cir. 2002). Because
both the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and the Idaho Court of Appeals apply the same test.
which is contrary to the test advanced by Defendants, this Court declines to apply the stricter
version of the McDonough test.
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 47(h) provides various grounds on which to challenge
jurors for cause. Had Mr. Barbo disclosed that he was a policyholder of Defendants, he may
1.
In that case, a man convicted of two counts of lewd and lascivious conduct and one count of sexual abuse
moved for a retrial on the basis of a male juror who failed to disclose during voir dire that his wife had been sexually
molested as a child. Id. at 901,828 P.2d at 1306. On the second day of trial, the man told the court of his wife's
abuse, and advised the court that when the question was asked, he had not thought of his wife. Id. After revealing
thls, he went on to say that he did not "think that it would affect [his] judgment in making the declslon." ld. at fn. 1
2.
This IS a criminal procedure standard under I.C. 19-2019.
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have been challenged as being "united in business" with the defendants, (I.R.C.P. 47 (h)(3)).
The trial court must ultimately determine whether or not a juror can render a fair and tmpaflral
verdict. Quincy 1). Joitzt Scfzotjl Dist, No. 31, 102 ldaho 764, 768, 640 P.2d 304, 308 (1982).

I

Generally, a prospective juror 1s not automatlcaily subject to challenge due to any small
business relat~onsh~p
with a party. The concept of being "united in business" applies to business
associates, and precludes someone from serving "as a juror in a case where his business,
moneyed, or other interests are at stake." Wall v. C'huttin, 1'7 Idaho 664, -,

106 P. 1132, 1133

(1910). More recently, the Court held that a doctor-patient relationship does not create a clear

risk of prejudice such that a court must disqualify from the jury all current patlents of the
defendant-doctor. Morris v. Thornson, 130 ldaho 138, 140, 937 P.2d 1212, 1214 (1997). The
Court based this on the observation that a doctor-patient business relationship does not implicate
the financial interest of the potential patlent-juror. Id. Whether or not a particular juror is biased
is a tactual decision for the tnal court. Qui~zcyv. Joirzt Sclzool Dist. No. 41, 102 Idaho 763, 768,
640 P.2d 304,308 (1982).

ANALYSIS:
First the court must determine if Mr. Barbo was dishonest in voir dire. It is worth noting
that the Court did not specifically ask the venire if anyone was a policyholder of Defendants
Instead, the Court asked if anyone personally knew the parties, at which point a prospective juror
noted that he was a policyholder. Mr. Barbo did not personally know Defendants; he did not
even realize that he was a policyholder, therefore his lack of response was honest. Although
Defendants argue that Mr. Barbo should have realized that the Court rnearzt to ask if anyone was
a policyholder of Defendants, based on an inference from the answers of the other prospective
jurors, this argument side-steps the i~nportof what the Court actually asked the venire.
Defendants argue that the Court "obviously" concluded that a juror who was a
policyholder of the defendants was sufficiently blased or at nsk of bias so as to preclude their
ab~lltyto act as Far and ~mpartialjurors. Thls does not accurately represent what happened
during voir dire. At the request of Mr. Risch, the Court dismissed the jurors who indicated that
they were policyholders, but it did so out of excess of caution rather than because a challenge for
cause existed against such individuals.
Even if Defendants are correct in stating that Mr. Barbo should have understood the
Court's question to include insured-insurer relationships, they have not shown that Mr. Barbo
intentionally lied to the Court. Defendants point out that Mr. Barbo was involved in a car
accident that he personally reported in 2004, and that, according to their records, Mr. Barbo
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himself contacted Liberty Mutual regarding the automobile policy on multiple occasions.
However, Mr. Barbo stated in his affidavit that he did not know that he had an insurer-insured
relationship with Liberty Mutual. This is corroborated by Liberty Mutual's records which
indicate Janet Barbo as the primary contact for the policy. The court thoroughly questioned and
evaluated Mr. Barbo's testimony at the evidentiary hearing, and although he was mistaken as to
when he had contacted Liberty Mutual, the court did not find him to be dishonest. It is true that
in 2004, nearly three years before this trial, he made a claim against the insurance policy, but Mr.
Barbo stated that he was satisfied with the outcome and held no grudges or bias against Liberty
Mutual. Since Mr. Barbo remained with Liberty after the accident, his statement that he was not
upset with Liberty appears truthful. Mr. Barbo's failure to reveal his relationship with Liberty
Mutual was an honest mistake.
Although Defendants allege that Mr. Barbo lied to the court in voir dire, they have not
alleged a credible motive to account for such behavior.%r.

Barbo demonstrated a strong desire

not to be a juror in this case. In fact, he asked the court to excuse him for his work duties.
Despite Mr. Barbo's mistaken memory of his contacts with Liberty Mutual, the fact that he
remains an insured shows his lack of bias against the company. Further, any implied prejudice in
this situation would be against Plaintiffs, rather than against his own insurance company.
Even if Mr. Barbo's omission in voir dire was not an honest mistake, it was not in regard

to a material matter giving rise to a challenge for cause. As a mere insured of an insurance
company, Mr. Barbo cannot be considered to be "united in business" with Liberty. Generally,
the risk of an insured being on the jury is that the insured will not want an adverse verdict
because i t might cause his premiums to go up. Here, Mr. Barbo was clearly not influenced in
that direction as his vote was against Liberty. Further, no evidence of bias exists.
Defendants argue that other jurisdictions recognize that policyholders are biased in cases
where the insurance companies are defendants, and cite Lopez v. Farmers Ins. Co. qf Arizoizu.

868 P.2d 954 (Ariz. App. 1993). Defendants fail, however, to recognize that in that case,
policyholders were dismissed because evidence was presented indicating that premiums would
go up if the insurance company lost. Id. at 956. Therefore, the jurors should have been
dismissed because the policyholders had a financial interest in the outcome of the case, and were

3.
"The motives for concealing information may vary, but only those reasons that affect a juror's impartiality
can truly be said to affect the fairness of a trial." McDonough, 464 U.S. at 556.
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b~asedIn favor of the insurance company. kd.' In this case, Mr. Barbo was clear1y not b~asedin
favor of the Insurance company, as he voted for the verdrct for the Weinsteins.

CONCLUSION:
Mr. Bat-bo's omisslon was an honest mistake that related to a non-mater-~almatter. The
fact that he was an Insured of the defendant L~bertydoes not, by itself, glve rtse to a challenge
for cause. Defendant's nlotlon for new trial for juror misconduct 1s denled.

IT IS SO ORDERED
Dated this 21" day of December, 2007

*J

Darla Williamson, District Judge

I, J. David Navarro, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have mailed, by
United States Mail, one copy of the Decision and order On Defendants Motion For New Trial
Re: Juror Misconduct as notice pursuant to Rule 77(d) I.C.R. to each of the attorneys of record in
this cause in envelopes addressed as follows:
James E. Risch
R. John lnsinger
Jason Risch
407 West Jefferson Street
Boise, ID 83702-6049

Robert A. Anderson
Phillip J. Collaer
C.W. Moore Plaza
250 S. 51h Street, Suite 700
P.O. Box 7426
Boise, ID 83707-7426

Daied r h l e d a y of December, 2007

4.

The case also stated that the facts of each case must be analyzed on an individual basis in order to
recognize such a small relationship as giving rise tu bias, instead of granting a blanket disqualification against ail
jurors who are policyholders of an insurance company defendant. Id. at 957.
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IN TEE DISTRICT COURT OF TEE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF DAWO, IN AND FOR TEE COUNTY OF ADA
LESLIE WEINSTEIN and LINDA
WEINSTEIN, Husband and Wife,
individually and as Guardian Ad Litem for
SARAH R. WEINSTEIN, and SARAH R.
WEINSTEIN, individually,
Case No-.

CVP

Plaintiffs,
MEMORANDUM DECISION
REGARDING AMOUNT DUE SARAH
WEINSTEIN
PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY AND
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY
and PRUDENTIAL GEmRAL
INSURANCE COMPANY and LIBERTY
MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY and
LM PROPERTY AND CASUALTY
INSURANCE,

I

Defendants.
Wearing Date:

December 13,2007

Heas~nr!Pur~ose:

Plain t l ffs' Motion for Supplemental or Amended Judgment in
Favor of Sarah Weinstein

Appearances:

For the Plaintiffs- James Risch, Jahn Insinger and Jason Risch
(James Risch arguing)
For the Defendants-Robert
Anderson arguing)

Anderson and Phillip Collaer (Robert

Memorandum Decision Regarding Amount Due Sarah Weinstein

BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs Linda and Leslie Weinstein purchased a policy of automobile insurance
from Prudential Property and Casualty Insurance Company.

This policy included

medical payment coverage of $5000.00 and uninsured motorist coverage of $250,000.00.
On September 30, 2002, Linda Weinstein was driving a covered vehicle which
was struck by an uninsured motorist. Her daughter, Sarah Weinstein, was a passenger in
the vehicle and suffered injuries. The fact that the cause of the accident was due to the
conduct of the uninsured motorist has never been disputed. The Weinsteins ultimately
filed this lawsuit on July 7, 2004 out of the handling of their claim under the policy.
Among their causes of action was a breach of contract claim for damages to Sarah
resulting from the accident. All causes of action were tried to a jury. The jury was
presented with evidence indicating Prudential had breached the contract by failing to pay.
The jury also heard evidence of Sarah's past and future pain and suffering, potential for
future medical bills, and medical expenses incurred.

On September 1, 2007 the jury

returned a verdict of $250,000.00 on the breach of contract claim. The jurors were
instructed they were not to consider in arriving at this verdict any amounts that were
previously paid to the Weinsteins on behalf of Sarah. The court would subtract those
sums from the verdict given.
On October 19, 2007 the coust entered a Judgment in Favor Of Plaintiff Sarah
Weinstein in the sum of $165,000.00. The court anived at this amount by subtracting
from the $250,000.00 the sum of $5000.00 med pay, and an additional $80,000.00 paid
prior to trial. Plaintiffs are now requesting the court to increase the judgment by an
additional amount of $80,210.17 reflecting prejudgment interest and additional interest
accruing after October 19, 2007, as well as $3000.00 that the court incorrectly included in
the judgment that was allocated for attorney fees. Plaintiff's trial Exhibit 283 reflects a
payment by defendants of $80,000.00 on January 10, 2005, of which $60,000.00 was
allocated to defendant's evaluation of Sarah's injuries, $17,000.00 to prejudgment
interest and $3000.00 attorney fees. Accordingly, the court should have subtracted
$65,000.00 instead of $85,000.00.'
1

According to the policy, the med pay is to be deducted from the uninsured motorist payment.(Pls trial
Exhibit 3 1)
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Defendants requested In thelr response that the court decrease the ~udgmentby
$3,072.71 for medical bllls paid afer suit was filed. In reviewing the trtal exhlblts the
court finds add~tionallythat defendants pald $264.57 on September 15, 2004 (Exhlblt

2811 and $2,509.95 on September 29, 2004 (Exhlblt 282) for a total of $2,773.52
addit~onulcredit due on the judgment. The court cannot readlly ascertain the remalnlng
balance of $298.19. There are substantral tnal exhib~ts. If defense counsel can wlthln
thlrty days d~rectthe court to the exhlblt reflecting this payment, the court wlll grant an
addltlonal credit of $298.19.
Defendants are opposlng any increase in the judgment for pretnal interest and
Interest accruing after October 19,2007 for claims based on prejudgment interest.

ANALYSIS
The remaining issue is are the Weinsteins entitled to prejudgment interest on the
$250,000.00. I.C. 28-22-104 allows for prejudgment interest at the rate of twelve percent
per annum in cases where money is due on an express contract. "In insurance cases
money becomes due as provided under the express terms of the insurance contract". Jury

bz.strzactio~zNo. 13; Greenouyh v. Farm Bureau Mut. I~zs.Co., 142 Idaho 589, 130 P.3d
1127 (2006). "When a contract expresses no specific time for its performance, it is to be
perlbrmed within a reasonable time, as determined by the subject matter of the contract,
the situation of the parties, and the circumstances attending the performance". Jury

lnstructiorz No. 13; Curzon v. Wells Cargo, Inc., 86 Idaho 38, 43, 382 P.2d 906; Itvine v.
Perry, 78 Idaho 132, 143, 299 P.2d 97. Weinsteins' insurance policy with Prudential
required the Weinsteins to provide a sufficient proof of loss before payment would be
made. The jurors were instructed regarding a sufficient proof of loss.' The purpose for a
proof of loss "is to allow the insurer to form an intelligent estimate of its rights and
liabilities, to afford it an opportunity for investigation, and to prevent fraud and
imposition upon it." Britzknzccrz v. Aid Irzs. Co., 115 Idaho 346, 349-50, 766 P.2d 1227,
1230-31 (1988). "The insurer will determine its liability with the knowledge that it must
be fair and accurate or suffer the consequences". Brinkman, 115 Idaho at 350, 766 P.2d
at 1231. Prior to suit being filed, Prudential had estimated the value of Sarah's claim to
"nstruction

No. 20
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be approximately $150,000.00 and had set a reserve in that amount. This sum was never
paid to or offered to Sarah after the estimate was made. In fact the only payment received
on behalf of Sarah prior to suit was the $5000.00 med pay. No additional amounts were
paid to Sarah until after the lawsuit was filed on July 7, 2004, almost two years after the
accident.
The jury verdict awarded damages of $250,000.00. In order to award damages,
the jury would have found that a sufficient proof of loss had been presented. The Verdict
form for Sarah did not ask the jurors to determine the date a sufficient proof of loss was
made and the date after which a reasonable time had lapsed for payment to be made. The
evidence was debated by both sides at trial.
Weinsteins argue at a minimum that prejudgment interest on $250,000.00 should
be computed from May 19, 2004, thirty days after the Weinsteins' attorney Bruce
Bistline sent a letter to Prudential demanding payment of medical bilk3 In that letter Mr.
Bistline indicated total medical bills to date at $23,102.91 with $6,759.35 being paid for a
balance of $16,669.64.
In Greenough the insurance policy required payment for loss to be made sixty
days after the insurer had received a proof of loss. Greerzough, 142 Idaho at 589.
Greenough demanded payment of $50,000.00 under the policy. In Greenough, the
insurer disputed liability but the amount of $50,000.00 apparently was not in conflict, if
liability was shown. Later the insurer accepted liability and paid the full amount due
under the policy. On summary judgment, the district court found Greenough was entitled
to prejudgment interest from the date of the accident as contemplated in Brinknzutz v. Aid
112s. CO., 115 Idaho 346, 766 P.2d 1227 (1988). The court overruled Brinkmarz and held

that under Greenough's policy prejudgment interest did not begin to accrue, until sixty
days after the insured was provided with a sufficient proof of loss. The case was
remanded to the trial court to detesmine when the insured was provided with enough
infomation to allow i t a reasonable opportunity to investigate and determine its liability.

"An analysis to detesmine when a proof of loss is sufficient is a question of fact."
Greenclugh, 142 Idaho at 593. Justice Eismann in his specially concumng opinion noted
that existing case law requires that "damages must be liquidated or capable of
' Plaint~ff'sExhibit 128
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mathe~~~attcal
computation for prejudgment ~nterestto be awarded." kd. at 503.

In

C;reel-tougl.~
the damages were not disputed.

The $250,000.00 jury verdict was not capable of mathematical computatron. The
verdlct included pain and suffering. The court does not know how much of the
$250,000.00 was allocated by the fact frnder to pain and suffering and how much for
medical bills. The jurors could certainly have found based on the evldence that Sarah
Welnstern's pain and sufknng was worth $250,000.00. The evidence indicated that Sarah
will likely suffer discomfort for the rest of her life. The jurors likewise could have
determined the amount of medical bills due and included that in the judgment and
allocated the balance to pain and suffering.
The jurors, not the court, were the fact finders. Unlike Grcleaough, the damage
amount here was unliqurdated.

CONCLUSION
No prejudgment Interest I S awarded. Plarntlffs are entltled to additional judgment
of $20,000. Defendants are entitled to an additional deduct~onof $2,774.52. If wlthln

thlrty days defendants can point to the record where ~t paid an addltlonal $298.19 for
rnedlcal bills after suit was filed the court w ~ l credit
l
the judgment with that amount. The
Judgment In Favor of Plaintiff Sarah Wernsteln entered by the cour-t on October 17, 2007
1s amended nunc

pro tunc by an Increase of $17,225.48.

D$qd this 21" day of December, 2007
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I, J . Dav~ciMavano, the uncierstgned authur~ty,do hereby certify that I have
malied, by Untted States Mall, one copy of the Memorandum Decision Regarding
Amount Due Sarah Weinstein as notice purauant to Rule 77(d) I.C.R. to each of the
attorneys of record in this cause in envelopes addressed as follows:
Jarnes E. Risch
R. John Insinger
Jason Risch
407 West Jefferson Street
Bo~se,ID 83702-6049

Robert A. Anderson
Phillip J. Collaer
G.W. Moore Plaza
250 S. sthStreet, Suite 700
P.O. Box 7426
Boise, ID 83707-7426
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IN TWE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
LESLIE WEINSTEIN and LINDA
WEINSTEIN, Husband and Wife,
individually and as Guardian Ad Litem for
SARAH R. WEINSTEIN, and SARAH R.
WEINSTEIN, individually,
Case No. CV PI0400280D
Plaintiffs,
DECISION AND ORDER ON
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
CLAIMED AS TO SARAH WEINSTEIN

VS.

PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY AND
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY
and PRUDENTIAL GENERAL
INSURANCE COMPANY and LIBERTY
MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY and
LM PROPERTY AND CASUALTY
INSURANCE,

Defendants.

Before the coun for decision are Plaintiffs' claimed costs and attorney fees as to
Sarah Weinstein and Defendants' objections thereto. Hearing was held on December 13,

2007. Attorneys James Risch, John Insinger and Jason Risch appeared on behalf of
Plaintiffs, with Mr. Risch arguing. Appearing on behalf of Defendants were attorneys
Robert A. Anderson and Phillip J. Collaer, with Mr. Anderson arguing.

000268
Decision and Order on Attorney Fees and Costs Claimed as to Sarah Weinstein

1

BACKGROUND
Platntlffs L~ndaand Leslie Welnstein purchased a policy of automobile insurance
from Prudentla1 Property and Casualty Insurance Company.

This pol~cy included

medical payment coverage of $5000.00 and uninsured motortst (UM) coverage of

$250,000.00. On September 30, 2002, Linda Wernstein was driving a covered vehtcle
which was struck by an un~nsuredrnotonst.

Her daughter, Sarah We~nsrern,was a

passenger In the vehicle and suffered injuries. The Weinsteins ultimately ftled t h ~ s
lawsurt on July 7, 2004 out of the handllng of their clalrn under the policy. Wernste~ns
had I-ecerved$5000.00 rn med pay benefits from defendants prior to f~ling.Among their
causes of action was a breach of contract claim for damages to Sarah resulring from the
accident. All causes of action were tned to a jury. The jury was presented with evidence
indicating Prudential had breached the contract by failing to pay. The jury also heard

evidence of Sarah's past and future pain and suffering, potential for future medical b~lls,
and medical expenses incurred.

On September 1, 2007 the jury returned a verdict of

$250,000.00 i n favor of Sarah Weinstein. The court has reduced the judgment to One
Hundred Eighty Two Thousand Two Hundred and Twenty-Five and 48/100 Dollars
($182,225.48), after deducting amounts paid pre-trial to the plalntiffs.

Plaintiffs are now requesting attorney fees and costs on behalf of Sarah
Weinstein, to wh~chdefendants have objected.

ANALYSIS
I. Costs
A prevailing party in an actlon is ent~tledto certaln costs as a matter of right and

may also be awarded discretronary costs. I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1). A determination that a party
is the prevailing party in an actlon

IS

comm~ttedto the sound d~scretionof the court.

I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B); J.R. Siinplot Co. v. Chemetics Int'l, Irzc., 130 Idaho 255, 939 P.2d
574 (1997). In malung that determination, the court must consider, among other thlngs,
( I ) the result of the action and the rel~efsought by the respective parties and (2) the

extent to which each party prevaiied upon his or her clam. kd. Rule 54(d)(l)(C)outlines
which costs the prevailing party

I S entitled to

as a matter of right.
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Sarah Weinstein received the maximum due under the policy. Only after suit was
filed did defendants pay more than the $5000.00 in med pay benefits. The defendants
evaluated Sarah's injuries to be $60,000.00 and paid $80,000.00, including the
$60,000.00 evaluation plus prejudgment interest and attorney fees on January 10, 2005.
The jury verdict of $250,000.00 was substantially greater than defendant's evaluation of
the injuries.
The coun in its discretion finds Plaintiffs to be the prevailing party and entitled to
costs. Rule 54(d)(l)(C) provides for costs as a matter of right. An award of costs is
committed to the sound discretion of the district court. Zimrnemzuiz v. Volkswugen ofAnz.,
Inc., 128 Idaho 851, 920 P.2d 67 (1996). Attached to this decision is Exhibit "A" of

Plaintiffs' Memorandum Of Costs And Attorney Fees As To Sarah Weinstein. No
discretionary costs are requested. Defendants have objected to items 6 and 10.

In item 6, Plaintiffs are requesting costs for preparation of exhibits in the sum of
$500.00. Defendants contend that there are no receipts or other information supporting
this claim. Plaintiffs supported the claim with the affidavit of their attorney R. John
Insinger, which stated that the costs were actually incurred in the prosecution of this
action. Although it would have been helpful to the court if receipts or itemization of the
exhibit costs were provided, the court is aware that each side admitted a large volume of
exhibits at trial. There were hundreds of exhibits admitted by the plaintiffs on behalf of
Sarah and the Weinsteins' claims. In comparing the costs claimed on behalf of Leslie
and Linda Weinstein, it appears the plaintiffs have allocated one fourth of the exhibit
costs to Sarah. In reviewing the exhibits it appears that many of the exhibits are of
Sarah's medical bills. These bills helped establish the extent of Sarah's injuries and
aided the jury in determining pain and suffering. Considering the number of exhibits
admitted, the court in its discretion believes $500.00 exhibit costs are reasonable.
In item 10, Plaintiffs are requesting deposition costs. Defendants are objecting to
the depositions of Linda and Leslie Weinstein, Nancy O'Connor, Anne Gorslu, Judith
Halverson, and Stephanie Abernathy. Defendants claim these depositions all pertained to
the bad faith claim of Linda and Leslie Weinstein. By affidavit, Mr. Insinger has stated
these deposition costs were incursed on behalf of Sarah. Sarah's claim was for breach of
contract. The insurance policy required that the Weinsteins present sufficient proof of
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loss to the insurance company before payment would be made on behalf of Sarah. At
issue was whether the Defendants had breached the contract in failing to pay Sarah's
claims. Although Sarah's issues may have overlapped with her parents' claim, Sarah had
to prove that sufficient proof of loss had been presented to establish a breach of contract.
Sarah also had to prove her medical condition and the effect that the accident had on her,
both past, present and future. The court in its discretion approves the deposition costs.
The remaining items on Exhibit A are not contested and are costs allowed as a
matter of right. The court awards costs as a matter of right of $2,958.15.

11. Attorney Fees
a. Legal Basis

Sarah Weinstein is requesting attorney fees of $1 17,823.27 (offset by $3000.00
paid by defendants in January 2005), with a remaining amount of $114,823.27 as of
October 15, 2007, plus interest at "24.22 per day after October 15, 2007, until judgment
is entered." Under Rule 54(e)(l), the Court may award reasonable attorney fees to the
prevailing party "when provided for by any statute or contract."'

Defendants assert that

Idaho Code Sections 41-1839 and 12-120 provide the statutory basis.
Section 12-120 does not provide a basis for attorney fees in this case. I.C.411839(4) specifically states that Section 12-120 "does not apply to any actions between
insureds and insurers involving disputes arising under any policy of insurance." I.C. 411839(4) is the exclusive remedy for the award of statutory attorney fees in all actions

between insureds and insurers involving disputes arising under policies of insurance.
Huyden Lake Fire Pro?. Dist. v. Alcom, 141 Idaho 307,312, 109 P.3d 162 , 167 (2005)

I.C. 41-1839(1) states:
Any insurer issuing any policy . . . of insurance . . . which shall fail for a
period of thirty (30) days after proof of loss has been furnished as
provided in such policy . . . to pay to the person entitled thereto the
amount justly due under such policy . . . pay such further amount as the
court shall adjudge reasonable as attorney's fees in such action.

The purpose of this statute is to provide incentive to insurers to settle just claims and
avoid the high costs associated with litigation. Hunsen v. State F u m Mut. Auto.
I

hls.

Co.,

Aftidavit of Attorneys Fees Claimed as Costs as to Sarah Weinstein, p. 4.
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112 Idaho 663, 735 P.2d 974 (1987). An Insured may recover attorney fees under this
statute lf ~t 1s shown that the insured has provided proof of loss as reyu~redby the
Insurance pol~cyand the Insurer faled to pay an amount justly due under the pollcy
wtthrn thlr-ty days of such proof of loss. Manirz v. State firm Mut. Auto. 1rzs.C~.138
Idaho 234,247, 61 P.3d 601 (2002).
Welnsteins' Insurance policy reyulred them to

give

Prudential “written proof of

the~rloss In a form contarnlng any relevant lnfurmatron" requested by Prudential withln

30 days of Prudential" request." (Plal~~tiffs'
Ex. 20). However, 'Ynsurance poltctes
cannot require proof any greater than that which is required in u prima &cie cuse."
Brirzkrnurz v. Aid Ins. Co., 115 Idaho 346, 349,766 P.2d 1227(1988).

The amount of information provided should be proportional to the amount
reasonably available to the insured. If the information provided is
insufficient to give the insurer an opportunity to investigate and determine
its liability, the insurer may deny coverage. Otherwise, the insurer must
investigate andor determine its rights and liabilities. The documentation
is the "Proof." The explanation of physical and/or financial injury is the
"loss." "Loss" must be distinguished from liability. The insurer will
detennine its liability with the knowledge that i t must be fair and accurate
or suffer the consequences.
ld. at 350.

Defendants argue that the timing and sufficiency of a proof of loss is a question of
fact for the jury to decide. Because the jury in this case was never asked in the verdict to

determine when a sufficient proof of loss was presented, defendants argue plaintiffs are
not entitled to attorney fees. In suppor-t of their argument they cite to Gree~zoughv. Furril

Bureu~t Mut. Irzs. Co. 142 Idaho 589, 130 P.3d 1127 (2006). However, Gree~zough
focused on the timing of a proof of loss as it relates to prejudgment interest, not attorney
fees, and held merely that prejudgment interest did not begin to accrue until sixty days
after the insurer was provided with a sufficient proof of loss.
In determining whether the insured is entitled to attorney fees pursuant to I.C. 411839(1), the proper focus for the court is ~ihetherplaintiffs presented a prin~u,fuciecuse

that a sufficient proof of loss was presented. Plaintiffs' trial exhibits reflect that
defendants knew on October 1, 2002, of the September 30, 2002 accident and that the
accident was caused by an uninsured motorist. (Exs. 45,46, & 47) Exhibit 49 shows that
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Prudential incorrectly advised plaintiffs on October 1, 2002 that the policy required a
Coordination of Benefits coverage (COB) through their health carrier before the Medical
Payment provision of the policy would apply.2This practice of denial continued into
August, 2004 (Ex. 77) until Prudential recognized their mistake. The policy also carried
$250,000.00 in UM coverage. On October 14, 2002 Prudential received the police
reports. (Ex. 52). Prudential was provided with medical bills for services rendered on
October 8, 2002, and September 30, 2002. (Exs. 55 & 57). A letter from Prudential on
November 11, 2002 asked the Weinsteins to provide copies of all medical expenses and a
report relating to the incident, and to sign and return a medical authorization form. (Ex.
61). The signed authorization was provided. (Ex. 63). Mrs. Weinstein testified at trial
that she provided all that Prudential requested. On November 15, 2002 Prudential was
aware of billings from St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center. (Ex. 62). On January 2,
2003 the Weinsteins advised Prudential that they were getting threatening phone calls
from medical providers for bills not being paid. Again Prudential incorrectly advised that
they would not pay because of the COB requirement. Prudential acknowledged receiving
medical bills and is aware of treatment and ongoing problems with Sarah's injuries. (Ex.
64). On January 4, 2003 Prudential was aware of bills from McMilliam Medical Center.
(Exs. 65 & 66). On January 21, 2003, Mrs. Weinstein notified Prudential that she was
unhappy and felt Prudential was denying her claim. Prudential advised her that they were
not denying her claim and incorrectly told her again that bills must first be denied by her
health care provider. (Plaintiffs' Ex. 67). On February 12, 2003, without paying anything
on Sarah's bills, Prudential told the Weinsteins that they had not received any medical
bills for quite some time and, unless notified within 30 days, they would assume that all
medical bills have been paid. (Plaintiffs' Ex. 70) Twelve days later on February 24,
2003, Prudential noted they had received no response to their thirty day letter and placed
the file in inactive status. (Exhibit 71) On April 8, 2003, Mrs. Weinstein advised
Prudential that Sarah had an MRI showing labial tear in her hip and may need
arthroscopic surgery and would need another MRI. Exhibit 74 shows that Prudential was
aware of these services and the amount charged. On May 12, 2003 Mrs. Weinstein told
2

This was incorrect as the policy did not require a coordination of benefits. The policy required Prudential

to pay, without regard to other health insurance, the medical bills up to $5000.00 under its med pay

coverage.
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Prudentlai that Sarah was scheduled for hip surgery with 6 to 9 months of recovery. (Ex.

75). On June 17, 2003 Prudent~aldented payment to Idaho Sports Med~cineInstitute.
Trlal restimolly by defendants indicated they never contested the legit~macyof any of the
medical bi 11s presented.
Gonsldenng all the infomation prov~dedto Prudentlal, the court finds that the
piaintlffb have made a prrma f'ac~eshowlng that by the end of 2003, or by early 2003, a
suffic~entproof of loss was presented to Prudentral. Prudentla1 fa~ledto pay within thirty
days the amount justly due under the polrcy. The evidence submitted durlng thls tlrne
was sufficient to glve Prudentlal an opportunrty to ~nvestlgateand detemlne ~ t liab~llty
s
and to pay the amount the jury detennlned to be justly due.
The tnai exhlbits contlnue to show non payment by Prudentlal and threats by

collection agencies against the Weinsteins, and requests for information that had already
been presented to Prudentlal.

The evidence presented at tnal indtcates that the

Welnste~nsdid everyth~ngrequested of them by Prudent~al. The tnal evidence also
indicated that Prudentlal never questioned the val~dityof the medical bills presented.
Finally in October, 2003 the Welnstelns sought the assistance of an attorney with a
lawsuit being filed on thelr behalf on July 7, 2004. Prror to fillng the lawsu~tthe only
amount rece~vedby the Weinste~nsunder thelr policy was the $5000.00 pa~dunder the
med~alpayment benefit of the policy. '
The amount justly due is the amount ult~rnatelydetermined by the jury. Brinkmart
v. Aid Ins. C'o., supra, at 350. The jury found this amount to be $250,000.00. The

Insurance company never tendered this amount to the plaintiff within thirty days of proof
of loss. The plaintiff 1s entitled to attorney fees pursuant to I.C. 41-1839(1).

B. Amount of Attorney Fees
"The calculat~onof reasonable attorney fees is withln the discretion of the tnal
court." Bott v. Idaho State Bldg. Auth., 128 Idaho 580, 592, 917 P.2d 737, 749 (1996).
"When awarding attorney's fees, a distr~ctcourt must consider the applrcable factors set
forth In I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3)." Nirzes

I?.

Nz~ze.i,129 Idaho 847, 855, 934 P.2d 20, 28, (1997).

"Rule 54(e)(3) does not require the d~strlctcourt to make specific findlngs In the record,
only to conslder the stated factors In determining the amount of the fees.
3

When

Payment was made after Prudential realized their mistake.
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factors tn reachtng an award amount.'Y~ltttrtzv. Mitfolz, 140 Idaho 893, 902, 104 P.3d 367,
376 (2004). The ""court need not specifically address all of the Zactors contained

in

1.R.G.P. 53(e)(3) in writlng, so long as the record clearly indicates that the court
cons~deredthem all." Bvel v. Stewart Rtle Cuur.Co., 137 ldaho 9, 16, 43 P.3d 768, 775
(2002).
One of the applicable factors ~ndetemrntng an award pursuant to Rule 54(e)(3),
1s whether the fee

1s

flxed or contingent. Plaintiff 1s requesting attorney fees based on a

contingent fee agreement with her attorney. Her agreement with the law firm of Gordon
Law Ot-fllces required her to pay attorney fees of 25% of all monies recovered by Gordon
Law Offtces. After suit was filed, the amounts recovered for Sarah We~nste~n
under the
poltcy (excfud~ngmedical payment benef~ts)by Gordon Law Offlces totaled $79,800.00.
Of this sum Prudential allocated $3000.00

In

attorney fees, wlth the balance applied to

principal and ~nterest. Gordon Law Offlces was entitled to receive 25% or $19,950.00.
Subtractrng the $3000.00 leaves a balance of $16,950.00 in fees due Gordon Law
Offlces. On January 10, 2005 plaint~ffsretained the firm of Risch Goss Inslnger Gustavel
to recover the balance owed under the policy. Plaintiff became contractually obligated to
pay this firm the sum of forty percent (40)% of the amount recovered for Sarah
We~nstein. The jury returned a verdict of $250,000.00. After considering the amounts
previously paid, the court found Sarah entitled to judgment of $182,225.48. For the
purpose of attorney fees to be awarded the court determines the contingent fee should
apply to the amount of $182,235.48. Forty percent (40%) of thls amount 1s $73,890.19.
Pla~ntiffshave not prov~dedan ltemlzatlon of hourly work by her attorneys.
However, the court is painfully aware of the large volume of work by counsel and the
court on this case. Much of the work had to do with the bad faith claim and punitive
damages requested by Leslie and Linda Weinstein. However, considerable work was
also done on behalf of Sarah. Defendants have fought tooth and nail over the Issue of a
sufficient proof of loss and the award of any damages to Sarah. For Sarah to recover she
had to prove that there was a breach of contract, requiring that she prove that a sufficient
proof of loss was presented. She also had to prove past and future medical bills and paln
and suffertng.
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In the affidav~rof Mr. Insinger he states that beginning October 2004 Sarah's
attorneys undertook a substantial axnount of work in gathering medical records, assessing
amounts due, submitting several detailed proofs of loss (in addition to the numerous pnor
proofs of loss submitted directly by plaintiff), engaged in negotiations with the
defendants, commenced lit~gation,and thereafter continued in unsuccessful discussions
and efforts regarding mediation and settlement. The trial lasted approximate1y 12 days.
Approximately one day, or more, ~rlcludedopentng and closlng statements, including

arguments on sufficient proof of loss. The court: estimates the medical evtdence and
other testimony on behalf of Sarah was one full day. The jury instructions took
considerable tlme and there was debate on the issue of sufficient proof of loss.

The novelty and difficulty of the questions in dealing with insurance policies is
complex. The law firm of Risch Goss Insinger Gustavel are skilled plaintiffs' attorneys
on these questions.

This case would not be considered desirable because of its

complexrty and the large resources available to an

insurance

company to mount a

sizeable defense.
The awarding of the contingent attorney fees would make Sarah whole. Making
the insured whole is the intent of I.C. 41-1839(1). Penrose v. Comntercial Travelers 1~z.s.
Go., 75 Idaho 524, 539, 275 P.2d 969, 978 (1954); Parsons v. h f ~ t tqf'Enunzc.1~~
.
Ins. Co.
143 Idaho 743,748, 152 P.3d 614 (2007) (approvtng award of contingent attorney fees).
After considering all the factors set forth in I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3), the court awards
attorney fees of $72,890.19 for Risch Goss Insinger Gustavel and attorney fees of
$16,950.00 for Gordon Law Offices.
Plaintiff is also requesting prejudgment interest on the amount of attorney fees
awarded. The court is unaware of any authority to grant prejudgment interest and
plaintiff has not provided the court with authority.

CONCLUSION
The court finds plaintiffs to be the prevailing parties on the claim of Sarah
Weinstein. Plaintiffs are entitled to costs claimed as to Sarah in the sum of $2,958.15.
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The court tinds and concludes that there is pnma fac~eevidence that a sufficient
proof of loss was presented to Prudential. Prudential was required to pay the amount
justly due wlthln thirty days of this presentation. Prudentlal failed to do so. Dekndants
are therefore Itable for attorney fees incurred on behalf of Sarah Welnsteln. The court
finds this sum to be $89,840.19.

IT IS SO ORDERED

Dated this 21'' day of December 2007

.

-

Darla ~illiamson,District Judge

I, J. Davld Navano, the understgned authority, do hereby certlfy that I have
mailed, by linlted States Mall, one copy of the Decls~onAnd Order On Attorney Fees
And Costs Cia~medAs To Sarah We~nsteinas nome pursuant to Rule 77(d) I.C.R. to
each of the attorneys of record In thts cause In envelopes addressed as follows:
James E. Risch
R. John Insinger
Jason Risch
407 West Jefferson Street
Boise, LC) 83702-6049

Robert A. Anderson
Phillip J. Col taer
C.W. Moore Plaza
250 S. 5thStreet, Suite 700
P.O. Box 7426
Boise, ID 83707-7426

Dated t h i f 3 day of December, 2007
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDIClAL Dl
THE STATE OF IDAI-lO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY
LESLIE WEINSTEIN and LINDA
WEINSTEIN, Husband and Wife,
Individually and as Guardian Ad Litem for
SARAH R. WEINSTEIN, and SARAH R.
WEINSTEIN, individually,
Case No. CV PI 0400280D
Plaintiffs,
vs.

A m N D E D J U D G m N T IN FAVOR OF
SARAH WETNSTEIN

PRGrDENPr1ALPROPERTY AND
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY
and PRUDENTIAL GENERAL
INSURANCE COMPANY and LIBERTY
MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY and
LM PROPERTY AND CASUALTY
INSURANCE,

Defendants.

1

The above-entitled matter having been tried to a jury verdict and the Court having
entered Judgment on October 17,2007, and now having made appropriate adjustments
thereto,
Judgment is hereby entered in favor of plaintiff Sarah Weinstein against
defendants L~bertyMutual Insurance Company and Prudential Property and Casualty
Insurance Company, in the amount of One Hundred Eighty Two Thousand Two Hundred
and Twenty-Five and 481100 Dollars ($1 82,225.48) and attorney fees of $84,150.00 and
costs of $2,958.15.
IT IS SO ORDERED that the Judgment entered on October 17,2007 is amended
nunc pro tunc to reflect Judgment in this amount.

Amended Judgment In Favor Of Sarah Weinstein

Dated thls 31" day of December, 2007

I

-

Darla Williamson, District Judge

I, J. Davld Navano, the undersigned authority, do hereby cert~fythat I have
rnallcd, by United States Mall, one copy of the Amended Judgment In Favor Of Sarah
Welnsteln as notlce pursuant to Rule 77(d) I.C.R. to each of the attorneys of record In t h ~ s
cause In envelopes addressed as follows:
James E. R~sch
R. John Insinger
Jason Risch
407 West Jefferson Street
Boise, ID 83702-6049
day of December, 2007

Amended Judgment In Favor Of Sarah Weinstein

Robert A. Anderson
Phillip J. Gollaer
C.W. Moore Plaza
250 S. 5thStreet, Suite 700
P.O. Box 7426
Boise, ID 83707-7426

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIA
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

LESLIE WEINSTEIN and LINDA
WEZNSTEIN, Husband and Wife,
individually and as Guardian Ad Litem for
SARAH R. WEINSTEIN, and SARAH R.
WEINSTEIN, tndi vldual l y,

CI
Case N-o.

Plaintiffs.
DECISION AND ORDER ON COSTS
CLAIMED AS TO LESLIE AND LINDA
WEINSTEZN

VS.

PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY AND
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY
and PRUDENTIAL GENERAL
INSURANCE COMPANY and LIBERTY
MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY and
LM PROPERTY AND CASUALTY
INSURANCE,

Defendants.

1

Before the court for decision are Plaintiffs' claimed costs and attorney fees as to
Leslie and Linda Weinstein and Defendants' objections thereto. Hearing was held on
December 13,2007. Attorneys James Risch, John Insinger and Jason Risch appeared on
behalf of Leslie and Linda Weinstein, with Mr. Risch arguing. Appearing on behalf of
Defendants were attorneys Robert A. Anderson and Phillip J. Collaer, with Mr. Anderson
arguing.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs' Linda and Leslie Weinstein purchased a policy of automobile insurance
from Prudential Property and Casualty Insurance Company.

This policy included
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medical payment coverage of $5000.00 and uninsured motorist (UM) coverage of
S2SO,OOO.00. On September 30, 2002, Llnda Weinstein was dnving a covered vehlcle
whtch was struck by an uninsured motonst.
passenger In the vehicle and suffered

Her daughter, Sarah Welnsteln, was a

injuries.

The Welnsteins ultimately flled thls

lawsuit on July 7, 2004 out of the handling of then claim under the policy alleglng the
tort of bad falth. The jury returned a verdict of $210,000.00 on the bad Path claim and
awarded $6,000,000 in punitive damages.
Lesl~eand Llnda Welnsrern are now requesting costs to whlch defendants have
objected.

ANALY SlS
A prevailing party in an action is entitled to certain costs as a matter of right and
may also be awarded discretionary costs. I.R.C.P. 54(d) (1). A determination that a party
is the prevailing party in an action is committed to the sound discretion of the court.
I.R.C.P. 54(d) (I) (B); J.R. Simplot Co. v. Chemetics I~zt'l,Inc., 130 Idaho 255, 939 P.2d
574 (1997). In making that determination, the court must consider, among other things,
(1) the result of the action and the relief sought by the respective parties and (2) the
extent to which each party prevailed upon his or her claim. Id. Rule 54(d)(l)(C) outlines
which costs the prevailing party is entitled to as a matter of right,
The court in its discretion determines that Leslie and Linda Weinstein are overall
the prevailing party. They proved their bad faith claim and received compensatory
damages of $210,000.00. They also received $6,000,000 in punitive damages. Leslie and
Linda were required to file this suit in order to recover on their claim.
An award of costs is committed to the sound discretion of the district court.
Zim~nevmurzv. Volkswagen qf Am., Inc., 128 Idaho 85 1, 920 P.2d 67 (1996). Attached to

this decision is Exhibit "A" of Plaintiffs' Memorandum Of Costs (Rule 54, I.R.C.P.) As
To Leslie and Linda Weinstein. No discretionary costs are requested. Defendants have
objected to items 6, 8.b, and 10.d.

In item 6, Leslie and Linda are requesting costs for preparation of exhibits in the
sum of $1500.00. However, Rule 54(d) ( I ) (C) allows only $500.00 for exhibit costs as a
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mattes of nght, Defendants contencl that there are no recelpts or other lnformat~on
support~ngthis cldtm. Leslle and L~ndasupported the cla~mw~ththe aff~davttof thelr
attorney R . John Insinger, stat~ngthat the costs were actually Incurred In the prosecut~on
of thls actlon Although

~t would

have been helpful to the court ~f recelpts or ltemizatron

of the exhibit costs were provtded, the court 1s aware that each slde adm~tteda large
volume of exhlblts at trial. There were approx~mately1000 exhlbits admitted by the
plalntlffs on behalf of Sarah and the Wetnsteins' clatms. In comparing the costs clalrned
on behalf of Leslie and Llnda We~nsteln,t t appears the plaintiffs have allocated one
fourth of the exhlbrt costs to Sarah. The substantlal number of exhrb~rshelped establish
the bad farth clam and the award of punrt~vedamages. Considenng the large volume of
exhiblts admltted the court in ~ t discretion
s
belleves $500.00 exhlblt costs are reasonable.
Also In respect to Item 6, defendants claim that the court should not award greater
then $500.00 total for a11 pla~ntlffs. The court prevrously awarded Sarah Welnsteln
$500.00 in exhrb~tcosts.

However, Sarah 1s a different party and her clalm was

Independent of the Leslle and Linda Welnsteln's7 bad Path claim.

In item 8.b., Lesl~eand Ltnda are requesting expert witness fees of $2000.00 for
Wayne Soward. A prevailing party

IS

ent~tledto costs as a matter of rlght for reasonable

expert wltness fees for an expert who testifies at a deposttion or at a mal, but not to
exceed $2000.00. Rule 54(d) (I) (C) 8. Defendants argue that Leslie and Linda are not
entltled to the fees related to Wayne Soward because they voluntanly wlthdrew him as a
w~tnessand moved for an order in limine prohlblttng the dtscusslon of hrs testimony.
Therefore, Defendants argue that Mr. Soward's testlmony was not necessary to preparing
for trral. Pre trlal heanngs before the court lndlcated that Mr. Soward became 111 and
unable to be used as plaintiffs' expert. He was deposed by defendants because they
understood he would be a pla~ntlffexpert wltness. The Court agrees that Leslle and Ltnda
should not be allowed $2000 in expert wltness fees for an expert who dld not appear at
trlal and further for the reason the Welnstein's requested an order in linziize prohlbltlng
any reference to hts deposition testlmony. However, as Rule 54(d) ( I ) (C) (10) expla~ns,
a depostt~onthat 1s not entered into evidence 1s allowable as a cost ~f ~t was reasonably
taken for preparation in tnal. Therefore, Leslie and Linda are entttled to the cost of
report~ng and transcribing Mr. Soward's depos~tlon, the cost of one copy of hls
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depositions, but not to the expert w~tnessfees.

Defendants have not objected to the

deposttion fee.

In item 10.d. Leslie and Llnda are requesting $332.00 for a copy of the
deposition of Mike L~ndstrom.Defendants argue that the Weinste~n'sare not enti tled to
the deposition copy charge related to Mlke Llndstrom because h s l i e and Linda
voluntartly withdrew h ~ mas a witness and moved for an order in l i m i ~ epreventing
reference to his testimony. As mentioned above, the mere fact that a deposttion is not
entered Into evtdence does not establish that ~ t staktng was unreasonable. Therefore,
Leslie and Linda are entitled to the deposition copy charges for Mike Lindstrom.
The rema~ningitems on Exhibit A are nor contested and are costs allowed as a matter of
nght. The court awards costs as a matter of right of $13,098.81.

IT IS SO ORDERED

Dated this

2 ? day of January 2008

Darla Williamson, District Judge

I, J. David Navarro, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have
mailed, by United States Mail, one copy of the Decision and Costs Claimed as to Leslie
and Linda Weinstein pursuant to Rule 77(d) I.C.R. to each of the attorneys of record in
this cause in envelopes addressed as follows:
James E. Risch
R. John Inslnger
Jason Risch
407 West Jefferson Street
Boise, iD 83702-6049

Robert A. Anderson
Phillip J. Collaer
C.W. Moore Plaza
250 S. 5" Street, Suite 700
P.O. Box 7426
Boise, ID 83707-7426

Dated r h i a day of January 2008
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EXHIBIT "A'"
(Leslie and Linda Weinstein)
COSTS AS A MATTER OF RIGHT:

I.

Filing Fee

2.

Service of Complaint and Summons on Defendants

3.

Witness Fees (except as stated below)

4.

Travel Expenses at -30 per mile one-way or actual travel
expenses not to exceed .30 per mile one-way
a.
b.

Expenses for certified copies admitted

6.

Costs for preparation of exhibits

7.

Costs of Bond premium

8.

Expert Witness Fees:

9.

0.00

$

0.00

$
$
$

2,000.00
2,000.00
2,000.00

$
$

122.50
297.50

$

1,218.18

$
$
$
$
$
$

268.83
141.50
168.00
229.60
150.50
2,241.10

James Wadhams
Norma Nielsen

5.

a.
b.
C.
d.
e.

$

James Wadhams
Wayne Soward
Norma Nielsen
Buddy Paul
David Childers

Charges for reporting and transcribing depositions:
a.
b.
C.

d.
e.
f.
g.

KempzcenskilBensingeriMcLaughlin/quim
Kent Dav,
Buddy Paul
Gary Olmsted
David Childers
Ken Hooper
Julie Kippenhan and Michael McDonough

EXHIBIT "A" (LESLIE AND LINDA WEINSTEIN) - Page I

10.

Charges for one copy of any deposition:
a.
b.
c.
d,
e.
f.
g.

Bruce Bistline
WapeSoward
Wayne Sowad Vol. I1
Mike Lindstrom
James Wadhms
Norma Nielsen
James Wadhams

TOTAL COSTS AS A MATTER OF RIGHT:

EXHIBIT '*A(LESLIE AND LINDA WEINSTEIN) - Page 2

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TEE FOURTH JUDICIAL DlSTRI

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND ITORTHE COUNTY OF ADA
LESLE WEINSTEIN and LINDA
WEENSTEIN, Husband and Wife,
lndivldually and as Guardian Ad Litem for
SARAW R. WEINSTEIN, and SARAW R.
WEINSTEIN. indlvidually,

---

a=

f4
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Case No.

Plaintiffs,
DECISION AND ORDER ON
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
REMImITUR OR, IN TEE
ALTERNATIVE, NEW TRIAL

VS.

PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY AND
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY
and DEENDANTS GENERAL
INSURANCE COMPANY and LIBERTY
MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY and
LM PROPERTY AND CASUALTY
INSURANCE,

Dekndants.

I

Hearing on Defendants' Motion For Remittitur Or, In The Alternative, New Trial was
held on December 13, 2007. Attorneys James Risch, John Insinger, and Jason Risch appeared on
behalf of Plaintiffs, wluh Mr. Risch arguing. Appearing on behalf of Defendants were attorneys
Robert A. Anderson and Phillip J. Collaer, with Mr. Anderson arguing.

Before the Court is the above-named Defendant Insurance Companies' motion for
Remittitur or, in the alternative, New Trial, based on several grounds.

Linda and Leslie

Weinstein (the "Weinsteins") sued Defendant insurance companies ("Defendants") for breach of
contract and bad faith based on Defendants' handling of their claim. All causes of action were
trled to a jury. On October 1, 2007, the jury found bad faith in the handling of the uni

\
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motorists ("UM") claim, but not in the med pay claim. The jury awarded $210,000 damages to
Linda and Leslie Weinstein for bad faith, and $6,000,000 in punitive damages. The jury also
determined that the total amount of damages sustained by Sarah Weinstein was $250,000.

On September 30, 2002, Linda Weinstein was driving a covered vehicle which was
struck by an uninsured motorist. Her daughter, Sarah Weinstein ("Sarah"), was a passenger in
the vehicle and suffered injuries. At the time of the accident, the Weinsteins carried automobile
insurance with Defendants. This policy included medical payment coverage of $5000.00 and

UM coverage of $250,000.00.
The Weinsteins timely reported the accident. Defendants immediately concluded, based
on the police report and other information, that an uninsured dnver was 100% at fault.
Defendants contacted the Weinsteins and explained that since an uninsured driver caused the
accident, Med Pay and UM coverage would apply to the claim. The UM portion of the Policy
states: "Our payment is based on the amount that an insured is legally entitled to recover for
bodily injury but could not collect from the owner or operator of the uninsured motor vehicle."
On November 11, 2002, the Defendants asked the Weinsteins to send them copies of all
medical bills and a signed medical release form. Mrs. Weinstein signed the release on December
5 , 2002 with a list of medical providers. Defendants incorrectly informed the Weinsteins that a
coordination of benefits ("COB") clause required them to submit bills first to their health
insurance before Defendants would pay anything. Defendants continued to notify the Weinsteins
and Sarah's medical providers that a COB clause prevented them from paying anything on the
medical bills until this mistake was caught and corrected in April of 2003. No investigation or
gathering of medical records was done on the claim during this time.
Medical providers sent bills resulting from the accident to the Weinsteins. When neither
the Weinsteins health insurance provider, nor Defendants would pay the bills, the
Decision And Order On Defendant's Motion For Remittitur Or, In The Alternative, New Trial
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providers sent the overdue notices to the Weinstelns. The Wetnstelns could do llttle about the
b~lls,srnce Rilr. We~nstetn'sbussness was not doing well. Mr. Welnstein owned his own bustness
proc~dlngscrvlces to the a ~ r l ~ nIndustry,
c
wh~chbas struggling In the wake of the

terrorist

attacks of September 11, 2001. The family was struggling financially.
On January 2, 2003, Mrs. Welnstesn told Deferrdants that she was recelvlng thi-eaten~ng

phone calls from the ambuiance company and hospital regarding unpald bills. She also told them
that she and her daughter were st111 receiving medical treatment for their lnjunes. Despite thls
continued contact from Mrs. Welnstein, on February 12, 2003, Defendants sent a letter to the
We~nstelnsstatlng that ~f they d ~ dnot receive new medlcal bllls withln 30 days, the file would
close. Twelve days later the file was inact~vated"since there has been no response to [the] 30
day letter."
In the meantime, Sarah's doctor recommended physical therapy. She began her physlcal
therapy program with the goal of prepanng her to play soccer-her

favorite sport-in

December

2002. Her program advanced as anticipated, and in February, 2003 her physical therapist
released her to resume physical act~vitiesas tolerated. When she began training for and playlng
soccer, her hip pain returned. She was only able to play ten minutes per half, and ultimately had

to stop playlng entirely. Her mother sought further medical treatment for her.
In Aprrl 2003 Mrs. Welnsteln notifled Defendants that Sarah had an MRI showlng a h ~ p
injury that might require surgery. After a second MRI, medical doctors deterinined that Sarah
had suffered a labial tear in her hip, resulting from the accident, which required arthroscopic
surgery.

Mrs. Weinstein called Defendants to advise them that Sarah was scheduled for

arthroscopic surgery on May 19, 2003 and that her recovery time would be approximately six to
nine months. By this time, Defendants determined their mistake regarding the COB and pald a
handful of bills that had been incurred right after the accident.

Decision And Order On Defendant's Motion For Remittitur Or. In The Alternative, New Trial

Sarah's surgery was perfomed as scheduled, and she began another round of physlcal
therapy. Her progress was slow and required numerous visits to medical providers to assess her
recovery. Sarah's frtends and family observed that she appeared depressed and withdrawn after
#'

her surgery. Sarah was unable to retum to play soccer for more than ten minutes per half, had to
restnct her runnlng, and suffered constant discomfort and pain. She st111 suffers pain when she
runs and engages In sports, and can only pafitcipate In high-impact phystcal actlvlties for lim~ted
periods of

time.

Medrcal doctors testif~edat trlal that, due to the accident, she will probably

reyurre h ~ surgery
p
sometrme tn the future, and will most likely develop arthnt~sIn her hlp.
From May 2003 on, Mrs. Wernstein continued to recelve regular phone calls and letters
from medical bt lllng departments and collection agencles regarding overdue medical bl 1 Is.

These events caused her to feel depressed and cry. The grief, stress, and constant embarrassment
resulted in manta1 discord and family turmotl. On one occasion, as Mrs. Welnstein was leaving
a doctor's office following Sarah's vislt, a staff member informed her that if she dld not pay her

outstanding bill In full immediately, Sarah would no longer receive treatment. This was stated at
a loud volume in front of other staff and patients, and Mrs. Weinste~nwas very upset to have her
tlnancial afpalrs publtc~zed. Although Mrs, Welnstein notlfied Defendants of thls ~ncident,they
d ~ nothlng.
d
Thls Court observed Mrs. Welnsteln's demeanor at tnal and the court belleves she
was deeply d~sturbedby the harassment of bill collectors and Defendant's

unresponsiveness

to

her pleas for assistance.
In July 2003, Mrs. Weinsteln again called Defendants to complaln about Sarah's
outstandlng medical bllls.' This resulted in the payment of a number of overdue bills under the
Med Pay coverage. In September, 2003, Mrs. Welnstern demanded that UM coverage pay
Sarah's outstandlng med~calbills, many of which were in collection. Mrs. Welnsteln told

1.
All b11ls cons~deredafter the exhaustion of med pay were responded to wth a form that explained the
denial by stating "Pitlicy benefits have been exhausted." (Plf's Exs. 83, 84, 111, 113, 119, 121).
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Defendants that she was afrald the doctors would stop treating Sarah due to unpald medlcal bills.
Uefefer~dantsinformed Mrs. Weinstctn that the Med Pay benefits were exhausted, and that UM
coverage does not pay untll final settlement, whlch occurs after the end of treatment. Dekndants
then faxed Mrs. Welnstern a MIPAA compliant medlcal authorlzatlon to allow thzm to get the
med pay file and information from the medical providers."rs.

Welnstein signed and faxed the

medlcal authonzation form to Defendants that day. The list of medical providers was faxed on
September 23,2003.
Frustrated by Defendants' slow progress on Sarah's claim, the Welnsteins hired attorney
Bruce Btstline to deal with ~ e f e n d a n t s . ~
On October 10, 2003, Mr. Bistline sent a letter to
Defendants notifying them that he had been retalned by the Weinsteins to represent Sxah's
interest regarding the 2002 accrdent. A few days later, Defendants sent a letter to Mr. Blstllne
requesting "complete medlcal and wage loss documentation'' In order to evaluate Sarah's claim.
On October 28, 2003, Mr. Bistline wrote to Defendants and asked whether Defendants intended
to dlspute the llabillty of the un~nsuredmotorist, and if so, who Defendants contended was
negligent. Defendants did not respond to this letter. Mr. Bistline also demanded payment of
several medical bills amounting to nearly $2,000, which Defendants did not pay.
On November 3, 2003 Mr. Bistline called Defendants and demanded payment of the
medlcal bills. Defendants told Bistline that a current medical authonzation form was needed to
get the b~lls,and that Defendants did not know what was wrong w~thSarah. Mr. Bistline stated
that he wo~ildgather the current bills if Defendants would get the med pay file and share ~t w~th
him. Defendants sent a letter the same day requesting copies of all medical expenses and reports,
a s~gnedmedlcal authorlzat~onform, and a llst of medical providers. Mr. Bistllne recelved

2

HIPAA came into effect on Apr~l14,2003
3
On September 30.2003, the Welnste~nssold a prece of property for $175,000. Then, in 2003, they
rece~vedan inheritance The rpec~ficdate and amount of t h ~ slnherltrnce has not been polnted out to the c o g
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noth~ngfrom Defendants until March 9, 3004, when he received a two page summary of the med

log, and nothing else.
On November 5 , 2003, Defendants' employees discussed the demand for med~calblll
payment under UM coverage, and confened with an in-house auorney. The attorney advised
Defendants that he was unaware of any law

In

Idaho requiring payment of medical b~llsbefore

sctrlement. Dekndants concluded that the policy required only one payment.

On March 3, 3004 a lten was placed on the We~nstelns'propfly for failing to pay bills
fron-1 the accident. On Apr~l30, 2004, Btstl~nesent another letter to Defendants requesting
payment of $16,669.64 In outstanding medical bills. He also stated that he would gather up-todate medical records arid a prognosis from a physician to provide a proof of loss as to future
medical expenses. On May 20, 2004, Bistline sent the medical records to Defendants. The next
month, Defendants flnally began evaluating the clam.

Defendants noted that Sarah had

treatment through February 20, 2003 and resumed soccer without problems, but had residual hip
pain, and then suggested that she resumed soccer too soon and caused additional problems.
Defendants observed that Sarah told the doctor in March, 2003 that she had a clicklng sensation
in her hip for two to three weeks and significant pain while running and kicking the ball.

On June 10, 2004 Defendants decided that they would offer a payment in advance of
$10,000 due to the Weinsteins' hardship. Defendants noted their desire to further review the
medical file records because Sarah's physical activities might have aggravated the injury. On
June 11, 2004, Defendants sent a letter with the payment in advance agreement ("PIA
Agreement"). On July 7, 2004, Bistline sent a letter to Defendants rejecting the PIA Agreement,
and indicating that the Weinsteins had filed suit for breach of contract and bad faith handling of
their claim under the policy.
At trial Defendants argued that in UM cases, their policy was to wait until after receiving

all information at the end of treatment and recovery, and then evaluate the claim and make off r

069292

Decision And Order On Defendant's Motion For Remittitur Or, In The Alternative, New Trial

6

1

of treatment to gather records and evaluate was In accordance with corporate pollcles.
Addltlonally, Defendants' log notes reflect &hatwhen supervrsors revtewed the We~nsre~n
file,
they reporled that the file was "properly directed." Defendants had no mechan~smfor e~ther
pay~ng und~sputed amounts In UM cases before the end, or for earlier investlgat~on and
evaluation in cases of prolonged lnjury and recovery.
The Wernsteins' experts testified that insurers had a duty to investigate and evaluate
clalms w ~ t h ~a nreasonable time and that, I n therr oplnion, Defendants had breached those duties.
The Weinste~nsalso presented Defendants' claims handllng manuals whlch lndlcated that
investigat~on of claims should begin when the insurer recelves notlce of a claim.

The

Welnstetns' experts also test~fiedthat In UM cases, as In other first party Insurance cla~ms,
Insurers have a duty to pay undisputed amounts In a reasonable tlrne. They op~nedthat the
treatment of the Welnste~nsby Defendants was lntentlonal and unreasonable, and contrary to
Industry practice In Idaho.
At tnal the Weinstelns presented Dr. Norma Nielson, a professor of Insurance. She

testified about the bas~cpurpose of the insurance ~ndustry,and how it works. She discussed
Idaho's regulation of the insurance Industry, and described the department as small and underresourced. She testfled that when state departments regulattng the Insurance Industry are underresourced they are not very effective In regulat~ngthe conduct of the ~ndustry. She oplned that
state regulatory act~onmay not be as effect~veIn controlling Industry behavtor as pun~tlve
damage awards. Add~tlonally,she test~f~ed
as to the finance of L~bertyMutual.

I. REMITTITUR
Defendants request a 1-emitt~tur
of the damages awarded by the jury. First, they argue that
there 1s insufficient evidence for the award. Second they argue that the statutory cap on punltlve
damages should be implemented. Finally, they argue that the punitive damage award violates
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Defendant's due process rights.
Should the Court cond~t~onally
deny a new trlal subject to a remittitur, "the party to
whom ~t 1s drrected shall have 42 days from entry of the order in whlch to accept or reject the
same. If such party files a notlce of appeal, the appeal shall not constitute an acceptance nor
rejection of

. .

. the remittltur and such party shall not be requlred to accept or reject the . . .

remittitur untll the determination of the appeal." I.R.C.P. 59.1.
A. INSUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

A motlon for remittltur based on insufficiency of the evidence must be considered under

Rule 59(a)(5). Prutton v. Gage, 122 Idaho 848, 851, 840 P.2d 392, 295 (1992). Because
Defendants base part of thelr motion for new trial on thls rule as well, both remittltus and new
tnal will be discussed i n sectton I1.D.

B. THESTATUTORY CAPON PUNITIVEDAMAGES
DOESNOTAPPLY
Defendants argue that the punltlve damage award should be limited to $250,000

In

accordance wlth the statutory cap found at Idaho Code, 6-1604. That amendment took effect on
July 1, 2003, In the mlddle of the Weinstelns' claim process. Defendants argue that the cause of
action for bad falth regarding the UM clalms did not accrue until after the amendment took
place, and thus the punitlve damages should be reduced to $250,000. The Weinstelns argue that
the evidence establishes that the bad faith handling of the claim began before July 1,2003.
Idaho Code chapter 6, section 1604 was amended, effective July 1,2003, to ltmlt punltlve
damages awards to the lesser of either three times the compensatory award, or $250,000. The
leg~slaturenoted: "th~sact shall be In full force and effect on and after July 1, 2003. Sectlons 1
through 3 of this act shall apply to all causes of action which accrue thereafter." Idaho Sess.
Laws Ch. 122, sec. 6, p. 372; see also Myers v. Workmen's Auto Ins. Co., 140 Idaho 495, 501,95
P.3d 977, 983 (2004) ('in. 1 ) .
The time that a cause of actlon accrued nlay be a questlon of law or of fact, de e d
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upon whether any dtsputed tssues of matenal fact extst. Kimbrollgh v. Reed, 130 Idaho 512, 516,

943 P.3-d 1232, 1236 (1997). Where there I S no dlspute over any lssue of matenal fact regarding
when the cause of actlon accrues, the questlon is one of law for deteminatlon by the court. Id.
However, where there IS confl~ctlngevldence as to when the cause of actlon accrued, the lssue 1s
one of tact tor the ti-ler of fact. M.;Nrrco Mirz~rat.~
C'o. I*. Mc~rrisonfiudsetz Gorp., 140 Idaho

144, 150,90 P.3d 894, 900 (2004). Under Idaho law, a cause of actlon generally accrues when a
party may malntain a lawsuit against another. Galbruith v. Vatzgus, Inc., 103 Idaho 912,915, 655
P.2d 119, 122 (Gt. App.1982). See Corbriltge v. Clark Equip. Co., 112 Idaho 85, 88, 730 P.2d
1005, 1008 (1986) (Cause of actton does not accrue until aggrieved party suffers damages);
Western Corp. v. Vunek, 144 Idaho 150, 158 P.3d 313 (Ct. App. 2006).

Punltlve damages do not constitute a cause of action, standing alone. Rather, punlttve
damages depend f~rston a successful underlying cause of actlon. See I&ho First Nut'l Bank v.
Bliss Valley Food Inc., 121 Idaho 266, 287, 824 P.2d 841, 862 (1991); YucFzt Clctb Sales &
Service, Irzc. v. First Nut'l Barzk of N. Idaho, 101 Idaho 852, 864,623 P.2d 464 476 (1980).

When consldenng a continuing tort, one involving wrongful conduct that is repeated untll
desisted, accrual is treated differently. Glaze v. Deffenbuugh, 2007 W L 4166234 (Idaho 2007);

Curtis v. Firth, 123 Idaho 598, 616, 850 P.2d 759, 767 (1993); In such cases, plaintiffs "can

reach back to its beginning even if that beginning lies outside the statutory limitations penod,
when ~t would be unreasonable to require or even permit him to sue separately over every
lncldent of the defendant's unlawful conduct." McCabe v. Cravelz, 2007 W L 1229095 (Idaho Ct.
App. 2007) (cltlng Hectrd v. Sheahan, 253 F.3d 316, 319 (7th Cir. 2001)). In a contlnulng tort
case, ~t is the cumulative effect of a continuous chain of tortious activity that causes injury.
Curtis, 123 Idaho at 616, 850 P.2d at 767. The wrongful acts must be so numerous and

continuous that it is impractical to allocate damages across them. Heard, 253 F.3d at 318-19.
"Since usually no single incident in a continuous chain of tortious activity can
Decision And Order On Defendant's Motion For Remittitur Or, In The Alternative, New Trial
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realistically he identtf~ed as the cause of slgnif~canr harm,' 1t seems proper to regard the
cuinulatjve ettect of the conduct as actionable." Curtzs, 123 Idaho at 603, 850 P.2d at 754
(quoting Page, 729 F.2d 818, 821-22 (D.G. Clr. 1984)).
Defendants urge the court to base its decision on the facts set forth In the Complarnt. The
Complaint specified examples of bad faith that occurred after July 1, 2003. Because ~tdoes not
speclfy acts before that date, Defendants argue that the bad faith claim on the UM settlement 1s
I~rnitedby the statutory amendment. However, Idaho law has long abandoned technical rules of
pleadtng, and does not require a plaintiff to set forth every potentla1 fact in the complalnt. Clark
v. Olsen, 110 Idaho 323, 325, 715 P.2d 993, 995 (1986). I.R.C.P. 8(a)(1) provides: "a pleading

whlch sets forth a claim for relief . . . shall contam . . . a short and plain statement of the claim
showlng that the pleader is entitled to relief." Therefore, the Welnsterns are not llmited to the
evldentlary examples In the Complaint but may cite any evldence on the record to support their
argument that the statutory cap does not apply.
Next, Defendants argue that the Court's comments at an Apnl 25, 2007 hearing on a
motlon to amend the complaint requlre the Court to apply the statutory cap. The Court noted
that, by allowing the Weinsteins to amend their complalnt to add a Med Pay clalm, the cause of
actlon clearly contemplated punltlve damages before the statutory cap was effective. Thts
comment was not meant to restrict the Weinsteins from presenting evidence at tnal to alter that
oplnlon. After heanng the evidence in its entirety, the Court determined that the pre-amendment
statute applied to the UM portion of the claim as well.
The Court deems the bad faith treatment of the Weinsteins' UM claim to be a continuous
tort that began when Mrs. Weinstein reported the accident and provided Defendants wlth medical
authorizations. It is neither fair nor realistic to pinpoint the exact moment when the bad fa~th

delay claim arose. However, there are many reasons for applylng the pre-July 2003 statute.
Defendants determined that the uninsured motorist was 100 percent at fault almost immediately
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after the accident. At that polnt, Defendants began to deliberately delay settlement of the UM
clarrn, ptlrsuant to the existing policy to pay nothing on UM claims unt11 the end-regardless

of

how long the Welnsterns would have to wait. The UM adjusters did nothlng with the medlcal
releases, and nunlerous bills were denied before July 1, 2003. Mrs. Weinsreln received calls
froin bill collectors In January, 2003. The LlM claim received n o attent~on,desplte Mrs.
Welnstetn's complaints, and the Med Pay portron was inactivated.
Further, Defendants were on notzce In 2002 that bad faith handling of the claim could
result In punltive damages for which there was no cap In Idaho.
Defendants argue that because med pay was not exhausted until July 2003, no bad faith
on the UM claim could have occurred. Both the UM and med pay claims were actlve when
Defendants determined that an uninsured motonst was 100 percent liable for the accident. Thus,
the UM clalms process should have begun, and there is no reason why Defendants should have
waited until the Med Pay limits were spent, particularly when the seriousness of Sarah's injury
was apparent.

C. DUEPROCESS
Defendants raise three arguments alleging that the punitive damages award violates due
process. They first argue that evidence and argument was impermissibly admitted relating to
out-of-state actions and lnjunes to non-parties, and that the jury improperly considered that
evldence when reaching the punltlve damages award.

Second, they argue that admitting

evidence of Defendants' net worth was improper and violated their due process r~ghts. Lastly,
they argue that the damages are excessive In llght of the three guideposts ldentlfied by the United
States Supreme Court.

1. Evidence of out-of-state conduct andfor injury to non-parties
Defendants first argue that Mr. Risch ' s references to the "insurance industry" were not
limited to Idaho and that Dr. Nielson's testimony about the insurance industry, considered
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together, demonstrate that the jury improperly considered evidence of out-of-state conduct and
harm to non-parties when reaching the punitive damages award.

Plaintiffs argue that no

evidence of out-of-state conduct or harm to non-parties was presented to the jury for
conslderatlon, and thus Defendants' due process rights were not violated.
States have a legitimate interest in imposing punitive damages for deterrence and
retnbutlon of wrongful conduct. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S.
408, 416 (2003) ("Campbell"). A state has no power to punish a defendant for conduct that was
lawful where it occurred and had no impact on the state. BMW of North Arnericu v. Gore, 51 7
U.S. 559, 572-73 (1996) ("Gore"). Generally, a state has no "legitimate concern In imposing

punitive damages to punish a defendant for unlawful acts committed outside of the state's
jurisdiction." Canlpbell, 538 U.S. at 421.
'The Due Process Clause forbids a state to use a punitive damages award to punish a
defendant for injury that i t inflicts upon nonparties." Philip Morris USA v. Williams. 127 S. Ct.
1057, 1063 (2007). In Philip Morris, a widow sued Philip Morris, the manufacturer of Marlboro
cigarettes, for negligence and deceit, because her husband died from smoking cigarettes. Id. at
1060. Dunng the course of the trial, plaintiff's counsel told the jury to "think about how many
other [smokers like decedent] in the last 40 years in the state of Oregon there have been . . . .
[Cligarettes . . . are going to kill ten [of every hundred]." Id. at 1061. Defendant Philip Moms
then requested a jury instruction stating "you are not to punish the defendant for the impact of its
alleged misconduct on other persons." Id. The trial court refused this instruction. Id. The jury
then awarded $821,000 in compensatory damages and $79.5 million in punitive damages. Id. at
1061. On appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, Philip Moms argued that it was unconstitutional for
the trial court to allow evidence of harm to non-parties without providing an instruction to the
jury prohibiting them from punishing a defendant for harm to non-parties. Id. at 1062. The
Court agreed with Philip Morris. Id. at 1064. The Court further stated that when evide@@fJ298
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harm to non-parties has been admitted or suggested, tnal courts must issue jury instructions that
explatn what evidence can be cons~deredIn determining a punit~vedamage award. Id. at 1065.
In this case, Mr. Risch argued In his opening statements and closing arguments that the
insurance tndustry In Idaho would be listening to the results of the case. On a few occasions, he
drd not say '3n Idaho" immediately after h ~ reference
s
to the Insurance ~ndustry.However, glven

that such omlsslons were made

In

the context of d~scusstngthe insurance industry In Idaho,

anyone listening to the ent~reryof his argument would understand that his references were
limited to Idaho. Further, the jury was instructed that the punitive damages award could not be
used to punish Defendants for out-of-state conduct, or for h a m to non-parties.
Dr. Nielson qualified as an expert witness in this case. To the extent her knowledge
could asslst the tner of fact In deciding a fact in issue or understanding the evidence, her
testimony was admissible. IRE 702; Stczte v. M e w i t z , 131 Idaho 642, 646, 962 P.2d 1026, 1030
(1998). The operations of the insurance industry are beyond the experience of the average juror.
I

Dr. N~elson'stestimony about the Insurance Industry and its regulation was properly admissible
because i t helped the jury understand the evidence. Her explanation of how and why Insurance
companies operate helped the jury understand what happened in this case, and whether or not the
Defendants' actions were reasonable. Dr. Nielson clearly testified that she had no knowledge of
the Welnstelns' clam or how it was handled, and that her testimony related to how insurance
works and why ~t exists. None of her testimony was offered as evidence of out-of-state conduct
or ham to non-parties, and thus no reason exists to overturn the punitive damages award for
violating Defendants' due process rights on these grounds.

2. Evidence of Defendants' Wealth
Defendants argue that permitting the jury to consider evidence of Defendants' wealth
violated their due process nghts. Plaintiffs argue that juries are not prohibited from considering
evidence of a defendant's wealth, but rather from basing awards on a defendant's wealth
Decision And Order On Defendant's Motion For Remittitur Or, In The Alternative, New Trial
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In Cilfitpbell, Mr. Campbell caused an auton~obilcaccident resulting in the death and
serjous ~njuryuf others. 538 U.S. at 413. Mr. Campbell was deemed liable. Id.

Desplte a

I

settlement offer w~thlnCampell's policy Itrnlts, h ~ sinsurance company, State Farm, refused to

i

settle and ~nsteadchose to ltttgate hls I~ability. M. Thls resulted In a jury verdict against

I
Fg
E

Campbell tdr rn excess of hls polley llmlts and the proffered settlement. Id. After sufferrng
financial and emotional distress resulting from the enormous ~udgmentagalnst him, Campbell

sued State Farm. Id, at 414-15. At tnal wttnesses testtfied regarding State Farm's nationwide
practices, many of which were unrelated to Campbell's claim. Id. The jury awarded Campbell

$2.6 million

in

compensatory damages and $145 million In punitive damages. 538 U.S. at 415.

The tnal court: reduced these awards, but the Utah Supreme Court retnstated the award, statlng
that Stare Farm's enormous wealth just~fiedthe damages. 538 U.S. at 426. On appeal to the
U.S. Supreme Court, the case was reversed and remanded because the damage awards were
excessive and because the tnal court had admitted evidence of d~ssrm~lar
and potentially legal
out-of-state conduct. 538 U.S. at 429. The Court stated: "the wealth of a defendant cannot
justify an otherwise unconstitutional punitive damages award." 538 U.S. at 427. Following that
statement are two quotes from Gore: the first recognizing that wealthy corporattons possess due
process nghts the same as individuals; and the second from Justlce Breyer's concurrence in Gore
statlng that "[wealth] provldes an open-ended basis for tnflattng awards when the defendant
wealthy . . . . That does not make its use unlawful or Inappropriate;

it

IS

simply means that thls

factor cannot make up for the failure of other factors." Id. at 428.
Contrary to Defendants argument in this case, Campbell does not stand for the
proposition that a defendant's wealth cannot be considered by the jury in determining punitive
damages. The relevant holding of Campbell is that an unconstitutional punitive damages award
cannot be justified solely by the defendants' wealth. 538 U.S. at 427. Defendants' wealth was
relevant to determining the size of the award necessary to deter Defendants, and others similarly
Decision And Order On Defendant's Motion For Remittitur Or, In The Alternative, New Trial

situated, from engaging in similar conduct in the future. See Myers v. Workmen's Auto Ins. Co.,
140 ldaho 495, 507, 95 P.3d 977,988 (2004) (holding that, when determining whether a punitive
damages award is excessive, the court should consider "the prospective deterrent effect of such
an award upon persons situated similarly to the defendant.").

3. Ratio of Compensatory Damages to Punitive Damages
Defendants argue that the punitive damages award is excessive because the award is 28.5
times the compensatory award, and 600 times the maximum statutory penalty. Plaintiffs argue
that award is not excessive, and cite Myers v. Workmen's Auto Ins. Co., 140 Idaho 495, (2004).
The compensatory damages awarded to the Weinsteins were $210,000 and the punitive damages
award was $6 million.
In determining whether a particular punitive damage award comports with due process,
the court considers three guideposts: 1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's
misconduct; 2) the ratio between the actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the
punitive damages award; and 3) the difference between the punitive damages awarded by the
jury and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases. Campbell, 538 U.S. at
418. Under ldaho law, punitive damages are not favored and should be cautiously awarded only
in the most compelling circumstances. Cheney v. Palos Verdes Inv. Corp., 104 ldaho 897, 905,

665 P.2d 661,669 (1983).
Reprehensibility is the most important guidepost.

Campbell, 538 U.S. at 409.

In

Cumpbell the Court set forth several factors for consideration in determining the reprehensibility

of a defendant's conduct. 538 U.S. at 410. These include: (1) whether the harm caused was
physical or economic; (2) whether the conduct showed indifference to or a reckless disregard for
the health or safety of others; (3) whether the target of the conduct was financially vulnerable;
(4) whether the conduct involved repeated actions or was an isolated incident; and (5) whether
the harm was a result of intentional conduct or of an accident. Id.
Decision And Order On Defendant's Motion For Rernittitur Or, In The Alternative, New Trial
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The initial result of Defendants' denial of the Weinsteins' claim was economic and
emotional. The Weinsteins agreed to pay monthly premiums to Defendants in exchange for
Defendants' promise to protect them from financial ruin in an emergency. To the shock and
disappointment of the Weinsteins, when catastrophe struck, Defendants did not investigate but
denied benefits, answered phone calls, and made no progress on the claim.
Insurance companies such as Defendants are in the business of dealing with physically
and financially injured people in crisis. To expect insureds to wait for years before making
payment certainly evinces a reckless disregard for the health and safety of others. In this case,
Mrs. Weinstein told Defendants that medical providers were threatening to stop treating Sarah,
even though she still needed medical treatment. Defendants did nothing. After automobile
accidents, the parties involved are likely to be financially vulnerable-especially when the
physical injuries require surgery and physical therapy.
Defendants repeatedly treated the Weinsteins dismissively, and failed to investigate their
claim or progress in settling for a year and a half. In fact, the Weinsteins were forced to hire an
attorney to collect money on their UM claim.

Defendants' experts testified that after an

insurance company offered a settlement for a UM claim, the insured could either accept it, or
hire an attorney. Such methods have been considered a way to "starve out" insureds until they
will accept a lower payment than they would otherwise have done. Chester v. State Fumi Ins.
Co., 117 Idaho 538, 541, 789 P.2d 534, 537 (Ct. App. 1990) (noting that the prolonged and

confusing claims process was to encourage insureds to settle for a smaller amount than they
otherwise would). According to the evidence, this method of waiting until the end of a UM
claim was established policy that adjusters were instructed to follow. Finally, the jury found that
the harm was the result of intentional conduct, and the Court agrees.
In assessing whether the difference between a compensatory award and a punitive
damage award violates due process, the United States Supreme Court has not established a
Decision And Order On Defendant's Motion For Remittitur Or, In The Alternative, New Trial

bnght-line rule for punitive damages. However, the Court noted that "few awards exceeding a
single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will
satisfy due process." Campbell, 538 U.S. at 425. See ulso Gore, 5 17 U.S at 581. In cases where
the compensatory award is nominal, the ratio between the nominal award and the punitive award
provides no assistance in determining whether or not the award violates due process. Myers v.
Workmens Auto Ins. Co., 140 Idaho 495, 5 10, 95 P.3d 977, 992 (2004). The court must also

consider the prospective deterrent effect of the punitive damages award on others similarly
situated to the Defendant. id. at 506.
In this case, compensatory damages of $210,000 and punitive damages of $6 million
were awarded. This award amounts to seventy-six ten-thousandths (0.00076) of Defendants'

$7.9 billion net worth, and just over one percent of Defendants' 2005 net income of $584
million. The Court deems the $6 million punitive damages award to be an appropriate amount,
in that it adequately serves as a deterrent to future bad acts by Defendants and others similarly
situated. The amount, while large to many individuals, is a tiny fraction of Defendants' assets
but enough to secure their attention.
However, the punitive damage award is 28.5 times the compensatory award, and thus
outside the limits the United States Supreme Court has set regarding punitive damages. The
Weinsteins argue that this ratio is not determinative of whether the punitive damages award is
unconstitutional, and base this argument on Myers v. Workmen's Auto Ins. Co. However, as the
Defendants point out, that case involved nominal damages, while here the $210,000 was
intended to compensate the Weinsteins for their damages resulting from Defendants' bad faith.
In light of the limitations expressed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Campbell, the punitive
damage award is excessive, and a remittitur should be entered reducing the award to within a
single digit ratio of the compensatory award.
Finally, punitive damages should also take into account the maximum statutory penalty
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lor wrongful conduct. Core, 517 U.S. at 583. Pun~tlvedamages greatly rn excess of a c~vll
2
t

penalty for similar misconduct may vlolate the defendant's due process nghts. Campell, 538
U.S. at 429. However, In Idaho, where a de-fendant has clearly tgnored the existence of a statute,

~l
to the pun~tlvedamage award
comparing the c ~ v penalty

IS

not helpful or necessary. Myers,

140 ldaho at 510. In that case, Myers sued Workmen's Auto Insurance Company for breach of

contract based on Workmen's failure to defend her In a lawsuit ansing out of an automobile
accident. Id. at 498. Despite Myers repeated requests for representation by Workmen's, whlch it

was contractually obligated to prov~de,Workmen's failed to defend her. Id. at 499. This breach
of contract resulted

In

a default judgment against Myers, the revocation of her dnver's license,

and significant burdens upon her family. Id. at 500. She repeated her attempts to convince
Workmen's to pay the default judgment and settle the claims, but Workmen's did noth~ng. Zd.
Ultimately, a jury awarded Myers $735

In

nom~naldamages and $300,000 in pun~tlvedamages.

Id. On appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, Workmen's argued that the punitive damages award

was

excessive,

In part, because ~t was 30 times greater than the maximum statutory penalty set

forth under the Idaho Unfair Claims Practices Act. Id. The Court held that because Workmen's
was not Influenced by the existence of the act, monetary penalties, or the threat of losing State
Ilcensure, the ratlo between the statutory penalty and the punitive damages award was not
controll~ng.Id. at 510.
Thls case involves the same statute that Myers considered. The maxlmum penalty for
v~olatlonof the Unfalr Clalms Pract~cesAct is $10,000. I.C. 41-1329A. However, as

In

Myers,

Defendants were not ~nfluencedby the ex~stenceof the statute, and therefore a cornpanson
between the award and the statutory penalty is not helpful,
The Court deems the $6 million punitive damages award to be appropriate to deter
Defendants from engaging in similar conduct in the future. However, because the United States
Supreme Court has limited punitive damages awards, the Court reduces the award to a single
Decls~onAnd Order On Defendant's Motion For Rernittitur Or, In The Alternative, New Trial

digit ratio of one to nine, which is $1.89 million ($1,890,000).
11.

NEWTRIAL

Defendants move for new trial pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(a) subsections (1)(3)(5)(6) and (7).
Each of these subsections requires the court to consider a different standard in determining
whether or not to grant a new trial. Therefore, after laying out the general standard applicable to
motions for new trial, each basis will be considered separately.

GENERALLEGALSTANDARDFOR NEWTRIAL:
A motion for a new trial under LRCP 59(a) may be brought in the alternative to a motion

for JNOV. IRCP 50(b); Quick V. Crune, 1 1 1 ldaho 759, 766, 727 P.2d 1187, 1194 (1986). On a
motion for new trial, the court has broad discretion and, unlike a motion for JNOV, "weighs the
evidence and the credibility of the witness." Id. On a motion for new trial, the trial judge may set
aside the verdict even though substantial evidence exists to support it. Id. at 767. Additionally,
the trial judge is not required to view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prevailing
party. Id. The rule that a verdict will not be set aside when supported by substantial but
conflicting evidence has no application to a trial court ruling upon a motion for a new trial.
Wilsoiz v. J.R. Simplot Co. 143 Idaho 730, 731, 152 P.3d 601, 602 (2007) (citing Dineen v.

Finch, 100 Idaho 620, 625-26, 603 P.2d 575, 580-81 (1979)). The Idaho Supreme Court has
held that "respect for the function of the jury prevents [a court from granting] new trial except in
unusual circumstances. Pratton v. Gage, 122 Idaho 848, 850, 840 P.2d 392, 394 (1992).
Where counsel fails to make a proper objection to evidence or testimony offered at trial
the issue is not preserved for appeal. Gillinghum Const., Inc. v. Newby- Wiggins Const., Inc., 142
ldaho 15, 121 P.3d 946 (2005). See Wheaton v. Irzdus. Special Indem. Fund, 129 Idaho 538, 54 1,
928 P.2d 42, 45 (1996). In order to assert such alleged errors after trial, defendants must first
object to those issues at trial. Rojas v. Lindsuy, 108 Idaho 590, 592, 701 P.2d 210, 212 (1985);

First Realty & Inv. Co. v. Rubert, 100 ldaho 493,497,600 P.2d 1149, 1153 (1979).
Decision And Order On Defendant's Motion For Remittitur Or, In The Alternative, New Trial
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A. Irregularity in the Proceedings
Defendants argue that they are entttled to a new trial based on several alleged
tnegulantles in the proceedings.

A new trial may be granted due to "irregulanty In the

proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party or any order of the court or abuse of dlscretlon by
which elther party was prevented from havlng a fatr trtal." I.R.G.P. 59(a)(l). In evaluating
whether an rrregularity tn the proceedrngs merlts a new tnal, a dlstnct court must conslder
whether the lrregularjty had any effect on the jury's deciston. See Wiizman v. Morrison-Knudsen

Co., 115 Idaho 869, 872,771 P.2d 533,536 (1989).
When the motion is based on on the prevailing party's misconduct, the movlng party has
the burden to prove that m~sconductocculred. Sluathuug v. Allstute Ins. Co., 132 Idaho 705,
710, 979 P.2d 107, 112 (1999). The opposing party must then show that the conduct could not
have affected the outcome of the trial or caused prejudice. Id.
1. Plaintiffs' Annotated Exhibit List

Defendants allege that the Wetnstelns commltted misconduct by distributing an lmproper
exhiblt to the jury. On September 21, 2007, Defendants discovered that the exhibit notebooks

Plaintiffs had distributed to the jury contatned an exhibit list annotated with commentary. The
Court collected the llsts from the jurors and instructed them to disregard the lists. In arguing that
the 11sts were prejudicial, Defendants provided an example of a notation that read: "[Mrs.
Welnsteln] mails back medical authorization. [the claims adjuster] never used it." Defendants
allege that such notations constitute inadmissible argument, and that a new tnal should be
granted because the jury had several days to read the exhl b~t list.
First, Piaintlffs assert that Defendants dld not object when the exhibit lists were admitted.
Thls

IS

correct, however, Defendants objected to the exhibits later on. Plaintiffs argue that

Defendants could not have been prejudiced because the court collected the exhibit lists and
instructed the jurors to disregard anything they had read in them. The court also noted after
Decision And Order On Defendant's Motion For Remittitur Or, In The Alternative, New Trial

examlntng the documents that only one, from an alternate juror, bore any mark~ngs. Defendants
argue that the lurors might have read the list wlthoitt marklng on the list, considering that the list
was

in

the~rpossession for days. However, because the jury was Instructed to disregard the

exh~bttIlst, and the jury instructrons l~kewiselimited their conslderattons to the adm~tted
evidence, the Court: presumes the jury dld as they were told and properly d~sregarded~ t .

2. Court's Comments Regarding Defendants' Exhibit Notebooks
Defendants argue that the Court made comments in the presence of the jury that
prejudiced the jury agalnst the Defendants and prevented a falr tnal. The comments referred to

occurred when Defendants moved to adm~tthelr exhlb~tnotebooks and have them d~stnbutedto
the jury. The Court asked Plalntlffs' counsel ("Mr. Rlsch") IC he had any objections, and he
d know what exhlblts Defendants' counsel was refernng to, but that he had
stated that he d ~ not
no objections. After Mr. Risch's comments, the Court admitted the exhibtts and stated: "Mr.
Rlsch you are free to look at them later if you want to, make sure that those are the exh~bltsin
there, so we aren't glving the jurors anythlng we shouldn't be g~vlngthem." Defendants argue
that the Court's statement created an ~nferencethat Defendants' counsel was untrustwoi~hy . No
objecrlon was made at tnal, and thus this Issue may not now be ralsed as a basis for new trial.

3. Plaintiffs' Closing Argument
Defendants argue that they are entltled to a new tnal because Mr. Rlsch argued In closlng
that Defendants had schemed to use the PIA agreement to cause pla~nt~ffs
to mlss the two year
statute of l~m~tatlons. Defendants allege that thls argument was h~ghly prejudlclal and
tnflammatory. However, Defendants failed to object to thls issue at tnal, and thus they may not
assert ~t as a basis for new tnal. The Pallure to object during trial, even ~f the alleged error
occurred dunng closlng arguments, precludes the court from grantlng new tnal on that bas~s,no
matter how mentonous. Slaathaug, 132 Idaho at 592,979 P.2d at 219.

4. Plaintiffs' References to the Insurance Industry
Decision And Order On Defendant's Motion For Remittitur Or, In The Alternative, New Trial

Defendants argue that they are entitled to a new tnal because Mr. Rrsch repeatedly made
refretences to the Insurance rndustry as a whole. A stlpulation on the record and a standlng
objection from Defendants ltinlted arguments and evidence to the insurance industry in Idaho.
Although Mr. Rlsch occastonally made statements regard~ng"the lnsurance rndustry," these were
all made In the context of discussing the Insurance tndustry In Idaho. 'The emphasis he placed on
Idaho's power Lo control the Insurance industry w~thln the state took precedence over the
occasional statement referring to the lnsurance ~ndustry,wrthout expllcrtly llmlttng 11to that "in

Idaho." Defendants have not met thelr burden to show that Mr. Risch vlolated the stlpulation.
Anyone llstentng to Mr. Risch's arguments In their entlrety would understand that hls references
to the ~nsuranceIndustry were lim~tedto Idaho.

5. Jury Instruction on the Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act
Defendants argue that they are entitled to a new tnal because Plaintiffs submitted, and the
Court gave, an Instructton settlng out the text of the Unfatr Glalms Settlement Practices Act,
Idaho Code 41-1329. Thts argument

IS

more properly considered

In

sectlon II.F, as an alleged

error of law.

6. Plaintiffs' Opening Statement
Defendants argue that when, In opening statements, Mr. Risch told the jurors that the
verdlct would change the way Insurers do bustness in Idaho by requinng progress payments for

UM clalms, he encouraged the jurors to ignore the jury instructions stating that they cannot
reform the tnsurance pollcy. Defendants have failed to carry the burden of provlng misconduct
by the prevalllng party. Mr. Rlsch openlng statement dld not encourage the jury to Ignore the
jury ~nstructlons,especially consldertng that ~t was made at the beglnnlng of a two week tnal.
The jury lnstructlons addressed how the jury should determine the meanlng of the pollcy
language in Issue. The jury interpreted the contract in conformance with the instructions; tt did
not reform the pollcy. Further, although Defendants made many objections during Mr. Rlsch's
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opening statement, none were premlsed on the theory that the jury was bang encouraged to
Ignore the ~ u r yInstructtons. 'I'herehrc, Defendants cannot raise this Issue post-trral for purposes
of reyuestlng new tr~al.

B. Surprise
A rnotron for a new tnal based on I.R.C.P. 59(a)(3) requtres a two-part showing. The

movlng party must f~rstshow prejudice, and second, that the alleged accident or surprlse 1s one
that "ordinary pr~idencecould not have guarded against." Nznglzes v. State, 129 Idaho 558, 929
P.2d 120 (1996). Idaho cases discuss~ngthis basis for new tnal lnvolve sttuations where

testimony or evldence was allegedly a surpnse. See, e.g. id. (holding no surprise when surprtse
testtmony was that of the movlng party), Cutt.rpillur v. WestjFull, 120 Idaho 9 18, 921, 821 P.2d
973, 976 (1990) (holdlng no surprise when other party's expert wltness changed his testimony

and court granted a two day conttnuance

in

order to prepare rebuttal testtmony); Alderson v.

Borzrzer, 142 Idaho 733, 743, 132 P.3d 126, 127 (Ct. App. 2006) (finding no surpnse for contents

of videotape that moving party had access to during the tnal).
Defendants argue that they are entitled to a new tnal because Mr. Rtsch's clos~ng
argument that the PIA agreement was offered to cause Plaintiffs to miss a statute of limitations
deadl~newas a surpr~sejusttfyrng a new tnal. Dunng the proceeding, Plaintiffs contended that
the PIA agreement constituted bad fa~thbecause ~t conditroned payment of the $10,000 advance
payment. During Buddy Paul's testimony, Mr. Risch inquired ~ n t othe statute of Iimitations.
Also, the letter from Mr. Bistllne to Defendants dated April 2004 referred to the statute of
Itmitations for torts.
Plaint~ffs argue that reasonable inferences from the evidence support the closing
argument. The handling adjuster, her supervisor, and the office claims unit manager met and
worked out a "plan" to deal with the We~nstelns'claim. Part of that plan was to present the PIA
agreement. The PIA agreement language granted and reserved unto defendants all defenses
Decision And Order On Defendant's Motion For Remittitur Or, In The Alternative, New Trial

available to the uninsured driver, even though UM llab~lityand fault was established. The poltcy
prov~dedthat the defendants were only obligated to pay the amount the Weinsteins were "legally
entitled to recover" from the uninsured driver.
a

There was no surprise or lrrconslstency with platntiffs' position on the PIA agreement.
Plalnt~ffs'argument at tr~alshowlng the effect of the PlA agreement in relation to the statute of
limitations was well-founded. The mere fact that the plaintiffs' interpretation of' the evidence
was not anticipated by the defendants is not sufficient surprise to grant a new trial. Mr. Paul's
testimony initiated discussion and evidence relating to the statute of limitations and opened the
door for plaintiffs to further clarify the significance of that statute of limitations.

C. Excessive Damages
When evaluating a motion for a new trial based on excessive damages, the trial court
itzust

weigh the evidence and then compare the jury's award to what the Court would have given

as fact finder. Wilsorz, 143 Idaho at 731, 152 P.3d at 602 (citing Dineen, 100 Idaho at 625-26,
603 P.2d at 580-81). If the difference is so great that it appears to the trial court that the award

was given under the influence of passion or prejudice, the verdict should be set aside. Id.; see

I.R.C.P. 59(a)(5). A motion for remittitur should be considered under this rule as well. Pratton,
122 Idaho at 85 1, 840 P.2d at 395.

Defendants argue that the jury verdicts of $250,000 for Sarah Weinstein, and $210,000 in
extra-contractual damages and $6 million in punitive damages to Leslie and Linda Weinstein are
excessive. They request remittitur or a new trial.
1. Sarah's Damages
Defendants argue that the evidence as to Sarah's future medical expenses is speculative,
and were not proved with reasonable certainty, and therefore her damages are excessive.
Plaintiff's argue that Sarah's damages are not excessive because they were not limited to her
future medical expenses but also included pain and suffering. Sarah's damages were not limited
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suffered a stgnlficant Injury to her h ~ pwhich requlred surgery and long pertods of recovery. She
missed many days of school due to surgery and paln and could no longer partlclpate tn her
favunte actlvltles of soccer and rurtnlng. She continues to

experience

pain, her usual actlvltles

are Iirnlted, and she w1l1 likely develop a ~ h n t i s .Additionally, she will probably requlre future
hip surgery. The Court found Sarah's testimony believable and, after weighlng the evrdence, the
court has detellnrned that ~t would have awarded a slmllar amount of damages to Sarah.
Therefore, the award of $250,000 1s not excesslve.
Defendants additionally argue that Plaintiffs' counsel improperly suggested to the jury
that they award the Pollcy llmlts of $250,000, in violation of I.G. 10-111. However, no objection
was made to thls at tr~al,and therefore the court cannot conslder ~t as a basis for new tr~al.
Quick, 111 Idaho at 782, 727 P.2d at 1219.

2. The Weinsteins' Damages
Defendants argue that the $210,000 award to Leslie and Linda for extra-contractual
damages was excesslve. These damages were due to emotional dlstress. A bad falth clalm 1s a
tort clalm ansing out of a breach of contract, for whlch an Insurer can recover damages normally
recoverable in tort, including emotional dlstress.

Wulston v. Monumerztul Li$e Ins. Co, 129

Idaho 21 1, 219, 923 P.2d 456, 465 (1996). As described in the memorandum declslon for
JNOV, Wulstorz suggests that the court apply the elements of the tort of emotional dlstress to
welgh the evidence. After dolng so, the Court determines that the seventy of Defendants
misconduct coupled with the Weinstein's expectation of the contract justifies the award.

Defendants denied the Weinsteins' requests for payment and defended a policy of delaying the
settlement of the UM claim until the end of all treatment, regardless of length. The Defendants
knew that the Welnsteins were receiving phone calls from bill collectors and belng threatened by
medlcal providers. The Weinsteins entered into the contract expecting that Defendants would
Deciston And Order On Defendant's Motion For Remittitur Or, In The Alternative, New Trial

protect them in their time of need. The Weinsteins presented evidence that they suffered from
embarrassment, harassment by bill collectors, from internal family turmoil, and overall
misfortune and distress in their life as a result of the defendants failing to meet their contractual
obligations. Mrs. Weinstein experienced depression and crying. The court would have set a
similar amount of damages and therefore, the $210,000 award is not excessive.
Defendants argue that the $6 million punitive damages award is excessive and the result
of passion or prejudice. Defendants argue that several events during trial prejudiced the jury
against the Defendants. First, Defendants point to Mr. Risch's closing argument that discussed
the PIA Agreement as a "scheme" to get the Weinsteins to settle for a mere $10,000. Next,
Defendants suggest that Mr. Risch repeatedly told the jury that the State could not effectively
police insurance companies, and that this award would send a message to the insurance industry
in the entire country. Defendants also point to the Court's comments suggesting that Defense
counsel was dishonest or could not be trusted. Defendants argue that these factors combined to
produce an at~nospherewhere the jury would act with passion or prejudice in deciding the
amount of damages. None of these alleged errors have any merit, as discussed throughout this
decision. Mr. Risch's closing argument was based on the evidence, and his references to the
insurance industry were properly limited to Idaho, when taken in the context of his argument. As
the Court has discussed herein, it would have awarded a similar amount of punitive damages as
the jury did. Only in consideration of the U.S. Supreme Court's limitation on the ratio of
compensatory damages did the Court reduce the award to $1.89 million.

D. Insufficiency of the Evidence
A new trial may be granted "when [the trial court is satisfied the verdict is not supported
by, or is contrary to, the evidence, or is convinced the verdict is not in accord with the clear
weight of the evidence and that the ends of justice would be served by vacating it, or when the
verdict is not in accord with either law or justice." Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho at 767. ( uoting
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Blaine v. Byers, 9 1 Idaho 665, 67 1,429 P.2d 397,403 (1967)).

District courts apply a two-

part test when considering motions for new trial based on the ground of insufficient evidence.
Heir; v. Curroll, 117 Idaho 373, 378, 788 P.2d 188, 193 (1990). First the court considers
whether the verdict was against the weight of the evidence and that justice would be served by
vacating the verdict; and, second, the court considers whether a different result would follow
upon retrial. Gillinghum Const., Inc. v. Newby- Wiggins Const., Inc. 142 Idaho 15, 23, 121 P.3d
946, 954 (2005); Heitz v. Carroll, 117 Idaho 373, 378, 788 P.2d 188, 193 (1990). The second
prong requires more than a mere possibility of a different result, but rather a probability that a
different result would follow. Sheridan v. St. Luke's Reg'l Med Ctr., 135 Idaho 775, 782, 25

P.3d 88,95 (2001).
Defendants argue that there was insufficient evidence of each of the elements of a prima
facie case for bad faith. Specifically, Defendants argue that there was insufficient evidence that:
1) Defendants intentionally and unreasonably denied or delayed payment; 2) that the claim was
not fairly debatable; 3) that the denial or delay was not the result of an honest mistake; and 4)
that the plaintiffs suffered extra-contractual damages.
As to the first three elements, the Court does not deem the verdict to be against the
weight of the evidence. In this case, the evidence showed that months went by with no action on
the claim. Defendants' internal departments disregarded requests for information from another
department. Experts testified that delays were intentional and unreasonable. The record indicates
there was no or little investigation of the UM claim until almost one and a half years after the
accident, although defendants had the releases allowing them to do an investigation shortly after
the accident. The med pay and UM claims both existed when Defendants recognized that an
uninsured motorist caused an accident with their insureds. The company had developed clear
policy to delay payment of UM benefits until the end of all treatment and refused to pay
undisputed amounts. Defendants' witnesses testified that the handling of the Weinsteins' claim
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was in accordance with established policy, demonstrating that no "honest mistake" occurred.
The court does not find the verdict to be against the clear weight of the evidence.
As to the fourth element, based on the facts and law discussed in the JNOV and above in
section II.C.2, the Court does not find the verdict to be against the weight of the evidence.
Defendants argue that there is insufficient evidence that the PIA agreement was offered
for an improper purpose. The Court agrees that the suggestion that the PIA agreement was
offered to trick the Weinsteins into settling for $10,000, with the intent to deny further payment
after the statute of limitations ran against the uninsured motorist, is not supported by the weight
of the evidence. However, the weight of the evidence does establish that the Defendants failed to
investigate the claim from the beginning, which resulted in the wrongful denial of UM benefits
for Sarah's medical bills. Even without the PIA Agreement, sufficient evidence supports the
Weinsteins' claim that their UM claim was intentionally and unreasonably denied and delayed.
Defendants argue that the evidence was insufficient to support the excessive amounts of
damages awarded. Defendants argue that their conduct was not reprehensible, especially when
considering that they tried to quickly get $10,000 to Plaintiffs once the medical records were
received. However, as Plaintiffs point out, Defendants made virtually no effort to pay under

UM, apart from the meager PIA agreement, until after plaintiffs sued them. Even the PIA
Agreement was not offered until one and a half years after the accident, after the Weinsteins had
suffered months of harassment, and a lien was placed on their house. The Defendants' claims
adjusters and supervisors testified that the written documentation in the claims file show that the
Defendants' established policy and practice was not to pay medical bills or any other amounts
until after treatment. This was so even when liability was established early on and the insured
communicated suffering. Plaintiffs offered rebuttal testimony presented by three practicing
attorneys who all acknowledged the common Idaho industry practice of insurers is to pay
undisputed UM benefits in advance of a final settlement. Defendants' misconduct and its refusal
Decision And Order On Defendant's Motion For Remittitur Or, In The Alternative, New Trial

The verd~ctis not agalnst the we~ghtof the evidence.

E. Errors of Law
1. Defendants' argue that the Court elred by f a ~ l ~ ntoggrant either- of Defendants'
motions for directed verdict. Even if refusing to grant Defendants' motions for directed verdict
was error, the court sees no reason why Defendants would be entitled to a new trial on that basis.
Defendants have re-argued most of the issues it raised in their motion for directed verdict in their
motion for JNOV.

2. Defendants argue that the court erred by permitting Norma Nielson to testify.
Defendants argue that her testimony concerning the insurance industry was irrelevant and that
she was not qualified to provide testimony concerning Defendants' financial condition or the
efficacy of punitive damages versus regulatory actions. Further, Defendants argue that her
testimony violated Defendants' due process rights by encouraging the jury to award damages
based on Defendants' financial condition.
A district court has broad discretion in determining whether a witness is qualified as an
expert and whether such expert's testimony is admissible, and its decision will only be
overturned for abuse of discretion. IRE 104(a); Wurren v. Slzurp, 139 Idaho 599, 605, 83 P.3d
773, 779 (2003). The test for determining whether a witness is qualified as an expert is "not
rigid." West

12.

Sonke, 132 Idaho 133, 138-39, 968 P.2d 228, 233-34 (1998). "If scientific,

technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence
or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." IRE 702.
To qualify as an expert, the witness must have specialized knowledge beyond the
competence of the average juror.

West, 132 Idaho at 138-39, 968 P.2d at 233-34. Formal

training is not necessary to qualify as an expert, but experience or special knowledge must be
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shown to qualify a witness as an expen. Wurretz, 139 Idaho at 605, 83 P.3d at 779. The
proponent of the testimony must lay foundational evidence showing that the individual is
qualified as an expert on the topic of his or her testimony. State v. Burrow, 142 Idaho 328, 330,
127 P.3d 23 1,233 (Ct.App.2005).
Once a witness is qualified as an expert, her testimony is admissible if her knowledge will
assist the trier of fact in deciding a fact in issue, as per IRE 702. State v. Menuin, 131 Idaho 642,
646, 962 P.2d 1026, 1030 (1998). Expert opinion which is speculative, conclusory, or
unsubstantiated by facts in the record is of no assistance to the jury in rendering its verdict and is
inadmissible as evidence. Weeks v. Eastern Iduho Heulttz Services, 143 Idaho 834,153 P.3d
1 180 (2007).

The operations of the insurance industry are beyond the experience of the average juror.
Dr. Nielson's testimony about the insurance industry and its regulation was properly admissible
because i t helped the jury understand the evidence. Her explanation of how and why insurance
companies operate helped the jury understand what happened in this case, and whether or not the
Defendants actions were reasonable.
Her opinion that regulatory action is less effective against insurance companies than
punitive damages has credible foundation. Her opinions are based on news accounts and
conversations with commissioners over the last 25 years. Even without strict empirical research
on the topic, her personal experience, background, and knowledge of the insurance industry
allows her to form opinions based on facts that other experts in her field based their opinions on.
Dr. Nielson is qualified to testify as an expert concerning the Defendants' finances
because she has a solid background in insurance industry operations. Dr. Nielson holds both a
master's and a doctorate degree in insurance, she also has long-term involvement in the industry,
that give her substantial relevant experience and education in interpreting published insurance
industry financial statements. The financial status of an insurance industry is a large part of
Decision And Order On Defendant's Motion For Remittitur Or, In The Alternative, New Trial

insurance industry operations, and her testimony helped the jury to understand the evidence
regarding Defendants' financial reports.

3. Defendants argue that the court erred by refusing to grant Defendants' motion
for a mistrial when the annotated exhibit lists were discovered in Plaintiffs' juror notebooks. The
court addressed t h ~ issue
s
above. The alleged error is not enough to warrant a new trial.

Alleged Errors in the Jury Instructions
The Court's review of jury instructions is "limited to a determination of whether the
instructions, as a whole, fairly and adeyuately present the issues and state the law." Newberry v.
Manens, 142 Idaho 284, 287, 127 P.3d 187, 190 (2005). "When the instructions, as a whole, do

not mislead or prejudice a party, an erroneous instruction does not constitute reversible error."
Id. The appellant has the burden to clearly show prejudicial error from an erroneous jury

instruction. Clark v. Klein, 137 Idaho 154, 159, 45 P.3d 810, 815 (2002). An erroneous
instruction 1s prejudicial when it could have affected or did affect the outcome of the trial.
Garcia V. Windley, 144 Idaho 539, 164 P.3d 819, 823 (2007). Whether a jury instruction should

have been given depends on whether there is evidence at trial to support the instruction.
Vu~zderjbrdCo. v. Knudsun, 144 Idaho 547, 552, 165 P.3d 261, 266 (2007). The determination

of whether the instruction is supported is committed to the discretion of the court. Id. A court
may refuse an instruction that erroneously states the law, is adequately covered by other
instructions, or is not supported by the evidence. Craig Johnson Const., LLC v. Floyd Towrz
Architects, 142 Idaho 791, 800, 134 P.3d 648, 651 (2006). Additionally, a tardy jury instruct~on

need not be honored. S d z ~ ~ u nSales
' s Enters., 142 Idaho at 831, 136 P.3d at 301. See I.R.C.P.
51(a)(l) (providing that any requested instructions not filed and served upon the parties five days
before the commencement of the trial need not be considered by the court).

4. Defendants argue that the Court erred by giving Jury Instruction 3 of the
Unfair Claim Settlement Practices Act, and thereby creating a de facto private cause of action for
Decision And Order On Defendant's Motion For Remittitur Or, In The Alternative, New Trial

a vtolatlon of the Act as well as introducing evidence of an lndusrry standard that was not
presented or explained by any of the witnesses or introduced per a strpulatron of the partles.
There 1s no pnvate cause of actlon under the Act. Sinzper v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Clo., 132
Idaho 471, 375, 974 P.2d 1100, 1104 (1999). An expert may use the Act in a bad fa~thcase to
show industry standard practices In Idaho. Iriland Group of Gus. v. Proviclerzce Witsh. 111s.Co.,
133 Idaho 243, 258, 985 P.2d 674, 683 (1993). Although none of the experts discussed the

Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act, evidence was sublnitted demonstrating that Defendants
had committed a number of violations under the act, and was not acting in accordance with
standard practices of the insurance industry in Idaho: When an issue 1s a matter of law, expert
testimony on that ~ssue1s not necessary. Noivurd v. Or. Mut. lns. Cu.,137 ldaho 214, 46 P.3d
510 (2002). The Unfair Clalms Settlement Practices Act is statutory law in Idaho, and the
instruction stated that the Act does not give rise to a right to sue. The instruction demonstrates
industry standards and was limited to the issue of punitive damages.

5. Defendants argue that the court erred by failing to provide Defendants'
supplemental requested jury instruction no. 9, which read: "a defendant is liable for emotional
distress only where the distress inflicted is so severe that no reasonable person could be expected
to endure it." Defendants cited Davi,c v. Gage, 106 Idaho 735, 741, 682 P.2d 1282, 1288 (Ct.
infliction of emot~onal
App. 1984), for thls standard, which relates to the tort of ~ntent~onai
distress. As discussed in the motion for JNOV, the Wulston decision controls on the issue of
emotional distress damages in a bad faith case. Although the elements of the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress are used as a guidepost in assessing emotional damages in a bad
faith situation, the decisions on the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress are not
relevant in these circumstances. The jury was provided with those elements, and still found that
the Weinsteins had suffered emotional distress that was cornpensable. Therefore, the court's
refusal of the instruction was not error. Furthermore, the requested instruction was untimely,
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6.

Defendants argue that the court erred by failing to provide Defendants'

requested Instruction No. 23 setting out the defense of advice of legal counsel. Idaho courts have
not recogn~zedthe "advice of legal counsel'defense in the context of bad faith cases. The
on the issue. In Larsert v. Allstutc. Intrurutzce
Defendants csted two cases from other jurssd~ct~ons
C;_1~?2pany,
857 P.2d 263, (Utah. App. 1993), the Utah Court of Appeals held that the claim was

"'fa~rlydebatable,"

in

part, because Allstate sought legal counsel on a un~queIssue of law before

denylng coverage. 857 P.2d at 266. The case did not establish that relsance on the advice of
counsel alone negates allegations of bad faith. Id. Likewise, the case Stute Furriz Mzituul Auto
I~~suruutce
Gomparzy v. Superior Court, 228 Cal. App. 3d 721 (CA. Fourth Distnct 1991), held

that evldence of rcilance on the advice of counsel is admissible because it goes to the issue of
whether the insurer acted reasonable, and relates to allegations of malice. 228 Cal. App. 3d at
725. Therefore, in Idaho law, evidence of advice of legal counsel relates to whether or not the

claim was "falrly debatable." Instruction No. 24 adequately defined the element of "fa~rly
debatable" cla~rns;the refusal to prov~deDefendants' requested Instruction No. 23 was not error.

7. Defendants contend that the court erred by providing Plaintiffs' requested jury
instruction No. 17, which read: "an honest mistake means an innocent mistake which was made
despite the presence of procedures to prevent the making of such mistakes. It is a mistake that
occurs despite reasonable care to prevent it. A mistake which is the result of negltgence or
inattention or indifference is not an honest mistake." This instruction was explicitly approved by
the Idaho Supreme Court in Robirzson v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Compuny,
137 Idaho 173, 178,45 P.3d 829, 834 (2002). Defendants likewise argue that i t was error for the
court to not provide Defendants' requested instruction no. 25. Defendants requested instruct~on
no. 25 was substant~allysimilar to the instruction the court actually gave in instruction no. 26.
However, it changed the language of the Court-approved instruction slightly. The court properly
opted to use the precise language approved by the Idaho Supreme Court.
Decision And Order On Defendant's Motion For Remittitur Or, In The Alternative, New Trial
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8. Defendants contend that the court erred by providing Plaintiffs' requested jury
~nstructlonno. 18 as to the standard for delay. The language of that instructton was approved by
the Idaho Srrpreme Court In Irzlunrl Group of

C'iis.

v. Provi~kilceWashington Ins. Co., 133 ldaho

239, 257,985 P.2d 674, 682 (1999). The ~nstructionwas proper.

9.

Defendants argue that the court erred by providing lnstri~ctlon No. 35,

tnfoimtng the jury that it could consrder Defendants' wealth and financial condit~on in
determining punitive damages. Defendants argue that this ~nstruct~on
was contrary to the
holding of Cumpbell and violated Defendants' nght of due process. For the same reason,
Defendants argue that the court erred in giving Defendants' requested instruct~on no. 31.
Instruct~on No. 35 was taken verbatim from Plaintiff's requested instruction no. 23 and
Defendants' requested ~nstructionno. 3 1. The language was taken directly from IDJI 9.20.5.
Ca~rlpbelldoes not stand for the proposition that a defendant's wealth cannot be considered by
the jury

In

determining punitive damages.

The relevant hoidlng of Cun~pbellis that an

ur~constituttonalpunltlve damages award cannot be justlfied by the defendants' wealth. 538 U.S.
at 427. lnstructlon No. 35 was proper.

LO. Defendants argue that the court erred by ruling that it was not a matter of f~rst
tmpresslon under Idaho law as to whether advance partla1 payments on a UM claim are
mandatory As discussed In the JNOV, ldaho law establishes a duty to invest~gateclalms, and to
pay undisputed portlons of claim w~thina reasonable tlme. The Court's ruling was proper.
Defendants similarly argue that it was error for the court to refuse Defendants7 requested
supplemental jury instruction nos. 6 and 7. Instruction No. 6 stated: "When a claim lnvolves a
legal questlon of first Impression, an insurer does not commit bad faith by lit~gatlngthe cla~m
even ~fthe lnsurer does not prevail." Thls toplc was adequately covered by Instruction No. 24,
whtch set forth the definition of fairly debatable.
Instruction No. 7 stated: "An insurer is not bound by or required to take notice of a
Decision And Order On Defendant's Motion For Remittitur Or, In The Alternative, New Trial
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tmpression even if a district court has previously ruled on that question," Defendants argue that
~nsurersneed not heed court rulings to which ~t is not a party, and base this argument on Vuugfzt
V.

Dutrylurzd fn~.Co., 131 Idaho 357, 362, 956 P.2d 674, 679 (1998). The relevant holdlng In

Vu~rglztwas that an msurer who 1s not a pasty to a lawsu~tthat detemtnes the relative fault and

negligence ot ~ t sInsured is not bound to that detemrnat~onwhen the insurer later settles the
clam wlth the Insured, and may dlspute the percent tault attributed to the ~nsured. Vuught, 131
Idaho at 361. Vurtght does not stand for the proposltlon that an insurer may disregard a court's
detemlnatton of what types of conduct constitute bad falth In the insured-insurer relationship.

11. Defendants argue that the court erred by failing to glve the llmlt~ng
lnstructlon on pun~trvedamages requested by Defendants. Defendants asked the court, in ~ t s
second supplemental request for jury Instructions, to add instructions contalnlng specific
language from N~nthClrcu~tCourt of Appeals cases. Merrick v. Puul Revere L$e Ins. Co., 500
F.3d 1007 (C.A. 9"' 2007); White v. Ford Motor Co.,500 F.3d 963 (C.A. 9th2007).
Were, Instructions Nos. 33 through 37 dealt wlth the Itm~tatlonson punltlve damages. No
evldence directly related to Defendants' out-of-state conduct was adm~tted,and any extrapolat~on
by the jury that the Defendants' acted out-of-state was neutralized by Instruction No. 34, whlch
told the jury that punltlve damages may not be assessed to change Defendants' out-of-state
conduct. Instruction No. 36 rnstructed the jury that punltive damages could not be assessed
agalnst Defendants to punlsh them for Injury to non-parties. That Instruction exceeded the
requirements of Plzillip Morris, wh~challowed the jury to conslder harm to non-parties when

determ~n~ng
the reprehenslblllty of defendants' conduct. T h ~ sCourt gave no ~nstructlonto the
jury telling them to conslder harm to non-part~esas ~t relates to the reprehens~b~llty
prong. The
Court dld not err

In

refuslng to glve Defendants' requested second supplemental lnstructlons

because they were sufficiently covered, and they were untimely requested.
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Defendants argue that the Court erred tn gtvtng lnstruct~onsNos. 33 and 34, which
~nstructedthe jury it could award punitive damages to deter other parties not related to thls
Irt~gut~on.One of the factors that Idaho Courts must conslder when determlnlng ~f a punltlve
damages award

1s excessive

1s "the prospective cleterre~~t
effect of such an award upon persons

situated s~rnllarlyto the defendant." Myers, 140 Idaho at 507, 95 P.3d at 988. One of the
purposes of punttlve damages

IS

to deter others h m engaging in similar behav~oras the

defendant by mak~ngsuch conduct unprofitable. Zd. at 503. Instruction No. 33 was taken from
ID31 9.20, and Instruction No. 34 properly limlts the punitive damages to address only conduct In
the State of Idaho as required by Gore. The instructions were proper.
12. Defendants argue that it was error for the court to refuse to glve the last

sentcnce of Defendants' requested Instructlon No. 21, statlng that the covenant of good falth and
f a r deallng "does not add new terns to the contract or require the partles perform duties contrary
to the terns of the contract negot~atedand executed by the parties." See Idaho First Nut'l Baizk
v.

B1is.u Vulley Foods, 121 Idaho 266, 824 P.2d 841, 863-64 (1991). That case, however, dealt

with contract cla~msbetween a bank, guarantors, and borrowers in a foreclosure proceeding.
The claim was general breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, rather than bad faith
In a first party insurance contract. The holding of that case is not controlling in this case.

13.

Defendants argue that the Court erred by faillng to glve Defendants'

requested Instructlon No. 28, or otherwise falling to Instruct the jury as to the need to value
Sarah Welnsteln's damages on a present cash value basis. Instruction No. 28 read: "When I use
the phrase "present cash value" as to any damage that may accrue in the future, I mean that sum
of money determined and paid now which, when invested at a reasonable rate of interest. would
be sufficient to pay the future damages at the time and in the amount the future damages will be
~ncurred." This instruction that defined the phrase "present cash value" was not given because
no other instruction used that phrase, and neither party requested the phrase be used.
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14. Defendants argue that the court erred in refusing Defendants' requested
Supplemental Jury Instruction No. 14, setting forth the "clear and convincing" evidence standard
for punitive damages. As discussed previously, because the claim was reported before the July
1, 2003 statutory amendment, and the Defendants' policies and procedures were in place at the
time the claim was made, the pre-July 1, 2003 punitive damages standard was proper1y applied.
Further, it was untimely requested.

15. Defendants argue that the Court erred by failing to give the last sentence of
the Defendants' requested Supplemental Jury Instruction No. 2, which read: "even if an
investigation could have been completed more expeditiously, there is no bad faith unless the
company delayed, intending to achieve delay for delay's sake." Roper v. State Faml Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 131 Idaho 459, 462, 958 P.2d 1145, 1148 (1998). This statement was made in the

context of discussing whether a claim was "fairly debatable" and both Instructions Nos. 23 and
24 deal with that legal concept. Therefore, the instruction is adequately covered.

16. Defendants argue that it was error to refuse to give Defendants' requested
Supplemental Jury Instruction No. 5, which read: "When a claim is fairly debatable, the insurer
is entitled to dispute the claim and will not be deemed liable for failure to pay the claim."
Defendants are correct that several Idaho Supreme Court cases have made this statement. See,
e.g., McGilvrey v. Farmers New World Ins. Co., 136 Idaho 39, 28 P.3d 380 (2001). However, it
is merely a rewording of the third element of a bad faith claim, which was laid out in Jury
Instruction No. 23. Therefore, the instruction was adequately covered.

17. Defendants argue that the failure to give Defendants' requested Supplemental
Jury Instruction Nos. LO and 11 (pertaining to ratification by a corporate officer or director in
order to sustain punitive damages against a corporation) was error. In Idaho, the plaintiff must
show that the directors or managing officers of a corporation participated in, authorized, or
ratified the alleged bad acts of the agent in order to recover punitive damages from that
Decision And Order On Defendant's Motion For Remittitur Or, In The Alternative, New Trial

corporation. Munning v. Twin Fulls Clinic & Hosp., 122 Idaho 47, 53, 830 P.2d 1185, 1191
(1992).

Although defendants argue that no ratification occurred, sufficient evidence of

authorization exists to justify the recovery of punitive damages against the corporations.

Defendants' witnesses testified that the corporate policy, which was created and/or approved by
corporate officers andfor directors, was to wait until treatment was done to investigate and
evaluate. It is reasonable to infer that the corporation authorized its own policies. Further,
Defendants did not affirmatively argue that ratification was absent, and the submission of the
jury instruction for consideration was untimely.

18. Defendants argue that giving Instruction No. 25 to the jury was error because
it rnisstates the policy provisions regarding the timing of the payment. Instruction No. 25 read:

A fairly debatable dispute as to a portion of a claim does not relieve an insurance
company from paying the undisputed portion of a claim within a reasonable period
of time after it has assessed the monetary value of the undisputed portion of the
claim.
As discussed in the motion for JNOV, the contract's provision regarding timing of
payment was ambiguous, and if not ambiguous, no time was stated as to when payment
was due. Further, the instruction was given with regard to the bad faith claim, not the
contract claim. The covenant of good faith and fair dealing requires the insurer to fulfill
several affirmative duties, one of which is to pay undisputed portions of claims within a
reasonable time after assessing those claims.

19. Defendants argue that giving Instruction No. 31 was error, because it does not
reflect the standard for bad faith actually enunciated by the Idaho Supreme Court. It read:
In order to prove plaintiffs' bad faith claim, the plaintiffs do not have to establish
that the insurance company acted with an evil or fraudulent intent, or with actual
malice towards the plaintiffs. It is sufficient if it is proven that the defendant was
aware of the nature, content, and probable consequences of its actions, and that it
acted with conscious disregard of such consequences.
This instruction is nearly verbatim from Inland Group v. Providence Wush. Ins., 133 Idaho 249,
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257, 985 P.?d 674. 681. That case held that, although a bad Faith jury instruction contained
language suggesting that negligent conduct was sufficient to find a bad faith claim, the presence
of the language that this Coun put in Instruction No. 31, along with a punitive damages
instruction and a jury verdict for punitive damages rendered the error of including negligence
language harmless. The Idaho Supreme Court approved the language of lnstruction No. 3 1.
CONCLUSION
The Court Orders a remittitur reducing the punitive damages award from $6 million to
$1.89 million as a condition of denying the motion. Should Plaintiffs refuse to accept the
remittitur, the Coun GRANTS Defendants' Motion for New Trial as to punitive damages. The
Court DENIES the remainder of the motion.

IT IS SO ORDERED
DATED this 2Yd day of January 2008.
/\

Darla Williamson,
District Court Judge
I, J. David Navarro, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have mailed, by
United States Mail, one copy of the Decision and Costs Claimed as to Leslie and Linda
Weinstein pursuant to Rule 77(d) I.C.R. to each of the attorneys of record in this cause in
envelopes addressed as follows:

James E. Risch
R. John Insinger
Jason Risch
407 West Jefferson Street
Boise, ID 83702-6049
Dated th@

Robert A. Anderson
Phillip J. Collaer
C.W. Moore Plaza
250 S. 5thStreet, Suite 700
P.O. Box 7426
Boise, ID 83707-7426

day of January 2008
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IN TEE DISTRICT COURT Of"'T W FOURTH JUDICIAL
THE STATE OF U)AHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
LESLIE WEINSTEIN and LINDA
WEINSTEIN, Husband and Wife,
rndr vrdually and as GuardIan Ad Lltem for
SARAH R. WEINSTEIN, and SARAH R.
WEINSTEIN, indt vtdually,

C ~ p s T o ~ W
A o

Case NoKX: C
',
Plaintiffs,

DECISION AND ORDER ON
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
JUDGWNT NOTWITHSTANDING
T I E VERDICT

VS.

PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY AND
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY
and DEmNDANTS GENERAL
INSURANCE COMPANY and LIBERTY
MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY and
LM PROPERTY AND CASUALTY
INSURANCE,

Defendants.

Hearing on Defendant's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict was held on
December 13, 2007. Attorneys James R~sch,John Insinger, and Jason Risch appeared on behalf
of the Weinsteins, with Mr. Risch arguing. Appearing on behalf of Defendants were attorneys
Robert A. Anderson and Phillip J. Collaer, with Mr. Anderson arguing.

Before the Coun is the above-named Defendant Insurance Companies' motion for
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict (JNOV). Linda and Leslie Weinstein (the "Weinsteins")
sued Defendant insurance companies ("Defendants") for breach of contract and bad faith based
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on Defendants' handling of their claim. All causes of action were tried to a jury. On October 1,

2007, the jury found bad fa1th tn the handltng of the uninsured motorists ("UM") claim, but not
In the med pay claim. The jury awarded $210,000 damages to Linda and Leslie Welnsteln for
bad fatth, and $6,000,000 In punltive damages. The jury also determ~nedthat the total amount of
damages sustarned by Sarah Weinstein was $250,000.

LEGALSTANDARD
ON JNOV:
A jury verdict must be upheld if there is evidence of sufficient quantity and probative
value that reasonable minds could have reached a similar conclusion as that of the jury. N U ~ S O I Z
V.

Cobbs, 118 Idaho 474, 478, 797 P.2d 1322, 1326 (1990). The judge may not weigh the

evidence, pass on the cred~bilityof w~tnesses,or make independent findings on factual issues.
Grig Inc. v. Curry Beun Co., 138 Idaho 3 15, 3 19, 63 P.3d 441, 445 (2003). Instead, the judge
must determ~newhether the evidence is of suff~cientquality and probative value that reasonable
minds could amve at the same conclusron as d ~ dthe jury. Sclzwaizn's Sules Erztei-s., lnc. v. Idaho
Tratzsp. Dep't, 142 Idaho 826, 830, 136 P.3d 297,301 (2006). The party seeking a JNOV adm~ts

the truth of all the other side's evidence and every legitimate inference that can be drawn from ~ t .
Quick v. Crurze, 111 Idaho 759,764,727 P.2d 1187, 1192 (1986).

FACTUAL
BACKGROUND:
On September 30, 2002, Linda Weinstein was driving a covered vehicle which was
struck by an uninsured motorist. Her daughter, Sarah Weinstein ("Sarah"), was a passenger in
the vehlcle and suffered injuries. At the time of the accident, the We~nsteinscarned automob~le
insurance

wrth Defendants. T h ~ spolicy ~ncludedmedical payment coverage of $5000.00 and

UM coverage of $250,000.00.
The Weinsteins timely reported the accident. Defendants immediately concluded, based
on the police report and other information, that an uninsured driver was 100% at fault.
Defendants contacted the Weinsteins and explained that since an uninsured driver caused the
Decision and Order on Defendants' Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict
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accrdent, Med Pay and UM coverage would apply to the clatm. The UM portton of the Pol~cy
states: "'Our payment

IS

based on the amount that an tnsured ts legally entitled to recover tor

bodily lnjury but could not collect from the owner or operator of the un~nsuredmotor vehicle."
On November 11, 2002, the Defendants asked Weinsterns to send them copies of all
nredlcal b~llsand a signed medlcal release form. Mrs. We~nsteinslgned the release on December
5 , 2002 w~tha list of medical providers. Defendants ~ncorrectlyInformed the Weinsteins that a
coordtnat~onof benefits ("COB") clause required them to submlt bills first to their health
~nsurancebefore Defendants would pay anyth~ng.Defendants continued to notify the Weinste~ns
and Sarah's medical providers that a COB clause prevented them from pay~nganyth~ngon the
medrcal brlls unt~lthls mistake was caught and corrected In Apn1 of 2003. No tnvest~gationor
gathering of medlcal records was done on the cla~mdunng this tlme.
Medleal providers sent bills resulting from the accident to the Weinsteins. When ne~ther
the Weinsteins health insurance provider, nor Defendants would pay the bills, the medlcal
prov~derssent the overdue notlces to the Welnste~ns. The Weinsteins could do llttle about the
s buslness
bills, since Mr. Weinstein's business was not do~ngwell. Mr. We~nsteinowned h ~ own
prov~dingserv~cesto the airline ~ndustry,which was struggling in the wake of the tersonst
attacks of September 11, 2001. The family was struggling financially.
On January 2, 2003, Mrs. We~nsterntold Defendants that she was recelvlng threatening
phone calls from the ambulance company and hosp~talregarding unpaid b~lls.She also told them
that she and her daughter were still receiving medlcal treatment for their

injuries.

Despite this

continued contact from Mrs. Weinstein, on February 12, 2003, Defendants sent a letter to the

Weinste~nsstatlng that if they did not receive new medical bills within 30 days, the file would
close. Twelve days later the file was Inactivated "since there has been no response to [the] 30
day letter."
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In the meanttme, Sarah" doctor recommended physical therapy. She began her ph ys~cal
therapy program w~ththe goal of

preparing

her to play soccer-her

2002. Her program advanced as anticipated, and

111

favorite sport---in December

February, 2003 her physlcal therapist

as tolerated. When she began tralning for and play~ng
released her to resume physlcal act~vlt~es
soccer, her hip paln rcturned. She was only able to play ten m~nutesper half, and ultimately had
to stop piaylng enr~rely.Her mother sought further medical treatment for her.

In Apnl 2003 Mrs. Weinsteln notlfled Defendants that Sarah had an MRI show~nga hrp
Injury that might require surgery. After a second MRI, medical doctors determined that Sarah
had suffered a labial tear in her hip, resulting from the accident, which requlred arthroscopic
surgery.

Mrs. Weinstein cailed Defendants to advise them that Sarah was scheduled for

arthroscopic surgery on May 19, 2003 and that her recovery time would be approximately SIX to
nine months. By t h ~ stime, Defendants determ~nedtheir mistake regarding the COB and pald a
handful of bills that had been ~ncurredright after the accident.
Sarah's surgery was performed as scheduled, and she began another round of physical
therapy. Her progress was slow and requ~rednumerous vtsits to medical providers to assess her
recovery. Sarah's friends and family observed that she appeared depressed and withdrawn after
her surgery. Sarah was unable to return to play soccer for more than ten minutes per half, was
advlsed to restrict her running, and suffered constant discomfort and pain. She still suffers aches
and pains when she runs and engages in sports, and can only participate in high-impact physical
actlvitles for lim~tedperiods of time. Medical doctors testified at trial that, due to the acc~denr,
she w~llprobably requlre hip surgery sometime in the future, and she w ~ l lmost likely develop
arthr~t~s
in her hlp.
From May 2003 on, Mrs. Weinste~ncontinued to receive regular phone calls and letters
from medical billing departments and collection agencies regarding overdue medical bllls.
These events caused her to feel depressed and cry. The grief, stress, and constant embarrass
Decision and Order on Defendants' Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict
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resulted in marital discord and fam~lyturmoil. On one occasion, as Mrs. Weinstein was leavlng
a doctor's office followrng Sarah's vrstt, a staltf member Informed her that ~fshe did not pay her
outstanding brll In full rmmedrately, Sarah would no longer rece~vetreatment. "I'hrs was stated at

a loud volume In front of other staff and patients, and Mrs. Weinsfein was very upset to have her
flnanclal affa~rspublic~zed. Although Mrs. Wernstein notified Defendants of thls ~ncldent,they
did noth~ng.This Court observed Mrs. Wetnstein's demeanor at trial and the court believes she
was deeply disturbed by the harassment of blll collectors and Defendants' unresponsiveness to
her pleas for assistance
In July 2003, Mrs. Weinstein again called Defendants to complain about Sarah's
outstanding medical bills.' This resulted in the payment of a number of overdue bills under the
Med Pay cover-age. In September, 2003, Mrs. Welnstein demanded that UM coverage pay
Sarah's outstanding medical bills, many of which were in collection. Mrs. Welnstein told
Defendants that she was afraid the doctors would stop treating Sarah due to unpaid medical bills.
Defendants informed Mrs. Weinstein that the Med Pay benefits were exhausted, and that UM
coverage does not pay until final settlement, which occurs after the end of treatment. Defendants
then faxed Mrs. Weinstein a HIPAA compliant medical authorization to allow them to get the
med pay file and information from the medical providex2 Mrs. Weinstein signed and faxed the
medical authorization form to Defendants that day. The list of medical providers was faxed on
September 23, 2003.
Frustrated by Defendants' slow progress on Sarah's claim, the Weinsteins hired attorney
Bruce Bistline to deal with ~ e f e n d a n t s . On
~ October 10, 2003, Mr. Bistline sent a letter to
Defendants notifying them that he had been retained by the Weinsteins to represent Sarah's

1.
All bills considered after the exhaustion of med pay were responded to with a form that explained the
denial by stating "Policy benefits have been exhausted." (Plf's Exs. 83,84, 111, 113, 119, 121).
2.
HIPAA came into effect on April 14,2003.
3.
On September 30,2003, the Weinsteins sold a piece of property for $175,000. Then, in 2004, they
received an inheritance. The specific date and amount of this inheritance has not been pointed out to the co t
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Interest regarding the 2002 accident. A few days later, Defendants sent a letter to Mr. Bistline
requestlng "complete medical and wage loss documentation" in order to evaluate f arah's claim.
On October 28, 2003, Mr. Bistl~newrote to Defendants and asked whether Defendants intended
to dispute the liability of the un~nsuredmotonst, and if so, who Defendants contended was

negligent, Defendants d ~ dnot respond to t h ~ sletter. Mr. Bistline also demanded payment of
several rnedlcal bllls amounting to nearly $2,000, which Defendants did not pay.
On November 3, 2003 Mr. Blstltne called Defendants and demanded payrnent of the
medical bills. Defendants told B~stlinethat a current medical authorization form was needed to
get the bills, and that Defendants did not know what was wrong with Sarah. Mr. Bistline stated
that he would gather the current bills if Defendants would get the med pay file and share i t with
him. Defendants sent a letter the same day requesting copies of all medical expenses and reports,
a slgned medical authorization fosm, and a list of medical providers. Mr. Bistline rece~ved
nothlng from Defendants until March 9, 2004, when he received a two page summary of the med
log, and nothing else.
On November 5 , 2003, Defendants' employees discussed the demand for medical bill
payment under UM coverage, and conferred wlth an in-house attorney. The attorney advised
Defendants that he was unaware of any law in Idaho requiring payment of medical bills before
settlement. Defendants concluded that the policy required only one payment.
On March 4, 2004 a lien was placed on the Weinsteins' property for failing to pay bills
from the accident. On April 20, 2004, Blstline sent another letter to Defendants requestlng
payment of $16,669.64 in outstanding medical bills. He also stated that he would gather up-todate medical records and a prognosis from a physician to provide a proof of loss as to future
medical expenses. On May 20, 2004, B~stllnesent the medical records to Defendants. The next
month, Defendants finally began evaluating the clalm.

Defendants noted that Sarah had

treatment through February 20, 2003 and resumed soccer without problems, but had residual hi
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pain, and then suggested that she resumed soccer too soon and caused additional problems.
Defendants observed that Sarah told the doctor in March, 2003 that she had a c11cklng sensation
in her h ~ for
p two to three weeks and s~gn~fleant
pun whtle runnlng and klcktng the ball.
On June 10. 2004 Defendants declcled that they would offer a payment

In

advance of

$10,000 due to the Welnste~ns'hardsh~p. Defendants noted their desire to further revlew the
medical ftle records because Sarah's physical activities might have aggravated the injury. On
June 11, 2004, Defendants sent a letter with the payment in advance agreement ("PIA
Agreement"). On July 7, 2004, Bistline sent a letter to Defendants rejecting the PIA Agreement,
and ~ndicatingthat the Weinsteins had filed suit for breach of contract and bad faith handling of
their claim under the policy.
At trral Defendants argued that in UM cases, their policy was to wait until after receiving

all information at the end of treatment and recovery, and then evaluate the claim and make offers
to settle. Defendants had several representatives and supervisors testify that waiting until the end
of treatment to gather records and evaluate was in accordance with corporate policies.
Additionally, Defendants' log notes reflect that when supervisors reviewed the Weinstein file,
they reported that the file was "properly directed." Defendants had no mechanism for either
paying undisputed amounts in UM cases before the end, or for earlier investigation and
evaluation in cases of prolonged injury and recovery.

The Wcinsteins' experts testified that insurers had a duty to investigate and evaluate
claims within a reasonable time and that, in their opinion, Defendants had breached those duties.
The Weinsteins also presented Defendants' claims handling manuals which indicated that
investigation of claims should begin when the insurer receives notice of a claim.

The

Weinsteins' experts also testified that in UM cases, as in other first party insurance claims,
insurers have a duty to pay undisputed amounts in a reasonable time. They opined that the
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treatment of the Weinsterns by Defendants was intentional and unreasonable, and contrary to
lndustry practice In Idaho.
Notably, during the entire course of events up until trial, defendants never disputed the
amount of or necessity of the medlcal bills subm~ttcdfor payment.
ANALYSIS:

BKEACH
OF CONTRACT

I. Payment was due in a reasonable time because the contract failed to specify the
time for payment.
First, Defendants argue that they are entitled to JNOV because no contract provis~on
requlres piecemeal payments, therefore, there was no breach of contract as to the UM benefits.
The Weinsteins argue that because no contract provision specifies a time when payment 1s due,
payment must occur within a reasonable tlme.
When the meaning of a contract 1s In dispute, a court must first deternine whether or not
the contract is ambiguous. Borzdy v. Levy, 121 Idaho 993, 997, 829 P.2d 1342, 1346 (1992). In
resolving thls question, the Court must construe the policy "as a whole, not by an lsolated

phrase." Cascade Auto G l u s ~Ilzc.
, v. Idulto Fum? Bureau Iizs. Co., 141 Idaho 660, 663, 115 P.3d
751, 754 (2005) (c~tingSelkirk Seed Co. v. State Ins. Fund, 135 Idaho 434, 437, 18 P.3d 956,959
(2000)). In order to determine whether the contract is ambiguous, the court must detesrn~ne
whether its terms are reasonably susceptible to conflicting interpretations. Id.; City of Chubbuck
v. City of Pacatello, 127 Idaho 198, 899 P.2d 41 1 (1995).

If the terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous, the interpretation of the contract's
meaning 1s a question of law. See e.g., Ada Counry Assessor v. Taylor, 124 Idaho 550, 553, 861
P.2d 12 15, 1218 (1993). The meaning of the terms of the insurance policy must be determined
according to the plaln meaning of the words used. Cuscade Auto Glass, 141 Idaho at 662-63,
115 P.3d at 753-54. Common words are given the meaning applied by laymen in daily usage, as
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opposed to the meanlng derived from legal usage, i n order to effectuate the Intent of the partles.

AID lrzs. C ~ Iv.. Arnzstro~tg,119 Idaho 897,900, 81 1 P.2d 507, 510 (Ct. App. 1991).
If, on the other hand, the terms of a contract are ambiguous, the interpretallon of that
contract's meanlng 1s a questlon of fact. Id.; Borzdy, 122 Idaho at 997, 829 P.2d at 1346. When
language In the policy 1s amb~guaus,the finder of fact "must determ~newhat a reasonable person
would have understood the language to mean." Mur. of E~zurrzclawIns. Co. v. Pedersen 133
Idaho 135, 139,983 P.2d 208, 212 (1999). Insurance contracts are contracts of adheslon and are
not typically negotiated by the parties, thus the finder of fact must construe any ambiguity most
strongly against. the insurer. Mason v. State Farm Mut. Iizs., 2007 WL 4472244 (Idaho S. Ct.
Dec. 24,2007).
In thls case, Defendants dispute when UM benefits are due under the contract. The
relevant portlon of the Policy states: "Our payment is based on the amount that an insured is
legally entitled to recover for bodily injury but could not collect from the owner or operator of
the uninsured motor vehicle . . ." Policy, Part 4, section A. Defendants argue that the singular
words "payment" and "amount" in the policy clearly indicate a single recovery at the end of the
claim process.4 he court is not persuaded by this argument. Based on the plain meaning of the
words used, this portion of the policy describes how the total amount of payment is determined,
but not when money becomes due or whether it will be paid as a single amount or at intervals.
The language is not ambiguous, but rather fails to specify the time when payment will occur.
When the time for performance is not specified in a contract, performance must occur in a
reasonable time. Ujdur v. Thonzpson, 126 Idaho 6, 9, 878 P.2d 180, 183 (1994). Whether or not
a reasonable time has passed is an issue for the jury. Sufficient evidence shows that many
5.
Defendants argue that this language is consistent with Idaho's uninsured motorist statute, the purpose of
which "is to afford the same protection to a person injured by an uninsured motorist as would have been enjoyed had
the tortfeasor carried liability insurance." Ryals v. State Farm Mut. Itzs. Co., 134 Idaho 302, 307, 1 P.3d 803, 808
(2000). This argument is irrelevant to this inquiry. The interpretation of the contract does not hinge on whether or
not the language is consistent with a statute, but rather goes to the intent of the parties at the time they entered into
the contract.
Decision and Order on Defendants' Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict

months passed after the submission of uncontested med~calb~llsbefore payment occurred and
oniy $5000.00 of the uncontested amount was paid pnor to sult be~ngfiled. Defendants falled to
pay w~thlna reasonable tlme after payment was due.
11. The insurer's duty to pay undisputed amounts relates to the bad faith claim and

not the breach of contract claim.
Defendants argue that they are entitled to JNOV because no independent duty requlres
insurers to make piecemeal payments of UM claims. Because any Independent duty requlnng
~nsurersto do so would be based on the covenant of good faith and falr deallng, the breach of
such a duty would not result rn a breach of contract, but rather

In

bad falth. Thls issue will be

discussed under the bad falrh sectlon.
111. Sufficient evidence supports the jury's finding that the Weinsteins did not

prevent Defendants from performing under the contract.
Defendants argue that the Weinsteins prevented them from performing by falling to
provide a proof of loss. As a consequence, Defendants argue they were not obligated to pay
because they could not conduct a comprehensive investigation. The Welnsteins argue that proof
of loss was submitted on multiple occasions, and that Defendants falled to Investigate the clalm.
The proof of loss reyulred by an ~nsurancecompany cannot be more than what 1s
necessary to show a psima facie case. Briizkman v. Aid Ins. Co., 115 Idaho 346, 349, 766 P.2d
1227, 1230 (Ct. App. 1988). Specifically:

The amount of information provided should be proportional to the amount
reasonably available to the insured. If the information provided is insufficient to
give the insurer an opportunity to investigate and determine its liability, the insurer
may deny coverage. Otherwise, the insurer must investigate andlor determine its
sights and liabilities.
Id. A proof of loss is sufficient when the insured provides the insurer with enough information
to allow the insurer a reasonable opportunity to investigate and determine the value of the claim.

Decision and Order on Defendants' Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict

Grerrzcltagh v. Farm Bttreuu Mut. Ins., 142 Idaho 589, 593, 130 P.3d 1127, 1131 (3006).

Whether a proof of loss 1s suff~cient1s a questlon of fact. ld.
The Policy required the Wetnsterns to glve Defendants "written proof of their loss

In

a

n
requested] w ~ t h ~30
n days of [that
form oontalnlng any relevant ~ n f o m a t ~ o[Defendants
request]." Policy, General Provlston, sect~onS. The We~nsteinsfilled out multiple medical
releases autl-ronzing the Defendants to gather medrcal ~nformatlon. The jury considered an
~nstructlonon proof of loss and found that the Weinstelns provided Defendants wlth adequate
proof of loss and sufficient evldence supports that finding.
In their reply, Defendants argue that the Weinsteins prevented defendants from
performing by faillng to sign WIPAA compliant medical releases after the new HIPAA rules took

effect on Aprrl 14, 2003. Defendants provide no explanation as to why or how HIPAA affected
the Weinstein's claims process, nor do they provide the Court wlth the statute. Mrs. We~nsteln
testified that she slgned a medical release every time Defendants requested one. After the new
rules took effect, Defendants did not notlfy Mrs. Welnstein that the previously signed releases
were vo~ddue to MIPAA. Mrs. Welnstein was not responsible for ensuring that the release she
signed was still effect~veunder federal law, and ~t was not her fault that Defendants dld not
request new releases until September, 2003. In short, sufficient evidence supports the finding
that the Weinstelns did not prevent Defendants' performance.

The jury considered the

instruction on prevention of performance and found agalnst Defendants on that issue.

BADFAITH
I. Elements of the Prima Facie Case
The plaintiff in a bad faith action bears the burden of proof as to all elements of the prima

facie case. Robinsort v. State Farm Mat. Auto. Irzs. Co., 137 Idaho 173, 177, 45 P.3d 829, 833
(2002). In order to prevail in a bad faith action on a first-party claim, the plaintiff must show
that: 1) the insurer intentionally and unreasonably denied or withheld payment; (2) the claim was

000336
Decision and Order on Defendants' Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict

11

not talrly debatable; (3) the denial or failure to pay uas not the result of a good faith mistahe,

and (3) the resulting harm was not fully compensable by contract damages. The insured must
also show that the clalm was covered under the pol~cy. I d

Defendants argue that the

We~nste~ns
faled to bear the burden of proof on all elements of a bad faith claim.

A. Intentional and Unreasonable denial or delay
Defendants argue rhat there 1s no evldence of Intentional or unreasonable denla1 or delay.
Defendants argue rhat, In bad falth delay cases, there must be evtdence of "delay for delay's
sake," and clte Greene v. Truck Insurance Exchange, 114 Idaho 63, 68, 753 P.2d 274, 279 (Ct.
App. 1988), for that proposttlon. In that case, Greene, an insured, sued hls insurer for bad faith
delays In tnvestlgatlon and evaluation, and Inadequate offers of payment. Id. Greene filed a
claim under hls wild animal attack insurance for losses resulting from mastitis in hls dairy herd
that he claimed resulted from a w ~ l dcougar attack. I .

The insurer spent a long tlme

investigating the claim, and the file demonstrated that the insurer's representatives were
concerned about the unique nature of the claim and the few verifiable facts supporting it. Id.
The court noted that the evidence did not indicate that the company intended to delay, but
showed that the company took its time considering the claim for legitimate purposes. Id.
Nowhere did the court hold that plaintiffs must prove a new element of "delay for delay's sake7'
In order to preva~lon a bad faith claim. Nor does ~tdisttnguish between bad t-alth denial and bad
fa1th delay cases.
In this case, the evidence showed that months went by with no action on the claim.
Defendants7lntemal departments disregarded requests for information from another department.
Experts testified that delays were intentional and unreasonable. The record indicates there was no
or little investigation of the UM claim until almost one and a half years after the accident,
6.

It should be noted that Defendants repeatedly argue that, in order for a bad faith claim to stand, there must
also be a breach of contract. That argument is contrary to the law on bad faith in Idaho. Inland Group of Cos. v.
Providatcc Wash. Ins. Co., 133 Idaho 249,985 P.2d 674 (1999) (holding that a bad faith claim may exist even in the
absence of a technical breach).
Decis~onand Order on Defendants' Motion for Judgment Notw~thstandingthe Verdlct
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although defendants had the releases allowlng them to do an ~nvestigatton shortly after the
acc~dent, The company had developed clear polrcy to delay payment of UM beneflts until the
end of all treatment, no matter how long that took. Unllke Greene, t h ~ scase did not Involve a
unique situation where the underlying facts of the claim were disputed or susp~cious,but rather
one where litab~lltywas clearly established from the beginning. Sufflclent evtdence ex~stedto
sat~slythe first element of a bad falth clairn.

B. The claim was not Fairly Debatable
Defendants argue that the claim was fairly debatable.

In bad faith cases "fa~rly

debatable" means that at the time the claim was under conslderation, there existed a legltlmate
questlon or d~l"ferencei n opinion over the eligibility, amount or value of the clalm. Robinson v.
Stute Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 137 Idaho 173, 178, 45 P.3d 829, 834 (2002). An

Insurer is entitled to debate a falrly debatable claim whether the debate concerns a matter of fact
or law. McGilvre~v. Farmers Nrw World hs. Go., 136 Idaho 39, 45, 28 P.3d 380, 386 (2001).
Defendants argue that the claim was fairly debatable on several grounds.
Defendants argue that whether the Welnsteins were eligible for partial payments of
outstanding medical bills on a UM clairn is fairly debatable. They assert that no Idaho case

squarely states that insurers must pay medical bills before a final settlement In UM cases, and
therefore the Weinsteins' request for payment was fairly debatable. The Weinsteins argue that
all bad faith cases should be treated the same, regardless of the type of insurance involved, to
best meet insureds' expectations regarding how claims will be handled under insurance policies.
The Weinsteins argue that because bad faith cases exist in Idaho mandating the payment of
undisputed amounts within a reasonable time, the lssue of whether or not those cases apply in a

UM case is not falrly debatable. Idaho case law has not distinguished between types of
insurance when discussing bad faith cases, thus the Court agrees that bad faith case law applies
to UM coverage the same as it does to other types of coverage.
Decision and Order on Defendants' Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict
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The tort of bad fa~thwas first recogntzed in Idaho in Wzite v. Urzigurd M ~ ~ t u cIils.
i l Co.,

1 12 Idaho 93,96,730 P.2d 10 14, 1016 (1986). The court stated
"The tort of bad fatth breach of Insurance contract, then, has its foundations In
common law covenant of good filth and falr dealing and is founded upon
unique relationship of the insurer and the insured, the adhesionary nature of
Insurance contract including the potential for oveneaching on the part of
Insurer, and the unique, 'noncommercial' aspect of the insurance contract.

the
the
the
the

ld. at 100. The Idaho Supreme Court indicated that the tort of bad faith was applicable to UM
cases in Anderson v. Fat-n~c~rs
Ins. Co., 130 Idaho 75.5, 947 P.2d 1003 (1997).
Once a claim has been filed and the company has investigated the claim and determined
that there is no dispute as to at least part of the claim, the insurer must pay the undisputed
portion. lrllclnd Group of Conlpaulies v. Providerzcu Wusiz. Ins. Co., 133 Idaho 249, 985 P.2d 674
(1999) (holding that a bad faith claim may exist even in the absence of a technical breach). In

Inland an insured filed a bad faith claim against its insured and prevailed. Id. The insured filed
a claim for losses due to the destruction of its equipment in a fire, and notified the insurer that the
financial condition of its business was precarious. Id. Although the insurer demanded payment
of the undisputed amount needed to repair the equipment, the insurer delayed in paying, resulting

in the collapse of the insured's business. Id. The Idaho Supreme Court held that an insurance
contract secures "more than the company's bare promise to pay certain claims when forced to do
so; implicit in the contract and the relationship is the insurer's obligation to play fairly with its
insured." M.at 680.255.
An insurer is required to pay undisputed portions of a claim even if the insurer
legitimately disputes another part of the claim. Chester v. State Fumz Ins. Co., 117 Idaho 538,
789 P.2d 534 (Ct. App. 1990). In Chester, an insured submitted a claim for the burning of his
barn. Id. The insurer offered Chester the actual cash value of the barn, which was only $50,000,
but Chester believed he was entitled to the replacement cost of the barn, which was $95,000. Id.
The insurance company paid nothing while this issue was being contested. Id. Chester then sued
Decision and Order on Defendants' Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict

for breach of contract and bad faith. The court held that the insurance company cornmltted bad
I

faith by fallng to pay the $50,000-the

minlmum amount it was liable for-even though the

Issue of valuatton was fairly debatable. Id.
Defendants' claim that the rnajorlty rule fsom other jurisdictions 1s that pre-payment of

UMfUIM clalms are not required. Aroizsorz v. State Furttz Ins. Co., CV 99-4074 CAS, 2000 US
D ~ s tLEXIS 6979 (C.D. Gal. 2000); Volurzd v. Furrtzers lns. Co. cf Ariz., 943 P.2d 808 (Anz
1997); LeFcrvrr v. Westberry, 590 So.2d 154 (Ala. 1991); Ellwein v. Wurlli,rd Accidenf urzd
Initem. Co., 15 P.3d 640 (Wash. 2001). These cases are all distinguishable from the present case.
Aronsoiz, is an unreported decision. Further, the insured never asked for payment in

advance, and the holding was explicitly limited to such circumstances. In Volaad, there was no
"und~sputedamount" bur rather an unaccepted settlement offer. Additionally, the insured did not
request payment in advance of the medical bills, as the Weinsteins did in this case. It should be
noted that Arizona courts do consider the failure to pay undisputed amounts potential bad faith
acts. See Borlund v. Sqfeco Ins. Go., 709 P.2d 552 (Ariz. App. 1985).
In LeFevre, the Alabama Supreme Court held that UM claims are "hybrid" claims that
are part first-party and third-party claims, and therefore no bad faith cause of action exists for

UM claims until the uninsured motorist's liability is fixed. This is substantially different from
Idaho law, which recognizes bad faith claims for UM claims as first party claims. Finally, in
Ellwein, the Washington Supreme Court held that in bad faith cases, insureds must prove bad

faith as a matter of law, thus allowing trial courts to dispose of bad faith claims on summary
judgment so long as uny evidence exists to show a reasonable basis for the insurer's

action^.^

This is different from Idaho law, which allows the jury to hear conflicting evidence on bad faith
claims and render the ultimate decision.

7.

It should also be noted that Ellwein was overruled by Snzitfz v. Safeco Ins. Co., 78 P.3d 1274 (Wash. 2003).
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Many jurisdictions

recognize

UM bad faith clams as first pasty claims, as does Idaho.

See Slate Furtn Mrt. Auto Ins. Co. v. Sht-uder, 882 P.2d 813 (Wyo. 1994). Under those
lu~-~sd~ctlons,
UM cla~msare treated the same as other first party cla~ms. The rat~onalebehlnd
this is that an Insured 1s entltled to expect that the ~nsurerwill handle a claim for uninsured
motonst coverage In the same manner as other coverages: fairly and in good fa~th. ALLAND.
WINDT, INSURANCE CLAIMS AND DISPUTES: REPRESENTATION OF INSURANCE
1NSUREDS 6-324 FN

COMPANlES AND

6 (2007). In fact, some expests suggest that the ~nsurer'sstandard of conduct

should be higher for UM claims, because most states mandate such coverage by statute.

ALAN

WDISS, 11 UNINSUEDAND UNDERINSURED
MOTORIST
INSURANCE237 (2000). Junsdictlons do
specif~callyrecogn~zcthat the fallure to pay undisputed amounts on UM or UIM cla~msmay
amount. to bad farth. See Saucier v. Allstute Ins. Co., 742 A.2d 482 (1999); Millers Mut. Ins.
Ass'n v. House, 675 N.E.2d 1037 (1997).

In this case, it was undisputed from October 1, 2002 that the uninsured motorist was at
fault. There was no fairly debatable issue of comparative fault on Mrs. Weinsteln's part.
Addit~onallythere was no pre-existing condition that may have contributed to Sarah's

injuries.

Defendants had a duty to investigate and evaluate the claim in a timely manner. Defendants were
requlred to pay the existing medical bills, which were undisputed amounts.
Defendants next argue that causation was fairly debatable because Sarah may have
aggravated or worsened her condition by returning to play soccer too soon. This argument I S not
supported by what actually occurred in the claims adjustment process. Although in June of
2004, Defendants noted that Sarah may have returned to play soccer too soon, that "debate" was
never communicated to the Weinsteins or their attorney. The "not fairly debatable" requirement
does not require plaintiffs to show that the claim was not hypothetically debatable.

See

Robirzsorz, 137 Idaho at 178, 45 P.3d at 834 (holding that the relevant time for determin~ng
debatabllity is "at the time the claim was under consideration"). Rather, it requires plaintiffs to
Dec~slonand Order o n Defendants' Motron for Judgment Notw~thstandlngthe Verdlct

show that the cla~rnwas not uc.tidully debated on a legrtlmate ground, Here, although Defendants
have alleged causation, this was alleged In hrndslght after suit was filed. Further, because Sarah
was slmply following the instructions of her medical providers, her actlons were not an
intervening cause rel~ev~ng
the insurance company from Irability. When a tortfeasor 1s liable for

another person's bodlly injury, he 1s also 11able for any additional bodily harm resulttng from
normal efforts of rhtrd persons
requires,

In

rendering a ~ dwhich the other person's Injury reasonably

regardless of whether such acts are done tn negl~gentmanner. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)

OF TORTSIj

457. Sarah d ~ dnot return to play soccer until her phys~caltherapists advised her to,

therefore if there was resulting harm, it is attnbutable to the tortfeasor. The evidence at tnal
~nd~cates
Sarah followed the advice of her doctor-recommended physical therap~st.
Defendants also argue that the cla~mwas fairly debatable because there was a quest~onof
fact as to whether Sarah will require a hip replacement due to the motor vehicle coll~sion,and
because there was no evidence or demand relating to non-economic damages. Even ~f these
elements were debatable, the insurer was required to pay the undisputed amount of the
outstanding medrcal b~lls.

C. The delay was not the result of an "honest mistake"
Defendants argue that if there were mistakes, they were made in good faith. The
Welnstelns have the burden of showing that any delay or denial was not the product of a good
fatth or honest mistake. Robinsorz, 137 Idaho at 176. Idaho law defines "honest mistake" as "an
Innocent mlstake which was made despite the presence of procedures to prevent the making of
such mistake. It is a mistake that occurs despite reasonable care to prevent it. A mistake which
IS

the result of negligence or inattention or Indifference is not an honest m~stake." Id. The jury

was glven thls tnstructlon and declded that the delay was not the result of an honest mlstake.
Suffic~entev~dencesupports that flndtng.
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D. Extra-contractual damages
Next Defendants argue that the Weinsteins faled to carry the burden to show that the
resulting harm was not fully compensable by contract damages, and that they fatled to do so.

Defendants c ~ t enumerous rntent~onal~nfll~tlons
of emotlonal distress cases to support thelr
contention

that the Wernsterns faded to carry the burden of proof regarding extra-contractual

damages. However, the cause of action in this case was bad faith handling of an insurance
contract, not an emotional distress tort. Because bad faith is a tort, the full range of tort damages
is available to a plaintiff with a successful claim, including emotional distress.
A bad faith clarm is a tort claim arising out of a breach of contract, for which an insurer
can recover damages nomaily recoverable in tort, including emotional distress.

Walstoiz v.

Monumerztal Lzfk lizs. Co, 139 Idaho 21 1, 219, 923 P.2d 456, 465 (1996). In discussing a case
where only emor~onaldlstress damages remalned outstanding, the court noted "an actlon for

lntentlonal lnfllct~onof emot~onaldistress w ~ l llie only where there 1s extreme and outrageous
conduct coupled wtth severe emotional distress." Wulston, 129 Idaho at 219, 923 P.2d at 464
(quotlng Davis v. Guge, 106 Idaho 735, 741, 682 P.2d 1282, 1288 (Ct. App. 1984)). After
quotlng the standard for lntentlonal lnflrctlon of emotlonal dtstress, the Walston court looked
only to whether the insurer's conduct was "extreme outrageous conduct" before conclud~ngsuch
damages were recoverable.
The duty of care in an insured-insurer relationship is much higher than the standard duty
of care contemplated in general tot-ts for emotional distress. "The court has 'recognized a special
relationship' between an insured and insurer due to the adhesionary aspects of the insurance
contract. Id. citing White v. Unigurd Mut. Ins. Co., 112 Idaho at 99, 730 P. at 1019. Insurers are
a kind of fiduciary for insureds.

Wulston used the elements of the tort of emotional distress to

weigh the evidence to determine if it supported the bad faith claim. This is consistent with how
other jurisdictions deal with the issue of emotional distress damages. In most jurisdictions that

000343
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consider a bad Calth clalm a tort, the full consequentlal damages are allowed, lnclud~ngmental
distress. ALLAND. WINDT,INSUKANCF:
CLAIMSAND DISPUTES:REPRESENTATLON
OF INSURANCE

Cohli~~rn
AND
~ s INSUREDS3 6:40 (2007). Orlly those states that do not

recognize

bad falth

clalrns or recogntze them as contractual clams require the Insured to prove all the elements of
the tost of lntentlonal infiict~onof emotional dlstress to recover emot~onaldistress damages. Id.
In thls case, the seventy of Defendants misconduct coupled wlth the We~nste~n's
expectatlun of the contract satisfies the requirements of W l s t o n . The Defendants denled the
Welnstelns' sequests for payment and defended a policy of delaying the settlement of the UM
clalm, w~thknowledge that the Weinstelns were recelvlng phone calls from bill collectors and
bang threatened by medical providers. The Weinsteins entered into the contract expect~ngthat
the Defendants would protect them in thelr tlme of need. The Weinsteins presented evldence
that they suffered from embarrassment, harassment by bill collectors, from internal famlly strife,
and overall misfortune and distress in their life as a result of the Defendants failing to meet their
contractual obligations. Mrs. Weinstein experienced depression and crying. The jury was
instructed on thls element, and found that the emot~onaldlstress was severe. The Welnstelns met

thelr burden to prove thelr harm was not fully cornpensable by contract damages.

THEPAYMENT
IN ADVANCE AGREEMENT
Defendants argue that the Payment in Advance Agreement ("PIA Agreement7') was not,
as a matter of law, improper, and therefore they are entitled to JNOV. Regardless of whether the
PIA Agreement was proper or not, the We~nsteins'counsel made his closing argument based on
the evidence in the record and the jury was Instructed that the closing argument was not in itself
evidence. Since the Defendants have not explained why, even if the PIA agreement was proper
as a matter of law, this would entitle them to a JNOV, the court reserves d~scusslonof t h ~ s~ssue
for the motlon for a new tnal.

Decision and Order on Defendants' Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict

THEDUTYTO MITIGATE
Dekndants argue that the Weinste~ns'bad Edith damages must be offset in whole because
the Welnstelns Failed to mltigate by uslng their lnherltance to pay overdue rned~calbtlls. "The
duty to mltigate .

. provldes

that a plaint~tfwho 1s lttjured by actionable conduct ot a defendant

is osdlnanly denled recovery for ctamages whlch could have been avoided by reasonable acts,
~ncludlngreasonable expend~tures,after actionable conduct has taken place."

Margaret N.

Ctrityrze Trust I>. Lipsky, 123 Idaho 253, 261, 846 P.2d 904, 912 (1993). The issue of whether or

not pla~ntiffsacted reasonably 1s one for the tner of fact. Id.
The We~nsteinsdld not receive any ~nhentanceuntil one year after the accident. Thts
was after Defendants refused to investigate or pay medical bills, and after Mrs. Welnsteln had
begun to recelve threatening phone calls from medical providers and collection agencies. The
jury could reasonable belleve that prlor to the Inheritance, the Weinste~nscould not mltlgate their
Injuries,

and that the bad Path had already been committed.

Also there was no evldence

presented to show that the inheritance eased their financial obligations. Flnally, the jury was
provided with a jury instruction on mitigation and could have found that the Weinstelns' cholce
to not use the lnhentance money to pay the overdue bills was reasonable under the
circumstances.

PUNITIVE
DAMAGES
AND CORPORATE
RATIFICATION
Defendants argue that the We~nsteinsfaded to show corporate ratificat~onof any actlons
support~nga clalm for punltive damages. In Idaho, the plalntlff must show that the d~rectorsor
managlng officers of a corporation partlclpated

in,

author~zed,or ratified the alleged bad acts of

the agent In order to recover punitive damages from that corporation. Manning v. Twin Fulls

Clinic & Hosp., 122 Idaho 47, 53, 830 P.2d 1185, 1191 (1992). GrifjS Inc. v. Curry Bean Co.,
138 Idaho 315, 321 (2003). Further, in order to ratify the malicious act of a lower-level
employee, the officer or director must "at the time of such ratification [have] knowledge
Decision and Order on Defendants' Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict
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The Court DENIES Defendants' motion for JNOV.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 23"' day of January, 2008.

Darla Williamson,
District Court Judge

I, J. Davld Navano, the itnderslgned authority, do hereby certlfy that I have ma~led,by
Unlted States Mall, one copy of the Dec~slonand Order on Defendants' Motlon for Judgment
Notwlthstand~ngthe Verdict to each of the attorneys of record in this cause in envelopes
addressed as follows:
James E. Risch
R. John Insinger
Jason Risch
407 West Jefferson Street
Boise, ID 83702-6049
Dated this@day

Robert A. Anderson
Phillip J. Collaer
C.W. Moore Plaza
250 S. 5thStreet, Suite 700
P.O. Box 7426
Boise, ID 83707-7426

of January 2008

Decision and Order on Defendants' Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict
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Kohel-i A. A~~dersctri,
ISB #2 123
I"hllllp J . C'oll~ier-,
1SB it3347
i\.l:lrh l) Sch;irti;in. ISB #hO I ?
ANI)k;KSON, JII1,IAN CI; Hlilsl, 1 I IJ
(' W. MC)C)IL"
PI~L~I
250 South F~fthStreet, Su~te'700

Post Offlce Box 7426
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426

(208) 344-5800
(208) 344-55 10

Tclephnnc:

Facslmlle:

Xttul-nei \
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Defendants

IN THE DISl'RICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRlCT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
LESLIE WEINSTEIN. and LINDA
WEINS'TELN. J-Ii~shanciand Wife, ~ n c llcltlally
~l
and ,I\ Ciua~il~~ins
ad l~temlo]-SARAH K .
Wt,IhS I L:lh. .~ndSARAH R WkINSrI'l=IN
I ndl L ldual l y

Case No CV PI 0300280D

DEFEIVDANTS' NO'I'ICE OF
APPEAL

Plain tiffs/Respondents,
VS.

PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY AND
CASLIALTY INSURANCE COMPANY and
PKllUENTIXL GENERAL INSURANCE
COMPANY and LIBERTY MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY and LM
PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE,

1

-1HE ABOVE IiNl'lTLED PLAIN'TIFFS, LESLIE WEINSrI'EIN, LINDA
WE1NSrTElN,AND SARAH WEINSTEIN, AND T m I R ATTORNEY, JAMES
RISCH, AND THE CLERK OF TEE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT

NOTlCE IS &REBY GIVEN THAT:

DEFENDANTS' NOTICE: OF APPEAL

-1

I

The above named appellants, PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY AND CASUAEl'Y

INSliRANCE COMPANY and PRIIDENTIAI. GENERAL, INSURANCE C'C)MPANL' a11d
1-IBL;IC I Y ML' 1 l A 1 - l?tSlIR,'\hC't, C'Ohl13,4h?i c t ~ ~l hd l PKOPEII 1'Y ANl)

(. "\SC'=II.1 L

INSC'RANCE, appe;"I agalnst the above runled lespondentx to the ld~thoSupreme ('OLII-t 11ori1the
./rrc/grrlc/rientered tn the abo~c-entttledproceeiilng o n October 1, 2007: ;mtl the I Z I I I P I I L I C ~

.ltlc/yrrzc~tttrrl I - L ~or
I of Strrilll IVc~ll~,\rcirr,
I>c~c*r\loilclttcl Onlev 0 1 1 i2rtonzev I.'i~c.\ mil Co\t.$ C'lc~rtric~~l
'[At o

LS~~t-t/ii
W C >\tc~tz,
I I ~ :itid I>c<I ~[oizC ~ I Z LO
I FL~O
01F
1 I ~ ~ ~ f ~ ~ t t [SIC]
c i c ~1V10?1011
~ t t ~ t for Ncjw

~ ' F I L rcJ.
I~

.Irrr-or Ml.rcorldrrct entered In the aboie entltled proceed~ngon the December 27, 2007, Dai-la

Wllllalnson presiding, Appellants reserve the right to appeal the Dlstrrct Court's declslons
I egal ding

other outstanding motions for new trlal andlor judgment notwl~hstandrngthe verd~cti t

and when such decisions should be entered by the Dlstrlct Court and served on Appellants

-7

r

-

lhat the parties hate a 11ghr to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the

ludgments or orders described In paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pulauant

LO

Rules 1 I(;"), I.A.R.
3

The primary Issue:, on appe.‘1 1 are.
(a)

Did the D~xts~ct
Court err In holding that there Mas no misconduct on the

part of juror Mark Barbo sufficient to warrant the grant of a new trial'!
(b)

Dld

the

Dlstr~ct Court

e1-r In

award~ng attorney'b

fees

to

Pla~ntlff/RespondentSarah Wernste~npursuant to Idaho Code 4 4 1 - 1839'!
(c)

Dld the Dlstrict Court err In awardlng costs as a matter of rlght to
Pla~nt~fSIRespondent
Sarah We~nstern?

IIEFENDANTS' NOTICE OF APYEAI, - 2

(d)

Dld the D~str-lctCourt err in grantlng the Arrzrrtdi~elfudgnlc~~zr
z r l k i v o r of
Sc~rirlt Ml(~rrlali~rl1pnor to rullng on Defendants'lAppellants' outstanding

motloris lor new trial andlor judgment notwithstanding the \ierdict'!
ie)

Uld the District C'iturt e n In falling to use the prc>pcr set-oil\ In
detern.lining the arnoun t of thc judgment?

4.

A repol-ter's transcrtpt 1s requested

In

its entirety for the hearings conducted on

Ntt~cmbei7 and 19.2007, and December 13, 2007 and Trlal transcript.
5

-1 hc i2ppcllcrrit\ lcqi~cstt I i , i ~ [IIC 1c)llonrr~gciocumcnls bc ~nclird~cl
rn the clci I<'\

I-ecordin tlddltlon to those autornatlcally lncluded under Kiile 28. 1 A.K.:
(a)

All bnefs, affldavlts or other documents flled or lodged by the partles

tt~

the D~strlctCourt pertalnlng to the Dcyi2rld~rzt~
' Motion for NC'LI:
Tr1u1rc2:
.Iirror MI.K ortclucr;

(h)

All bl-lefs, tlffldavits

01-othel- doculnents

flied or lodged by the pal-tles 01-

the Dlstrrct Court perta~ntngto the Plaintiffs' motlons for costs and fees;
(c)

All brlefs, afflda~ltsor other documents filed or lodged by the pal-tles or
ill F ~ n ~ o0t ). SC~IYIII
the D~sti-lctCourt pel-tuning to the ilrtzetttlecl Jitckgr?z~~zt
l.t;.lil

(d)

.~nd.

\rt~l/r.

All exhlblts offered

01.admltted

at the hear~ngsconducted on Noveinbt.1- 7

and 19,3007, and December 13,2007.
(e)
0

All Exhlblts admltted at the tl-ial.

I eel-t~tj th,tr

(a)

The clerk oi the Dlhtr~c~
Coui-t will be pald the estllnated fee
preparation of the reporter's transcript and clerk's record;

I)EFENI),ANri'S' NOTICE OF APPEAI,
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(17)

'l'he Ltl~pell;iii:I~lirlg1cc i n the ~tnctutii1 1 $100.00 has becn paid; and.

(c)

lTt-ratse~-\~lce
has been made upon the trall court Repol-ter and all pastres
reyurred to be served pursuant to Rule 20.

DATED this

ay of January, 2008

LIAN BL HULL

'4

I.I.~)

t A. Anderson, O f t h e FII-m
Aitolneys 101-Defendants

w

DEFENDANTS' NOTICE OF APPEAL
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on thlsgTday
of January, 2008, 1 served a true and correct
cctpy of thc fc,regolng DEFENDANTS' NOTICE OF APPEAL by deliverrng the same to each
of the follow~ngattorneys of record, by the method tndicated below, addressed as follows:

407 W. Jcl'fermn Street
Botse, ID 83702

DEFENDANTS' NOTICE OF APPEAL
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&..->-.
,-*
*...
< ;*g;$,&
g
r

;

-,*

,.i"

NO.

Rohci-t A Atiderson, ISB #3 1 33
Phillip J C'oll;tei, ISB #?337
M,IIh 1) Scb,ist1,111,1SB #OO I I!
Ahll)l:RSON, Jl1LdI.4NK; l1111~1,
1 i 1,
I' W hilrtotc P l t t / ~
350 South Filth St~cct,Suite 700
P o ~ Offlce
t
Box 7326
Bo~se,Idaho 83707-7426
Telephone
( 2 0 8 ) 334-5800
I;ac\lmllc:
(208) 333-55 10
E-M,ril. iiindcl ~on@!:a~hlaw.conl
Ai~ol-neyst)rDefendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY O F ADA

LESLIE WEINSTEIN, and LINDA
WEINS'I'EIN, Husband and W ~ f e~ndiv~d~lally
,
x n ~ al \ C;uar-dlans ad 11temfor SARAH R
W1:INSrl't.,1N.aiid SARAH R WEINSTEI3
~nd~\idually

Case No. CV PI 040028013)

DEFENDANrI'S'FIRS?' AME:Nl)E:l)
NO'TICE OF APPEAL

PKI~DL,N'I'IAL_
PKOPkRTY AND
C'IISI~AL~IY
INSURANCE COMPANY and
PRULItN I'IXL GENERAL INSURANCE
COMPANY and LIBERTY MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY and LM
PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE,

TO:

TIiE ABOVE ENTITLED PLAINTIFFS, LESLIE WEINSTEIN, LINDA
WEINSTEIN, AND SARAN WEINSTEIN, AND THEIR ATTORNEY, JAMES
RISCH, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:

DEE'ENDANrI'S' FIRST AMENDED NOTlCE OF APPEAL - 1

1.

'The abokc named appellants, PR'CJDENTJAL PROPERTY AND CASUALTY

INSL'KAKC'E COMPANY and PRIIDENTIAL GENERAL, INSURPlNGE COMPANY and

LIBEK'I'Y MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY and LM PROPERTY AND CASUALTY
INSURANCE, appeal against the above named respondents to the Idaho Supreme Coui-t fi-om the
Jrrllg~tlrrtt cntel-cd

In the above-ent~tledproceeding on October 1 . 2007; and the A I I I ( - ' I ~ ~ ~ c L ~

.Irrtlqitrc~lrr111 I-lr\'or

of

cr

.V~lr-cilr 1 2 / ; j i r t \ r c ~ t r r ,

l o S t i r r l l t C Z / l ~ t 1 1i t c j i ~ l .and

1,lc.c i \tot1

I I c J1~\ t r j 1 1

[rltti

t i l l ~ 01
i clr-'~ o i l

01dot- ort

: \ r f o r - ~ t ~\ J~' O O \ t l r l r l

I

I ) c ~ / i ~ ~ l ~t l c\ iI C
~ ]r ~,Motloll

C'i)\f\

C'ltli~~t(l(l

for IVOII I'n~rlI-(.

Jut-or Mr.\cotiduct entered In the above ent~tledproceeding on the December 27, 2007, Darla

W~ll~amson
presldlng. Appellants reserve the right to appeal the Distrlct Court's dcc~sions
i-egtlrd~ngothel- outstanding ~ n o t ~ o nfor
s tiew trlal andor judgnlent notwlthstandlng the verd~ct~f
and when such decls~orisshould be entesed by the District Court and served on Appellants.
2.

That the partles have a r~ghtto appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the

judgments or orders described In paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant to
Rules 1 I(a), I.A.R.

3

The primary issues on appeal are.
(a)

Did the D~rtl-~ct
COLII-L
err in holcl~ngthat there mias no ni~scoiiduct011 the
part of juror Mark Barbo sufficient to warrant the grant of a new tl-lal'?

(b)

Did

the

Dlstnct

Court

err

In

award~ng attorney's

fees

to

Plaintlff/Respondent Sarah Welnstein pursuant to Idaho Code 4 41 - 1839'?
(c)

D I the
~ D ~ s t r ~ cCourt
t
en. In awardlng costs as a matter of r~ghtto
Plaint~ff/RespondentSarah Welnstein?

DEFENDANTS' FIRST AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2

(dl

Did thc Di\k~rut C'OLIIt
Slir~rlr

CZ'ol~istoirlp110i

C I I I I I g ~ ; t ~ i t the
~ i ~A/rli.iltli)d
s

1 ~ )ru1111gon

.lutlq~r~c~/tr
rri F l i t or- r~l

Dcfe~idants'/Appellati~~'
outstdndrii~

motlons for new trral andlor judgrrtent notw~thstandingthe verd~ct?
(e)

Drd the Dlstrrct Court err In falling to use the proper set-utfs In
determ~nlngthe amount of the judginent'?

3

A I-eporter's transcrrpt 1s rcquesled In rts entlrety for the hcar-~ngsconducted o n

No~ember7 and 19, 2007, and December 13, 2007 and 'Prial transcript.

5.

The Appellants request that the follow~ngdocuments be Included In the clerk's

I-ecordIn a d d ~ t ~ oton those ai~toniat~cally
~ncludedunder Rule 38, I.A.R.:
(a)

All hrlels. att~d,i\~ts
01 othe~docurnents tried or lodged b j the p,lrtics or-

the D ~ s t ~ -Court
~ c t pci-talnlng to rhe Llc.fe/z~lulzt.~
' Morrorl )or. Nelt 1-t-ILL/1-6.
Juror Mi.)cot duct;

(b)

All briefs, aff~davlts01-other documents filed or lodged by the part~esor
the D ~ s t r ~Court
ct
pel-ta~n~ng
to the Plalnt~ffs'motlons for costs and Sees:

(c)

All bl-lets, attidav~tsor other documents filed

01-lodged

by the pal-tles or

the Distnct Court pertalnlng to the Amerxled Judgitzerzr irz Favor

01 SarciI1

Winstc.in; and,
(d)

All exh~bitsoffered or adm~ttedat the heal-~ngsconducted on Novelnber 7
and 19, 2007. .lnd Deccmber 13, 2007.

(el
6.

All Exh~brtsadln~ttedat the t1-1~t1.

1 cert~fythat:
(a)

The clerk of the Distr~ct Court will be pard the estimated See torprepal-atlon ot the repol.te~-'stranscl-lpt and clerk's record;

DEFENDANTS' FIRST AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3

(b)

The appellate t illng Ice m the amount rf $100.00 has been p a ~ dand,
;

(c)

That sesvlce has been nude upon the tsatl court Reporter and all parties
reyu~sedto be served pursuant to Rule 20.

DATED this

I*

day of February, 1008.

Robert A, Anderson, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Defendants
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sc

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on t h ~ (
s
day of February. 2008,I served a true and correct
copy of the forcgo~ngDEFENDANTS' FIRST AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL by
del~verlngthe same to each of the follow~ngattorneys of record, by the method indicated below,
acldrcssed as follows:

(
[

Penny Tardiff, Reporter
ADA COUNTY COURTHOUSE
200 W. Front Strect
t3or~c.1ii;~lio83703

1
j

[ ]
[
I ]
[ j

4

Overntght Marl
F;icsrmlle
U.S. Ma1 I, postage prepald
Hand-Dell vered
Overn~ghtMall
Facstm~lc

Robert A. Anderson
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JAMES E. RISCH (ISB ff1224)
R. JOEIN INSINGER (ISB #1678)
JASON S. MSCH (ISB #6655)
RTSCEl GOSS INSINGER GUSTAVEL
Attorneys at Law
407 West Jefferson Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 345-9974
Facsimile: (208) 345-9982
Attorneys for PlaintiffsICross-Appellants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

LESLIE WEINSTEIN and LINDA
WEINSTEIN, Husband and Wife,
individually and as Guardian Ad Litem
for SARAH R. WEINSTEIN, and Sarah
R. Weinstein, individually,

1

Case No. CV PI 0400280D

)
)

NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL

1

PlaintiffsICross-Appellants,)
VS.

)

1

PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY AND
)
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY )
and PRUDENTIAL, GENERAL
INSURANCE COMPANY and
1
LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY and LM PROPERTY AND )
CASUALTY INSURANCE,
1

1

DefendantsICross-Respondents. )

NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL - Page 1

TO:

THE ABOVE-NAMED CROSS-ESPONDENTS, PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY
AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, PRUDENTIAL GENERAL
NSUKANCE COMPANY, LIBERTY MUTUAL I N S U M C E COMPANY, AND
LM PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE, AND SAID PARTIES'
ATTOWEYS, ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL, AND THE CLERK OF THE
ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT:
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

LESLIE WElNSTEIN and LINDA WEINSTEIN, as Cross-Appellants, do cross-

appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court against the above-named Cross-Respondents from the January
23,2008 Decision and Order on Defendants 'Motionfor Remittifur, or, in the Alternative, New Trial
entered by the Honorable Darla S. Williamson (this Cross-Appeal is only as to the Court's remittitur
of the jury's $6 million punitive damage award to $1.89 million; Cross-Appellants do not appeal
any aspects of this Court's January 23, 2008 Decision and Order other than Section C.3. and all
remittitur issues, and do not appeal any other judgment or order entered in this action). Although
Cross-Respondents have not yet amended their January 29,2008 Notice of Appeal to specifically
include issues subject of the Court's January 23,2008 Decision and Order, their Notice of Appeal
specifically reserved (in paragraph 1) the right to appeal the District Court's decisions and orders
regarding their motions for new trial and/or judgment notwithstanding the verdict when entered.
Based on that reservation and the fact that those reserved issues were decided in the January 23,2008
Decision and Order, Cross-Appellants expect that Cross-Respondents will amend their Notice of
Appeal to include that Decision and Order (presumably excluding an appeal of the Court's decisions
on remittitur and Section C.3.). Because it is not expected that Cross-Respondents will appeal the
remittitur aspects or rulings of the January 23, 2008 Decision and Order and because CrossAppellants only appeal from the remittitur decisions in this action, this may not be a pure
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'%ross-appeal'3n a technical sense, but to any extent this Cross-Appeal might otherwise be construed
or characterized as a direct appeal of those remittitu: issues rather than a cross-appeal, it should be
deemed as such as to Section C.3. (and any other remi~ituraffected sections) of the January 23,2008
Decision and Order.
2.

Cross-Appellants, LESLIE WEINSTEIN and LINDA WEINSTEIN, have a right to

appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the above-referenced January 23,2008 Decision and Order
described in paragraph 1 above, is an appealable order under and pursuant to Rules 11, 1 1.1 and
1 1.1(5), I.A.R.

3.

The primary issues on this Cross-Appeal by LESLIE WEINSTEIN and LINDA

WEINSTEIN are:
a.

Did the District Court err in reducing the jury's $6 million punitive damage
award to $1.89 million?

b.

Did the District Court e n in ordering a rernittitur reducing the punitive
damage award from $6 million to $1.89 million as a condition of denying the

Defendants'/Cross-Respondents' Motion for New Trial?
c.

Did the District Court e n in granting the DefendantsY/Cross-Respondents'
Motion for New Trial as to punitive damages should PlaintiffsICrossAppellants rehse to accept the remittitur of the punitive damages award from
$6 million to $1.89 million as a condition of denying the Motion for New
Trial?

4.

No additional reporter's transcript is requested by the Cross-Appellants, because an

adequate transcript has already been requested by the Cross-Respondents in their January 29,2008
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Notice of Appeal; Cross-Appellants acknowledge that the extent of the reporter's transcript
requested by Cross-Respondents in their January 29, 2008 Notice of Appeal is appropriate and
complete as to all issues and that no additional transcript is needed.
5.

Cross-Appellants concur that the docments listed in Cross-RespondentsYanuary

29,2008 Notice of Appeal should be included in the clerk's record in addition to those automatically
included under Rule 28, I.A.R.; no others are needed or requested by Cross-Appellants.

6.

Icertify:
a.

Because of the requests for the transcript and the record specified in CrossRespondents' January 29, 2008 Notice of Appeal, no additional reporter's
transcript or clerk's record will be required as a part of this Cross-Appeal,
and thus no additional fees are required.

b.

Service of this Notice of Cross-Appeal (including the statement herein that
no additional transcript will be required or requested beyond that specified in
the Cross-Respondents' January 29,2008 Notice of Appeal) has been made
upon the reporter.

c.

Service of this Notice of Cross-Appeal (including the statement herein that
no additional transcript will be required or requested beyond that specified in
the Cross-Respondents' January 29,2008 Notice of Appeal) has been made
upon the clerk.

d.

The Cross-Appeal filing fee in the amount of $101.OO has been paid.

e.

Service of this Notice of Cross-Appeal has been made upon the trial court
reporter and all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 20, I.A.R.
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000361

DATED This 7" day of February, 2008.
IZISCH GOSS INSINGER GUSTAVEL
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Cross-Appellants

BY
R. JOHN INSINGER, of the firm

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 7'h day of February, 2008, I caused to be served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL as follows:
Robert A. Anderson
Phillip J. Collaer
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL, LLP
Attorneys at Law
C. W. Moore Plaza
250 S. SthStreet, Suite 700
P.O. Box 7426
Boise, ID 83707-7426
Penny Tardiff, Court Reporter
Ada County Courthouse
200 W. Front Street
Boise, ID 83702
Jean Hirrner, Court Reporter
Ada County Courthouse
200 W. Front Street
Boise, ID 83702

[(/I U. S. mail (postage prepaid)
[(/I
[ ]
[ 1

Facsimile (344-55 10)
Hand Delivery
Federal Express

[ I

U.S. mail (postage prepaid)
Facsimile
Hand Delivery
Federal Express

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

[/I

[ 1
[ ]
[

1

R. John Insinger
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U. S. mail (postage prepaid)
Facsimile
Hand Delivery
Federal Express

I

z
-

-

FEB 2

t4iillil>J C'oIl,tc.i.ISB#34-17
M,uI\L) Sel~a\ticii~,1SB#0013
ANLIEKSON, JULIAN X HULL 1.1.1'
C . W. Moore Plaza
250 South Fifth Street, Sulte 700
Post Office Box 7426
Boise, Itllrho 81707-7426
Tclephonc:
(208) 344-5800
I;ac\imlle'
(318) 343-55 10
E-hl,ii l randel son C@ajhla~v.con~

i

20bd

Attoi-neys l'or Defendants
I N THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

l,kSL,If: WI,INSI'EIN, .tnd LINDrZ
\iV121YSIklh tl~~sh,incl
,~ndW ~ t c indi~id~ially
.

Ca\c N o . ('V PI 0400280l>

.u1d .is ( ; L I ~ ~ I ~ I ~ I ;id
I I I litem ioi SARAH R.
WklNSTEIN, and SARAH R. WEINSTEIN
indlviduall y

DEFENDANTS' SECOND
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL

Plainti ffslRespondents,
VS.

PKCIDET\;7L'IAL
PROPERTY AND
CASIJALTY INSURANCE COMPANY and
PRUDENTIAL GENERAL INSURANCE
COMPANY and LIBERTY MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY and LM
PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE,

TO:

THE ABOVE ENTITLED PLAINTFFS, LESLIE WEINSTEIN, LINDA
WEINSTEIN, AND SARAH WEINSTEIN, AND T m I R ATTORNEY, JAMES
RISCI-I, AND TKE CLERK OF TKE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:

DEFENDANTS' SECOND AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1

I

Thc above named appellants, PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY AND CASUALTY

I N S I f K , 4 N f ' t COMPANY and PKCJDEN'I'IAL GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY and
LIUkRrlY MI'TUAL INSL'RANCE COMPANY ,~nd LM 13ROPERTY AND C"4SCiAL'I'Y

INSURANCE, appeal agalnst the above named respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from
the .fil~lq?)lcv~lf
enlered In the abote-entrtled proceed~ngon October 1, 2007; ihe

(11)

(I)

Ai~~orr~lcd

.f~ttl:,~~rt~trr
111 I-rit~orof SLITLIJIU'i~zrt.\f~112
entered In the tthove ent~tledpi-oceed~ngon December 27,

2007,

(111 )

thc

r rroti m i l 0r~lc.rori Attorrirv Frri tatd Co,rr.r Clnznzed

1jc.c

~1.3

to Suruh Wo~~i.srer~i

entered In the above ent~tledproceedlng on December 27, 3007; (IV)the De~.i.siorzund Or-dcur 012
Dt~f<~lirlu~zr.\
[slc] Motiolz fijr New Ti-iul re: Juror Miscorzdz~ctentered In the above ent~tled

proceeding on December 27, 2007; (v) the Deci~iotz ulzd Order on Defi,nd~l~zt.s'JVlorio~z for
JLIL~~N
I ~O~ ~~ J~I VI ~I I I ~~I ZSPV(~il~11ct
~ L ~ entered
I ~ ~ L I n~ the
~ ~above entltled proceedlng on January 21,
2008;

(VI)

the L)ecl.\zolz cud OF-drron Dejelzllcilzts' il/lotiolz for Kcmztrztur or, itz the Alter-~rutrl~j,

iVr\t+Trrtil entered In the above ent~tledproceed~ngon January 23, 2008; (vll) the L ) O L I ) I ~CUZL/
II

Orrlc~r011 fist\

Clnirned (is to Leslie ci~td LincJu Weilzstc~ilzentered in the above entitled

ploccedlng o n Junutil-y 23, 2008; and

( ~ I I I ) all

court orders and l-ul~ngsleading up to those

judgment\, the Eionorahle Darla Wllllamson presldlng.
.3

That the partres have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the

judgments or orders descr~bedin paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant to
Rules I I(a), I.A.R.

3

The prlinary lssues on appeal are:
(a)

Dtd the Dlstr~ctCourt err in holding that there was no mlsconciuct on the
part of juror Mark Barbo sufflc~entto warrant the grant of a new tnal'!
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(b)

Uld

the

Dtstrrct

Coui-t crr

In

awarding

attorney's

Sees

to

Pla~nt~i'i'ltiespctndent
Sarah Wetnsteln pursuant to Idaho Code 4 4 1- 1839?
((3)

Dtcl the D~stnctC ~ ~ i err
r t In a~vardrngcosts as a mattes ol- rrght to
Platntiff/Respondent Sarah Welnste~n?

(cl)

Did the Dlstrrct Court err In granting the Antended Judgnletlt irz Fullc/r of
Suruft Wein.rteirz prror to rul~ngon Defendants'/Appellants' outstanding

motloni lor new
(c)

tt-lill

L i ~ ~ juclgmcnt
d / ~ ~ - notwlthstand~ngthe ~ e r d ~ c t ' ?

Did the D~strlct Court cir In I'a~llng to use the proper set-otls In
determlnlng the amount of the judgment?

(1')

Should the punltlvc damage award (as reduced by the court's remtttttur
ru 11 ng) he reversed bccause:

0)

the court erred In fa111ng to apply Idaho's statutory pun~ttvc

damages cap, wh~chtook effect July 1, 2003;
(11)

the court erred In allowtng Plaintiffs' counsel to invite puntshment

of' the entll-e Insurance ~ndustry,takrng Into account harm to others bestdes

Plalnr~ffs,and In ratlonallztng that those comments were tmpl~cltlyllmtted
to Idaho;
(111)

the court erred In refus~ngto instruct the jury or set aslde the

verdlct w ~ t hrespect to the t'allure to prove the elements of corporate
rat~ttctltlonnecessary to obtaln punltlve damages under Idaho law; and,

OL)

the court erred in not reduc~ngthe award to a constltutlonally

acceptable amount relat~ve to the amount of compensatory damages
awarded by the jury;
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(v)

the c o u ~ctred
~ In lnstructlng the jury that ~t could conslder the

Dctcnclants' ~ i c ~ ~'1l11d
t h~ I I ~ ~ I ~ CL I' OL I~ II ~ I ( I ~ I ~ "
)

UIJ the court ~ ~ ~ ~ r c c t n sas
t l u3e mattel ol law the duties of an Insurance
company w ~ t hrespect to an un~nsuredmotorrst clalm by:
(I)

holdtng that under Idaho law an Insurance company's duty to an

~ n s ~ i r etod pay benef~tson an uninsured motonst c l a ~ m1s the same aa the
duty to an ~nburedw ~ t ha f~rst-partyc l a m ; and,
(11)

find~ngthat Defendants engaged In bad f a ~ t hbreach of contract by

not ~mmed~ately
paylng un~nsuredmotorlst benef~ts w~th each med~calb~ll
I-ecelbed'?
(h)

D I the
~ COLII-t ell

.t\

.I

m~lttel-ol lau In l a ~ l ~ ntog glanl a judgment

nolw~rhstand~ng
the L erdlct.
(I)

based on the evldence that Pla~nt~ffs'counsel

prevented

Defendants from maklng tlmely payments by fallrng to prov~deproper
releases and/or t~nielydel~verlngmed~calrecords; and/or that ~t was a
good t a ~ t h mlstahe for Defendants to rely on the representations on
Pla~nt~ffs'
counsel that he would del~versaid records;
(11)

based on the evidence that the Insurance pollcy d ~ not
d reyulre that

Defendants ~mmeci~atelypay un~nsured motorlst benefits w t h each
111ed1cztl b ~ l lrece~veci,and/or that such o b l ~ g a t ~ owas
n "lit~rlydebatable"
due to the lack of pnor Idaho precedents recognlLlng such
(111)

,I

duty,

based on a lack of ev~dence supporting an ~ntent~onaland

unreasonable den~alor delay In paylng benefits;
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based on cvidcncc that ihc extent of Dclendant's obl~gatlonto

(I\)

make u n ~ ~ ~ s u motorist
red
payments for Platntiff Sarah We~nstein'srnjui-tes
or damages were fairly debatable;
based on a lack of ev~denceto establish the Plaintiffs suftercd

(v)

extra-contractual daniages:

(v~)

based on an ~nsultlclency of

the evidence shvuing either

~ntentionaldelay or that any delay was not the result of a good f a t h
mistake on the part ol Defendants;
hased on an ~nsuff~clency
of the evtdence to support the awards for

(\I))

cornpenhatory damages; and,
(~11)

based on evidence showing that Plaintiffs failed to mittgate their

damages'?
(I

C)ld

the court er-r in

giving,

over Defendants' objections, a jury

instruction

thai prcbents the text of the Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act'?
(1)

Did the court err rn failing to grant a new tnal as to the claims of breach of
contract and bad faith as to the un~nsured motorist

provisions

of the

policy:
(I)

based on the Improper d~str~bution
to the jury of Plaintitts'

annotated exhibi t I~st;
(11)

based on an award of excessive damages both for compensatory

damages and punlt~vedamages;
(111)

based on a failure to instruct the jury as to the defense of adv~ceof

counsel;
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(I\)

thi~cd011 thc c o i ~ i t i~rovid~rig
a

j~11.y I I I \ ~ I . L I C I ~ Oon
~

bad la1111

rnct)ll?ol.t1111g.I ~icglrge~ici:
\rdnddl d ,
(v)

b a ~ e don the court permitting the testimony of Pla~nt~ftb'
witncss,

Norma Nlelson:
(VI)

bascd o n et.rdence t h ~ ~the
r jury verd~ctwas the I-esult oi passlon

dnd 1"-qudlce,
(VII)

based on the court's comments before the jury disparag~ng,01.

seemlng to d~sparage,Defendants' counsel;
(~111)

based on ~ncorrectlyInstructing the jury as to when payment was

due;
(1x1

bascd on inzoi-~cctly~ns~rucrlng
the jury as t o \+hat c o n ~ r ~ t ~ i ~ c d

actionable delay; and,
(x)

based on ~nconectlyInstructing the jury as to proper standard (rol-

bad t 'uth'!

(k)

D I the
~ court en- In holding that Pla~nt~ffs
had made a sufflclent proof of
loss as to all claims?

(I)

Did the court err by falling to give an instruction that whei-e a claim

1s

i'a~rlydebatable there can be no bad faith?
(m?

Did the court e n by falling to glve an instruction that where there exists a
matter of flrsr Irnpresslon these can be no bad falth?

(n)

Did the court err by falling to glve a jury ~nstrucrionon the requ~l-ed
severity for emotional distress damages?
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(o)

Did the court e1-r ~n c(3ntrnulng the summary judgment hearing

In

order Lo

EI ve Pialnt~t t s an opporlunl ty to amend t h e ~ rSecond Amended Complall~t

b

to avoid a poss~ble adverse summary judgmet~truilng?

(p)

D I the
~ court err in not grantlng Defendants' mottons in li~ni~ze?

(4)

Did the court err In not granting Defendants' motlon for drr.ected verdict?

(I)

DICI [tic court
Jdmdgeb

In riot ~nstruct~ng
the J ~ I - ythat Sarah We~rtite~ri'\

(11-1

101.futulc

~neJ~c,ti
~ " t r cwere to bc d~vardedon

LI

p~e\)enlcLt\li

value bas1s?
(s)

Dtd the court err In fa~ilngto grant Defendants' motion for summary
judgment?

(I)

D I the
~ court err

in

grant1ng Pl~~i~ztiff:~
' Motiorz to A I ~ c ~ IP~I C
L ~I L L5Cto
I~II~

Irz~.lttdea Prayer fitr KeEiejSeekitzg Punitive Dunzuges?
4.

A reporter's transcript is requested in its entirety for (i) the September 2007 trial

of t h ~ smatter: and fcrr the hearings conducted on (11) December 7, 2006; (111) January 3, 2007;
(IL)

April 25, 2007; ( v ) May 2. 2007,

(11)

Scplernher 11, 2007:

(LII)

No~ernber7, 2007:

(~111)

N o ~ c ~ n b1 cI.~3007, ( ~ x November
)
19, 3007. , ~ n d( x ) December 13, 2007

5.

The Appellants request that the following documents be included In the c i e r k ' ~

I-ecordIn addltlon to those automatically illciuded under Rule 28, 1.PI.R.:
(a)

or other documents filed or lodged by the parties or
Ail bnefs, aff~dav~ts
~ c t pel-talnlng to the Dc.felldurzt.c1Motiorz fi)r Necv 7r-z~llre:
the D I S ~ I -Court

Juror Miscolzd~ict;
(b)

All br~efs,affidav~tsor other documents filed or lodged by the parties or
the Dlstrict C ~ U Ipertalnlng
-t
to the Plaintiffs' motions for costs and fees;
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All briels,

ttt fldavtts

or other dclcurncnts t lied or lodged by the partlcs or

the D~strlctCourt pertalnlng to the A I I ~ C ' If~~lgl?leizf
~ ~ O C ~ 111 Eiivor of Sui-(i11
\\'(jlll

$tC1l!1,

All exhlb~ts01 Je~ecl01 acltnlt~cdat the heannga conducted on Novcmbcr 7
and LC), 3007, and December 13,2007;
All E x h ~
b ~ t sadmitted at the trtal;
All briefs, aff~davltsor other documents f ~ l e dor lodged by the partles or
the D ~ s t r ~ Court
ct
pertalnlng to Dejendatzts' Motion filr Rertrittiti~ror,

iiz

tile Alterrzutivt., Ncjw Trial;
All briefs, af'fidav~tsor other documents filed or lodged by the parties or
the D~strict Court pertalnlng to Defendants' Motion for Ju~I,y~ilelzt

Kot\t~trllstcr~ltlltz~)
tlii) l'c~nllct :
All brlels, utf~duv~ts
or other documents f~ledor lodged by the partles or
the District Court pertainlng to Defendants' Motion for Su~tlrtlury

J~ldgnzentfiled on or about November 8, 2006.
All bnefs, affidav~tsor other documents f ~ l e dor lodged by the parties

01-

the D~stnctCourt pertainlng to Plainfig&'Motion to Amerzd pleading^ to

Itzclude u Pruyer for Relief Seeking Punitive Daunuges f ~ l e don or about
November 15,2006.
All brlefs, aff~davltsor other documents flied or lodged by the pal-tles or
t
pertalnlng to M o t r o ~ t~o A~~tcjildSrcofld AIIIC~I~LL~JLI
the D ~ s t r ~ cCourt

Gorrtpl~liltt, ~ncluding, but not llrn~ted to, Defendarzt.5' Ol~jectrort to
Procedure;
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(h)

Any and all ot the Dtslnct Court's schedultng or-ders entered In the above
entitled matter;

(1)

All jury lnstructlons grven, tendered and refused;

(m)

All briefs, afficfavits or other documents jsertainlng to Defendants' motions
111 !1171111<":

in)

All briefs, affldavlts or other documents filed In support or

In

opposition

to proffel-ed jury instructions; and,

(01

All brief\, aftidavits or- otl~esdo~umentspet-r,iining to Dclcndant\' n~otioii
tor directed ver-d~ct.

6.

I certrly that:
(a)

The clerk of the District Court has been paid the estimated fee h r
preparation of the reporter's transcript and clerk's record;

(b)

The appellate fillng tee i n the amount l f $100.00 has been pald; and,

(c)

That servlce has been made upon the trral court Reporter and all pai-ties
requlred to be served pursuant to Rule 20.

DATED this M 5 a y of February. 2008.

A N D V I A N bi HULL tar.t)

Robert A. Anderson, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Defendants
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this &%ay
of February, 2008,I scrved a true and cori-cct
copy 01 thc filrego~ngDEF):NDANrTS' SECONI) AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL by
del~vci-lngthe sitme to each of the following attorneys of record, by the method lndlcated below,
nddi-eased as thllows:

14U.S.Mall,postagepl-epald

Jaine\ Kl'rch
~1s~- GOSS INSINGER CUSTAVEL,
307 W. Jefferson Street
Bolse, ID 83702
Penny Tardl f f, Reporter
A D A COUNTY COURTHOUSE
200 W. Front Street
Bor \c, Idaho 83702

/ j
[ ]
[ 1

Hand-Del~vered
Overnight Mall
Facs~m~le

[Jf

U.S.Mail,postageprepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overn~ghtMall
Facsimile

[ ]
j
[ 1

/

------i

'
.,
Robert A. Anderson

-
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2

4

Z
Cf"J

-

JAMES E. IUSCH (ISB #I2241
R. JOHN INSINGER (ISB # 1678)
JASON S. RISCH (ISB #6655)
RISCH GOSS INSINGER GUSTAVEL
Attorneys at Law
407 West Jefirson Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 345-9974
345-9982
Facsimile: (208)
.

t

DAVID MAVARRa, GI@&
By A. GARDEN
DEPUTY

,

a Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Cross-Appellants
IN THE DISTIUCT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

LESLIE WEINSTEIN and LINDA
WEINSTEIN, Husband and Wife,
individually and as Guardian Ad Litem for
SARAH R. WEINSTEIN, and Sarah R.
Weinstein, individually,

)
)
)
)

1

Plaintiffs/Cross-Appellants,
)

1

VS.

)

PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY AND
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY
and PRUDENTIAL GENERAL
INSURANCE COMPANY and LIBERTY
MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY and
LM PROPERTY AND CASUALTY
INSURANCE,

)

1
)
)
)
)
)
)

Defendants/Cross-Respondents.

-
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Case No. CV PI 0400280D
FIRST AMENDED NOTICE OF
CROSS-APPEAL

TO:

THE ABOVE-NAMED CROSS-RESPONDENTS, PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY
AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, PRUDENTIAL GENERAL
INSURANCE COMPANY, LIBERTY MUTUAL INSUUNCE COMPANY,
AND LM PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSUMNCE, AND SAID
PARTIES' ATTORNEYS, ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL, AND THE CLERK
OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT:
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

LESLIE WEINSTEIN and LINDA mPNSTEEN, as Cross-Appellants, do cross-

appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court against the above-nanled Cross-Respondents, from the
January 23, 2008 Decision and Order on Defendants' Motion for Remitfitur, or, in the
Alternative, New Trial entered by the Honorable Darla S. Williamson. This Cross-Appeal is

only as to the Court's remittitur of the jury's $6 million punitive damage award to $1.89 million,
and related new trial and remittitur issues, and is not an appeal of any other judgment or order
entered in this action. Notwithstanding the inclusion of Sarah Weinstein as a party in the
original Notice of Cross-Appeal and in the heading of this First Amended Notice, Sarah
Weinstein is not a party to this Cross-Appeal because it only pertains to the claims of Leslie
Weinstein and Linda Weinstein.
The order and issues appealed from in this First Amended Notice of Cross-Appeal are
essentially the same as those addressed and cross-appealed from in the plaintiffs' original
February 7,2008 Notice of Cross-Appeal; this First Amended Notice of Cross-Appeal is filed so
that if for any reason the February 7, 2008 Notice of Cross-Appeal was insufficient or deficient
in including these issues on appeal, they are hereby preserved and presented for appeal by this
First Amended Notice of Cross-Appeal.
This First Amended Notice of Cross-Appeal is to amend, supplement, correct, clarify,
present and preserve the appeal of all remittitur issues and the Court's reduction of punitive
FIRST AMENDED NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL - Page 2

damages and conditional denial of a new trial. LEf LIE WEINSTEIN and LINDA WEINSTEIN
thus give this notice of their cross-appeal of those issues set forth in the Court's January 23,2008
Decision and Order.
2,

Cross-Appellants LESLIE WEINSTEIN and LINDA WEINSTEIN have a right to

appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the above-referenced January 23, 2008 Decision and
Order described in paragraph 1 above, is an appealable order under and pursuant to Rules 11,
11.1 and 11.1(5), I.A.R.
3.

The primary issues on Cross-Appeal by LESLIE WEINSTEIN and LINDA

WEINSTEIN are:
a.

Did the District Court err in reducing the jury's $6 million punitive
damage award to $1.89 million?

b.

Did the District Court e n in ordering a remittitur reducing the punitive
damage award from $6 million to $1.89 million as a condition of denying
the DefendantsVCross-Respondents' Motion for New Trial?

c.

Did the District Court e n in granting the Defendants'/Cross-Respondents'
Motion for New Trial as to punitive damages should LESLIE
WEINSTEIN and LINDA WEINSTEIN refuse to accept the remittitur of
the punitive damages award fiom $6 million to $1.89 million as a
condition of denying the Motion for New Trial?

d.

Did the District Court err in granting the Defendants'/Cross Respondents'
Motion for New Trial on the issue of punitive damages only, thereby
precluding a new trial of the Weinsteins' other damages?

FIRST AMENDED NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL - Page 3

4.

No additional reporter's transcript is requested by the Cross-Appllants LESLIE

WEINSTEIN and LINDA WEINSTEIN, because an adequate transcript has already been
requested by the BefendmtslCross-Respondents in their January 29, 2008 Notice of Appeal;

PlaintiffslCross-Appellants acknowledge that the extent of the reporter's transcript requested by

DefendantslCross-Respondentsin their original and their First and Second Amended Notices of
Appeal is appropriate and complete as to all issues appealed by all parties, and that no additional
transcript is needed.
5.

Cross-Appellants LESLIE WINSTEIN and LINDA WEINSTEIN concur that

the documents listed in Defendants'lCross-Respondents' original and their First and Second
Amended Notices of Appeal should be included in the clerk's record in addition to those
automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R.; no others are needed or requested.
6.

I certify:
a.

Because of the requests for the transcript and the record specified in

Defendants'lCross-Respondents'

Notices,

no

additional

reporter's

transcript or clerk's record will be required as a part of this Cross-Appeal,
and thus no additional fees are required.
b.

Service of this First Amended Notice of Crass-Appeal (including the
statement herein that no additional transcript will be required or requested
beyond that requested by the DefendantslCross-Respondents) has been
made upon the reporter.

c.

Service of this First Amended Notice of Cross-Appeal (including the
statement herein that no additional transcript will be required or requested
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beyond that requested by the Defendants/Cross-Respondents) has been
made upon the clerk.
d.

The Gross-Appeal filing fee in the amount of $10 1.OO has been paid.

e.

Service of this First Amended NQtice of0oss-Appeal has been made upon
the trial court reporter and all parties required to be served pursuant to
Rule 20, I.A.R.

DATED This

fL;t;lf day of March, 2008.
RISCH GOSS INSINGER GUSTAVEL
Attorneys for PlaintiffslCross-Appellants

ER, of the firm
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 5 % a y of March, 2008, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing FIRST AMENDED NOTICE OF CROSSAPPEAL as follows:
Robert A. Anderson
Phillip J. Collaer
ANDERSON, WLIAN & HULL, LLP
Attorneys at Law
C. W. Moore Plaza
250 S, 5thStreet, Suite 700
Y .O. Box 7426
Boise, ID 83707-7426

[J]
[J]
[ ]
[ ]

Penny Tardiff, Court Reporter
Ada County Courthouse
200 W. Front Street
Boise, ID 83702

[ ]
[ 1

Jean Hirmer, Court Reporter
Accurate Court Reporting
P.O. Box 140218
Boise, ID 837 14-0218

[dl
[ ]
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[ ]
[ ]

[ ]
[ ]

U.S. mail (postage prepaid)
Facsimile (344-5 5 10)
Hand Delivery
Federal Express

U.S. mail (postage prepaid)
Facsimile
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
U.S. mail (postage prepaid)
Facsimile
Wand Delivery
Federal Express

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH m I C I A L DISTRZCT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, EN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
husband and wife, mdi\ridually and as guasdjans ad litem
for SARAH R. WEENSTEIN, and SARAH R.
WEINSTEIN individually,

Supreme Court Case No. 34970
CERTIFICATE OF EXHBITS

Plaintiffs-Respondents-Cross Appellants,

PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY AND CASUALTY
INSURANCE COMPANY and PRUDENTIAL
GENERAL INSUMNCE COMPANY and LIBERTY
MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY and LM
PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE,

I, J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the
State of Idaho in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify:

That the attached list of exhibits is a true and accurate copy of the exhibits being
forwarded to the Supreme Court on Appeal.
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the following documents will be submitted as EXHIBITS to
the Record:
1. Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment - Fees and
Interest, filed February 24, 2005.
2. Affidavit of Linda Weinstein in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment - Fees, filed February 24,2005.
3. Affidavit of Bruce S. Bistline in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment - Fees, filed February 24,2005.

4. Defendant's Memorandum Opposing Partial S m a r y Judgment, filed March 18,2005.
5. Second Affidavit of Linda Weinstein in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment - Fees and Interest, filed April 7,2005.

6. Second Affidavit of Bruce S. Bistline in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment - Fees and Interest, filed April 7,2005.

CERTIFICATE OF EXHLBITS

7. Defendam Prudential Property's Memormdum In Support Of Motion For Sununary
Judment, filed November 8,2006.

8. Affidavit Of Vicki Kempczenski In Support Of Defendants' Motion For Summary
Judment, filed November 8,2006.

9. Memorandum In Support Of Plaintiffs' Motion To Amend Pleadings To Include A Prayer
For Relief Seeking Punitive Damages, filed November 15,2006.
10. Affidavit Of Wayne L. Soward Re: Plaintiffs' Motion To Claim Punitive Damages, filed
November 15,2006.
1 1. Affidavit Of R. John Insinger In Support Of Plaintiffs' Motion To Amend Pleadings To
Include A Prayer For Relief Seeking Punitive Damages, filed November 15,2006.

12. Defendants' Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Continue Hearing On Plaintiffs
Motion To Amend Pleadings Re: Claim For Punitive Damages, filed Novernber 27,2006.
13. Defendants' Memorandum In Opposition To Plaintiffs' Motion To Amend Pleadings To
Include A Prayer For Relief Seeking Punitive Damages, filed November 30,2006.

14. Memorandum In Support Of Defendants' Motion To Strike The Affidavit Of Wayne L.
Soward, filed December 1,2006.
15. Reply Brief Re: Defendants' Motion To Continue Hearing On Plaintiffs Motion To
b e n d Pleadings For Punitive Damages, filed December 5,2006.
16. Plaintiffs' Memorandum In Opposition To Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment,
filed December 19,2006.
17. Affidavit Of Wayne L. Soward In Opposition To Defendants' Motion For Summary
Judgment, filed December 19,2006.
18. Affidavit Of R. John Insinger In Opposition To Defendants' Motion For Summary
Judgment, filed December 19,2006.
19. Affidavit Of James L. Wadhams In Support Of Plaintiffs' Motion To Amend For Punitive
Damages, And In Opposition To Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment, filed
December 22,2006.
20. Supplemental Affidavit Of Robert A. Anderson In Support Of Defendants' Motion To
Continue Trial, filed December 29,2006.
21. Affidavit Of Phillip J. Collaer, filed December 29,2006.

CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

22. Supplen~entalAffidavit Of Wayne L. Soward In Support Of Plaintiffs' Notion To Amend
And In Opposition To Defendants7Motion For Summaw Judgment, filed
February 2 1,2007.
23. Plaintiffs' Closing Brief In Opposition To Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment,
filed April 11,2007.
24. Plaintiffs' Closing Brief In Support Of Plaintiffs' Motion To Amend Pleadings To
Include A Prayer For Relief Seeking Punitive Damages, filed April 11,2007.
25. Affidavit Of Irving "Buddy" Paul In Opposition To Claims Of Bad Faith And Punitive
Damages, filed April 11,2007.
26. Defendants' Reply Brief Re: Motion For S m a r y Judgment, filed April 11,2007.
27. Defendants' Supplemental Memorandum In Opposition To Plaintiffs' Motion To Amend
For Punitive Damages, filed April 11,2007.
28. Second Affidavit Of Phillip J. Collaer, filed April 11,2007.
29. Affidavit Of S. David Childers In Support Of Defendants' Motion For Summary
Judgment And In Opposition To Plaintiffs Motion To Amend To Claim Punitive
Damages, filed April 12,2007.

30. Defendants' Memorandum In Opposition To Plaintiffs' Motion To Amend Second
Amended Complaint, filed May 1,2007.
*

3 1. Memorandum In Support Of Defendants' Motion In Limine No. 1, filed August 3 1,2007.
32. Affidavit Of Counsel In Support Of Defendants' Motion In Limine No. 1, filed
August 3 1,2007.
33. Defendants' Memorandum In Support Of Motion For Directed Verdict, filed
September 21,2007.
34. Defendants' Requested Jury Instructions Nos. 1-36, filed September 26,2007.
35. Plaintiffs' Jury Instructions, filed September 26,2007.
36. Defendants' Requested Third Supplemental Jury Instructions And Amended Jury
Instructions, filed September 26,2007.
37. Original Jury Instructions, filed October 1,2007.
38. Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for New Trial Re: Juror Misconduct,
filed October 15,2007.
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

39. Affidavit of Phillip J. Collaer in Support of Defendants' Motion for New Trial Re: Juror
Misconduct, filed October 15,2007.

40. Memorandum in Support of DefendantsWotion for Remiaitur or, in the Alternative,
New Trial, filed October 15,2007.
41. Affidavit of Robert A. Anderson in Support of Defendants' Motion for Remittitur or, in
the Alternative, New Trial, filed October 15,2007.
42. Memorandum In Support Of Defendants' Motion For Judgment Notwithstanding The
Verdict, filed October 15,2007.
43. Affidavit Of Janet Nolan, filed October 15,2007
44. Memorandum of Costs (Rule 54, I.R.C.P,) as to Leslie and Linda Weinstein, filed
October 15,2007.
45. Affidavit of Amounts Due to Plaintiff Sarah Weinstein in Support of Judgment in Favor
of Plaintiff Sarah Weinstein, filed October 15,2007.
46. Affidavit of Attorneys fees Claimed as Costs as to Sarah Weinstein, filed
October 15,2007.
47. Memorandum Of Costs And Attorney Fees (Rule 54, I.R.C.P.) As To Sarah Weinstein,
filed October 15,2007.
48. Plaintiffs' Response Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Remittitur or
New Trial, filed October 26,2007.

49. Affidavit of James E. Risch in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for a New Trial Re:
Juror Misconduct, filed October 26,2007.
50. Affidavit of Mark Barbo, filed October 26,2007
5 1. Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for New Trial Re: Juror Misconduct, filed
October 26,2007.
52. Brief In Opposition To Defendants' Motion For Judgment Notwithstanding The Verdict,
filed October 26,2007.
53. Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants7Motion for New Trial Re: Juror
Misconduct, filed November 6,2007.
54. Affidavit of Kenneth Bensinger in Support of Defendants' Motion for New Trial Re:
Juror Misconduct, filed November 6,2007.
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

55. Defendants' Reply Brief Re: Motion for Remittitur or, in the Alternative, New Trial, filed
November 6,2007.
56. Defendants' Reply Brief Re: Motion For Judgment Notwithstanding The Verdict, filed
November 6,2007.
57. Amended Reply Memorandm in Support of Defendants' Motion for New Trial Re: Juror
Misconduct, filed November 7,2007.

58. Affidavit Of Kelly Saar, filed December 12,2007.
59. Affidavit Of Mark Northcutt, filed December 12,2007.

60. Supplemental Affidavit of Amounts Due to Plaintiff Sarah Weinstein in Support of
Judgment in Favor of Plaintiff Sarah Weinstein, filed December 13,2007.
TN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said
Court this 7th day of July, 2008.

J. DAVID NAVARRO
Clerk of the District Court

CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

EmIBIT LIST
Darla Willimson
Judge

Janine Korsen
Clerk

Date September 14,2007
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Case No. CVPI0400280D
Linda & Sarah Weinstein

Jim Risch
Risch Goss & Insinger

vs.
Prudential Property & Casualty Insurance

BY

No.

Description

Rob Anderson
Anderson Julian & Hull

Status

CHRONOLOGY AND EXRIBIT LIST
Weinstein v. Prudential
Ada County Case No. CV PI 04002801)

/

/

Exhibit
No.

1

EX 1-37
-

I

+

Ex 38-44
PRU393-399

I

'1

&L

Date

1
1

09130102

fld/nw

Event

I
4
--

p s u r a n c e Poiicy

1 Accident - Police Report

I

1

I

I

I Adjuster's Log - Greg Sanders - See no liability on the part of the insured
I

10101102

1

E x 47-48
PRU644-647
1 W2016-2017

L-

-

'

10101/02

Adj. Log - Sanders - It appears that the sole cause is Brittany Hardan the UM - Good ,
chance there is no insurance - "Appears UM caused this multi-car accident, closed i
I- liab SFX and opened UM SFX."
----t
I
Adj. Log - Vicki Kempczenski - Case transferred from Sanders to Kempczenski She also concludes UM caused accident.

1

1 Letter - Patricia Doyle to Parent of Sarah Weinstein- I am handling claim -you have

10101102

I

1

--- -----

10108102

I

--

10/14/02
-

-

I

I
-I

----

--

-

--

1
1

g - Dorothy Quim - Received Police Report - Describes details of accident I
1 after witness interviews and police report - Concludes UM caused accident; "1 00% 1
...on
Hardan."
I
--

/
d j . Log - Quinn - Called insured and lcfi msg that after investigation it appears only
1j isince
fault is with Hardan Advised her to tell her atty to send out a letter of representation
I
this appears to be a UMBI claim.

i

I

Ex 54

P R U OI~~2024~-2024~

1011;
a

I

PRUXOI-802
~202.5-2026

-

-I_i_---

' Prud. requests search of all prior claims made by Sarah.
--

-

I

1

1

-

Kempczenski - Explained Coll, Ded, Med Pay, UM to Linda; Subro letter

10102102

Ex 51

-

- Doyle to Parent of Sarah Weinstein - Your auto policy carried COB - "This
requires our policyholder to pursue reimbursement for medical bills through the
appropriate health carrier."
-

-

PRUO 16-0 18
I
W2019
--

W2020
E X 52-53 I
PRU02 1-024
~2022-2021

p
-

1 Letter
I

--

,

I

Ex 4p

---

I

1

- - - - - 1 $5k med pay coverage

! PRU648-650 I

PR1J404

1

-

-

2
1

I

Letter - Doyle to McMillan Med. Center Dr. Little - Payment Denial. "Sarah
Weinstein carries COB coverage on their auto policy with Prudential. This is excess
over any coverage" under primary med. plan.

-
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1

I

Event

Date

Exhibit
No.

I

Letter - Doyle to Ada Co. Emerg. Serv. -Payment Denial. "Sarah Weinstein carries I
COB coverage on their auto policy with Pmdential. This is excess over any
coverage" under primary med. plan.

---+

Adj. Log - Kempczenski - No rep letter rec'd to date. Will await atty rep letter to
find out about treatment - Index forms in, shows a MVA for Linda on 05/21/02 send inquiry forms to Farmers.

j

1

Adj. Log - Kernpczenski -Mrs. Ins called . . .(ends with) "I'm going to increase UM 1
reserves to $5500 each with ongoing TX."
I
Letter - Kempczenski to Linda Weinstein - need info - copies of med. exp./reports
and sign and return med. auth. - Linda handwritten note indicates mailed back on
1215.

1 111 1/02

- -----

Letter - Doyle to St. Al's - Payment Denial. "Sarah Weinstein carries COB coverage
on their auto policy with Prudential. This is excess over any coverage" under primary
med. plan.

+-/

Linda mailed back signed Medical Authorization Form to Kempczenski
(Kem~czenskinever used it)
- - -- -- --- - --- -- -

A ~ ~ . -1
LDoyle
o ~ called Linda - Starting to get threatening phone calls for bills not
being paid. COB on all bills, including Sarah. Bills must go to HCP first; Linda
"didn't agree with it"
Letter - Doyle to McMillan Med. Center Dr. Turner - denial - "The patient carries a
Coordination of Benefits policy with Prudential which provides that all medical bills
must first be submitted to patient's health care provider."

1

1i

Ex 66
PRU 117

0 1116/03

1 Adj. Log

- Doyle - Tells McMillan bills must first be submitted to HCP.
-

1
II

/

to Linda -Linda upset, says PN is denying claim. Doyle tells her
to HCP.
I

i

--

Cp--

I

-t7I

02/12/03
- ---

Ex 70
PRU809
~2038

----

Ex 71
PRU132

--

Letter - Doyle to McMillan Med. Center Dr. Turner - Payment Denial. "Sarah
Weinstein carries COB coverage on their auto policy with Prudential. This is excess
over any coverage" under primary med. plan.

-- -

Adj. Log - Doyle untes "advised that we need denial for HCP claim." Sending 30
day letter - if no bills received will close.
--

1

02/12/03

Letter - Doyle to Parents of Sarah - I am handing the medical claim. I've noticed we
have not received any med. bills "in quite some time" -will close in 30 days.

I1

02/24/03

Adj. Log - Since no response to 30 day letter, no bills, no OOPS, deactivating file.

I
--

-
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I

1

Exhibit

/

Date

--

-I

Event

I Med Pay Log -First

1

-

med bill payment ($52.22 to Sarah Weinstein for prescription

' UM Adj. Log - First entw since 1111
1/02, except one irrelevant subroentry
--I
--

1

-I

Adj. Log - Ken Bensinger - "Mrs. Ins called - daughter had one MRI showing labial I
tear in hip and may need arth. surgery. . . is having another MRI this week. . . I raised
the reserve to $25k. Ken"

1

1 LeMer - Prud - Allowed med bill, but not paid

-

-1
I

Adj. Log - Kempczenski - Called Mrs. Ins, she said that the MRI on her daughter
showed a tear of the cartilige in her hip. She is scheduled for surgery 5/19/03-under
anesthia they will stretch out the socket, then go in arthoscopicaly to repair it. The dr.
said it would be 6 to 9 months of recovery and therapy main therapy will be a
stationary bike, she will be on crutches for at least a month . . . . she has been unable
to play soccer since MVA, has missed a lot of school due to pain, the bills are running
up, she will get the info together and in to me, she said her neck still hurts, but she has
been concentrating on her daughter and will deal with herself when her daughter
is OK. Will discuss reserve increase when info rec'd.
Letter - Delphina Steward to Id. Sports Medicine - denial - "Because the patient's
health care carrier was elected as the primary payer of medical bills, the patient must
submit their bills to the health care carrier first and provide us with an EOB when it
is made available to them.
Adj. Log - Steward - TC Linda. Insd very concerned re: outstanding meds for Sarah.
Steward tells Linda COB & applies to Linda, not Sarah (Prudential) will not
process meds under Med Pay coverage.

Ex 77

PRU 144

1

EX 72

1

07/31/03

1 Med Pay Log -Payments on 9 bills, some dating back to 9/30/02 date of the accident. I
UM Adj. Log - First entn since 05/12/03
Adj. Log - Kempczenski - Linda called - Said that med pay was not paying for
daughter's bills. Health ins was not paying also . . . went through mult med pay reps
. . . recently Del Stewart got the case and paid some of the old bills, a lot of bills are
outstanding, collection agency after ins, health ins won't pay . . . Del Stewart told
insured that med pay cov on daughter now exhausted and UM will pay the bills . . .
insured called, credit ruined, Pru took all this time to decide to pay med pay, she
demands that UM now step in and pay, since we won't make the at fault party pay .
. . told her UM coverage: we gather all info and settle to include all when ready to
settle. She refuses to wait, collection agencies after them, credit ruined . . . health
won't pay, said auto is primary. . . faxed her new HIPPA med auth . . . she will fax
back so I can get med pay file and order info from Dr's etc. - Dr. said the inj is very
unusual, don't know what recovery etc. will be, have her in PT now . . . she has
developed bursitis in the area, don't know how long that will go on . . . need ongoing
-
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I

Exhibit
j No. I

1

Date

Event

i

I include a list of the current medical providers, called, left message asking she fax that
I

I

I

I

, Faxed rned auth to rned pay rep asking for a copy of the rned pay file on Sarah ASAP. 1
I

1

1

Ex
PRU283

I

FAX Letter- Kempczenski to Steward -Hi Del, As I'm sure Mrs. Weinstein told you,

09/02/03

1 they have collection agencies after them for Sarah's bills. Please get me a copy of her

1

/ med pay file to me ASAP. Med. auth. is enclosed.

I

1 Letter - Steward - Payment Denial to St. Luke's. "benefits exhausted"
1 Letter - Steward - Payment Denial to Dr. Lach. "benefits exhausted"
\

Ex83
W205I

1

09102103

I

Ex 84

09/02/03

W2052

Ex 72
PRU158-160
~2093-2095

I

1

Med Pay Log - St. Luke's paid $920.21 from rned pay - that payment takes rned pay
to $5,000 but does not pay St. Luke's in full - (next payment on St. Luke's bill was
more than 1 year later, 09/29/2004)

09/03/03

/ p:;s$60
1 09/25/03 1 FAX - Linda to Kempczenski - Full list of medical providers
EX 89

1

Ex 90
W2064

EX 91
W2066

1

E~92
W2065

I

/
I

1
1
11

10110103
10110103

1

10110103

PRU8l4
~2068

1

Letter - Bistline to Stice (Prop. C1. Adj.) - I represent Weinsteins -No insurance on
vehicle that caused accident.

I

1

/1 E-mail
Bistline to Stice - Appreciate input - File very confusing - "I have five
separate Prudential claims numbers" - Understand tortfeasor is uninsured - Is this
-

10/10/03

your understanding?
Adj. Log - Kempczenski - Apparently ins hire atty that got Carol S. name who reps

1 the Weinstein's called atty, left mess. sending ack. Letter

1

11

I

/ E-mail - Carol Stice (Prud.) to Bistline - Weller is handling PD - "Vicki
/
I

I

Ex 94

Letter - Bistline to Doyle (PI C1. Adj.) - I represent Weinsteins - Weinsteins
understand you have paid out full rned pay benefits of 5k - Responsible driver
uninsured - Please confirm that - Who at Prudential will process UM claim?

Kempczenski is handling the injury portion" - can be reached at 480 etc. - I handle
subro.

I

~2067

1/

10/10/03

10/13/03

1 Letter - Kempczenski to Bistline - We have been notified of your rep. - need med.
I

and wage loss documentation.
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1
I

I

--

I

--

-

-

Eti?:

--

I--+--

I

I

Event
---

-

-

Adj. Log (SUPERVISOR '"TARGET REVIEW") - Martha McLaughlin - Our invest
indicates UM clmt is prox cause-insd contends clmt Kaya contributed to loss. Insds
are now atty rep for the inj IVP Sarah. Sarah sustained a hip injury with resulting
surgery and a recovery time of 9months. Med pay limit exhausted. We do not have
the hi1 amt of bills or any med reports. Recent lor ltr - ack with req to supply records,
Due to the seriousness of injury to 16yr old Sarah and our position that the UM is
responsible, recommend increasing the reserve on Sarah's "AJ" to $SOk. Linda is fine
at the $5k. File is properly directed. Martha (McLaughlin)

I

I Evaluation/Authority Request (title of doc i
I

Letter - Bistline to Kempczenski - Last time Weinstein spoke to Prudential she was 1
advised no basis to proceed against Kaya - I concur - Does Prudential intend to claim I
E-Iardan's conduct is not sole cause (and 4 related questions) -Tendering 6 rned bills
for $1,898.52 - I realize rned benefits exhausted but submit under UM coverage.
Ans f/ 2,
W200 1

-

-

--

Ex 106
PRU048-050
W208 I-2081A

Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. purchased Prudential Property & Casualty Ins. Co. (Answer
filed in this lawsuit in 2004 says Liberty Mutual "is the entity responsible for handling
all matters involved in this Complaint")
Adj. Log -Kempczenski - Atty Bistline called, MP on child used, ongoing meds with
no other cov. Wants me to short cut and get the med pay file and pay the outstanding
bills under UM. Told him that is not our practice. He said he will send a letter saying
ifwe don't dispute liab, and we don't dispute the bills, we have to. Told him fine, I'll
review that with my bosses when I get it, told him there is no short cut to the rned pay
file, I'll need a current rned auth. Will send it to him, went over MP payment with
him, appear bills paid by them are older bills, they may not have the current bills, said
he will gather everything also and return to me with the med auth. I'll order the rned
pay file and when I get it in share it with him. Told him I don't know what is wrong
with the child, he said the hip was damaged, at first they thought it was bruised, then
they did surgery and that has not worked and now they are talking about a possible
total hip replacement, said he only got on this recently, does not have a lot of info, he
knows they have $250,000 UM cov, so he wants the bills paid . . . sending him the
rned auth.
recent telephone conversation, we
discussed that we will need the following additional information to resolve this claim:
auth. for Prud. Med Pay Unit to

Ex 108
PRUOS f
W2083

Log - Kempczenski - Talked to (supervisor) Ken (Bensinger) and (Unit
Manager) Julie (Kippenhan) about Bistline wanting meds paid under UM, contact
counsel for opinion.
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/I Exhibit
C- No.
-- -

Event
--

-

.

Ex 110
PRU053
~2084

A

Adj. Log - Kempczenski -Liberty Mutual in-house attorney (Ken) Day; Idaho is his
state, "he is unaware of anything in Idaho that requires payment of bills prior to
seEIement," suggests asking atty Gordon for authority and he will be happy to look
at it when I get it.
--

1 1/06/03

I-----

Adj. Log - Kempczenski - Atty Gordon said he would send me a letter, I'll wait for
letter to see if he has any authority on this.
--

1 1/06/03
1

1
1

!

Exlll
PRU812
~2085

I

I

I

1

1

I

I

Ex112
PRU054
~2086

I

i

la
PRU796

11/18/03

I
PRU239-24 1
~2088-2090

1

Ex
PRU054

Adj. Log - Martha McLaughlin - SUPERVISOR Mandatory QR - Idaho UM case.
File is properly directed with on going invest into atty allegations to pay meds prior
to UM settlement. Case is properly reserved . . Martha (McLaughlin)

11118/03
I

11/19/03

/ Letter - Steward to Foothills Physical Therapy and Linda - "Please be advised that

11

the maximum policy Limits of $5,000 for medical expenses related to this accident
have been paid and no further payments can be made. You may wish to contact this
patient on the appropriate health insurance carrier for payment of future bills."

1

Letter - Bistline to Kempczenski - We will get med. records from treating doctors

I and send to you - enclosed is a release to allow you to secure copies of med pay dept.

/ of your company.

I

1

Letter - Steward to Intnntn. Orthopedic - Payment Denial. "Please be advised that
the maximum policy limits of $1,000.00 for med. expenses related to this accident
have been paid and no further payments can be made." - Contact patient or health
carrier.

11120/03

I

I

4

Adj. Log - Kempczenski - Red Med Auth yesterday will send to get Med Pay file.

I
I
I

Letter - Kempczenski to Steward - "As part of our investigation of this claim, we 1
request that you forward a complete copy of your med pay file for Sarah Weinstein.
I
We have enclosed a signed authorization for this request."

1

Letter - Prudential to Foothills Phys. Therap. - Payment Denial. "Policy Benefits
have been exhausted."
Ex 1 2 0

11

12/03/03

Adj. Log - Kempcreniki - Statement to ird
party: "Harden at fault and Harden is a

1i

UM."

I
-

121
W2096

02/09/04

-

-

-

-

1 Letter - Prudential to losephR. Gobel, M.D. - Payment Denial.

1 have been exhausted."

-
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Exhibit
No.

1

--

-- - 1-

r-

I

Ex It2

/

Date

1

03109104

-

Event

1

1

1

1

I

Adj. Log - Kempczenski - Rec'd mess. from Kathy with atty office wanting a copy
of the med pay log called her back, left mess, with med pay office info, asked she call
me with ur~date.
I

Letter (FAX) 3 pages - Steward to Cathy at Bistline Law Office - "As requested, I
attached is med pay log for Sarah" 2 attachments show 05/28/03 $1 88 - 06/03/03 $25
- 07118/03 $142 - 07/31/03 10 pmts. total $3,323.57 - 09/03/03 $950.21 plus i
notation med pay benefits exhausted. Total paid is $4,628.78. (List is inaccurate-one
page is missing)
--

1
I

--I

Adj. Log - Kempczenski - Wave not rec'd the med pay file I requested in November
and the request I faxed in Sept. of last year, copied Nov. request again and will fax it
to med pay rep.
--- -

I1

Ex "7
PRU237
~2101

1

1
128-129 I
PRU651-652
--

EX

/

04120104

Ex 130-2S4
PRU653-777

1

1

04120104

04120/04

1

FAX Letter - Kempczenski to Steward (Liberty) - 3rd request for med pay file (first
was 09/02/03; second was 11120103).

1

1I
1
I

I
I

Letter - Bistline to Kempczenski (Prud.) -Enclosed rned bills and records - Consider
this Proof of Loss for med exp -Prudential has paid $6,759 so owes $16,669 - Will
work over next few weeks to get prognosis (totals are incorrect).
i
Anachments to Bistline letter of 04120/04
Letter - Pierce to Kempczenski - We are still working on updating records and bills
since 1 1120103 and to provide info we have rec'd since Bistline letter of 4/20 - also
encloses Dr. Shea's chart record of 12/9/03 -"Suggests that she is developing some
mild but early degenerative arthritis in her hip."

Ex 260
PRU057
Wil09

1

1 ;;;;;

1

i

1

1

I

Ex

I

Ex261
PRU058
w2!10

1,

1

06/07/04
06/07/04

06108104

/

Adj. Log - Kempczenski -Letter from atty office rec'd May 24, they are still working
on getting the updated records/bills. File to Ken for trans

Adj. Log - Bensinger - (SUPERVISOR) *OK to inc the reserve to $75,000 on one
1 clmt with injury to hip to 16 yr old . . Ken (Bensinger)
Adj . Log - Kempczenski - Discussed Sara's claim with Ken (supervisor Bensinger),
with the hip surgery to repair the tear and ongoing complaints with long
walkinglrunning, increasing reserve to $75,000.

I

I
Adj. Log - Transfer to 04008 (Quinn) from 04010 (Kempczenski) by 04079 /
(Bensinger)
I

Adj. Log - (NEW ADJUSTER DOROTHY OUrNN - file review) Rev'd UM
transfer-I assisted 010 Kempczenski in investigation-this is ID loss-we have 2501500
UM limits-facts indicate that UM driver pulled out of d/way--crossed road & was to
pull out into median but when she got to median-clmt saw OV conway in the medianthought she would hit it headon-so she continued into WB lanes and hit OVD Kaya
as he was braking and caused Kaya to lose control and go into EB lane where Kaya
hit IV on left front-then OV Kaya spun and hit the OV conway-there is
-

-
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1

Exhibit
No.

Event
spd on OV Kaya despite insd's allegation-we have assessed liab on UM Hardan-she
is teenager wlo insur and suspended license-insd has atty representing NPIdaughter
who has had hip injury & surgery? The injury appears unusual and she does play
soccer per file notes to will have to review the medical infomation-insd atty has
asked us to pay the medical expenses prior to settlement of UM and ID defense
counsel had advised that we have no legal obligation to do so-5k h4P is exhausted
perhaps the insd has health insur covering the bills now-reserve is set at 75k-need to
find out if any residuals-will send atty a letter that I have assumed handling and to
advise me on current medical status-will review the meds now.
Adj. Log - Quinn - Mrs insd had neck inj but appears to have not tx'd-minimal amt 1
paid under medpay-she adv 010 (Kempczenski) that she was dealing with daughter
first-will check IS0 for other claims.
I
Adj. Log - Quinn - It doesnt appear we recd the MP file which was requested in Novwill send note to Chris Rose and see if she can get file if it is closed.
- --

Adj. Log - Quinn - Revd the ER notes-IVP was taken post MVA to St A1 and she
had right sided neck pain and left pelvic discomfort-she didnt have any discomfort
with hip movement-she was restrained-3 point restraint-she had a small abraison in
the left superior iliac crest and there was tenderness along the ridge but none in the
abdominal region-was dx'd with a muscular neck strain and a left hip and pelvic
contusion-associated with seatbelt buckle-she then sought tx with McMillan Urgent
Care-seen 1018 and notes indicate left sided pain-stabbing pain for 4-5 days in flank
area-in flu on 11/29 she had left sided pain-he rc'd meds and PT-on 119103-she
reports lsided hop and left rib pain-unable to tolerate activity-she went to St A1 for
rehab 12112102-mentions IV hit curb after impact-she adv her neck inj resolved-she
had pin in left rib cage-and left hip-notes indicate she tx'd thru 2/20 and resumed
soccer w/o problems but has residual rib pain and hip pain-given a home exercise
program-is it possible that she resumed the soccer too soon and caused add1
problems?? the ortho records begin 3121103-states she resumed playing soccer and
noted she had signif pain while running and kicking ball-and she had a clicking
sensation in hip presetn for past 2-3 wks-and she has incr pain with activity-exam
found palpable popping or clicking in the left hip-some tenderness and dr rx'd MRI
and set up PT again-the left hip MRI showed a suspicious tear at the anterosuperior
labrum also a cyst that accompanies a tear.
- --

Ex 266
PRU235
W2ll8

06/09/04

Internal Memo - Quinn to Rose -"Can you check on the whereabouts of the med pay
file? If it is in storage - can you obtain it for me?" Handwritten notes: "Outstanding
(bills), recognize out of pocket expenses and willing to offer advance."

06110104

Adj. Log - Quinn - Disc case with Julie (Unit Manager Julie Kippenhan) and Ken
(Supervisor Ken Bensingerkwill send ltr outlining our liab position that the UM
driver appears 100% liab for the loss-not clmt Kaya-will also advise that defense
counsel states we are not obligated to pay bills as incurred but offer to do a PL4 of
0k for the OOP
expenses-since he claims there are a financial hardshipwill
-

I

I

-
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8

Event

Date

-

if he files suit against OVD Kaya to send me copy of suit-adv Julie of delay on
payment by medpay-mistake on WC primary issue-didnt apply to ivpass just ni-also
advised that I want to have records review of the medical file ESP since her physical
activities might have aggrevated the injury-we disc reserve and I suggested 150k-she
adv me it will be referral since we have reserve for IVD open also-will do referral and
eserve at 150k.

-----

Letter - Quinn to Bistline - I have assumed handling UIM claim - Review of file
indicates Hardan solely responsible and not insured so 2501500 UIM will be
"afforded."

1

In response to your request that we pay Ms. Weinstein's medical expenses, we have
been advised by our Idaho defense counsel that there is no legal obligation to do so.
If you have any case law that differs with his opinion, then please provide it for our i
review and consideration.
I

I
i

We do recognize that there may be some out of pocket expenses and will offer a
$10,000 payment in advance on Ms. Weinstein's Euture settlement. Must sign form.

L
I1
1
I

1

Ex

PRU232

Q8' ,:;",

/
0612 1104

/

I

We will evaluate Ms. Weinstein's damages when her medical treatment is completed
or when you submit a settlement demand with all the medical documentation and
proofs.
I

1 Document enclosed with Letter
I

0611 1104

1

- "In

consideration of our payment . . . ."

Adj. Log - Quinn - Waiting for atty response to PIA - FRI July

4
1
1I

Letter - Bistline to Quinn - I have your letter of June 1 1,2004, and I have reviewed
it with my clients. While the Weinsteins are more than happy to have payments made
for which they were contracted, my clients feel that they have no duty to agree to
anything before receiving payment for the medical bills which have been incurred, I
and presented in a proper proof of loss. Nor can they, in view of the pendency of the
statute of limitations, wait any longer in expecting whatever company it is that is now 1
responsible to honor the contractual obligations for which Prudential Property and
Casualty Insurance Company accepted premiums.
1
Hence they have instructed me to file the complaint . . . . Initially, we need to
determine if any of the "defenses" which "Liberty Mutual" seeks to reserve in the
"advance" agreement, which you tendered, include an assertion that the conduct of
some person who will soon be protected by the statute of limitations is a partial cause
of the damages sustained by Sarah Weinstein. I note that your letter gives at least the
appearance of a concession that this is properly a UIM claim, but I cannot reconcile

1

I
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Exhibit
1
NO.
-

--

------

--- -

-A

-- -

-

I

Event

I

--

this appearance with the reservation language in the "advance" agreement. In any
event, the complaint has been filed today . . . .
When the Weinsteins purchased their policy, they trusted that policy would pay on I
their behalf under the circumstances such as these. As far as 1 can tell, there is 1
nothing in the policy that affords the insurance company the o p p o m i t y to defer
making payments once it has received proof of loss; rather the statute seems clear that
payment is due within 30 days of proof of loss. As a practical matter, I can see no
reason why your company should be allowed to enhance its cash flow situation by
shifting the burden of amounts on which it is obligated to pay, to the insured, the
health insurer or the physician. However, given the advise you claim to have received
from Idaho counsel, 1 suppose we will sort this all out as we go along.
If your company wishes to tender the sum to the Weinsteins to allow them to pay the
accruing medical bills, you should feel free to send that payment to this office. . . .
Of course any payments you make will go toward reducing the total UIM coverage
due under the policy. My clients would be happy to sign a receipt acknowledging the
payment as a credit against the policy limits. However, they are under no obligation
to agree that your company has reserved any defenses or that the payment is not an
admission of liability under the policy.
Complaint filed (this lawsuit initiated)
Adj. Log - Quinn - Referral for reserve incr not completed yet due to rep being out
1Odays and today recd a ltr from insd atty-he has filed complaint-his position is that
we should pay the bills-the suit includes a dec action re payment of the bill and breach
of contract and he notes he sent 2 proof of loss 10/03 and 4/04 for unpaid med and we
refused to pay-atty also sent interro & production requests----advised Julie (Unit
Manager Julie Kippenhan) that atty has suit ready to be filed & served on Idaho insur
dept-she adv me to fax to Mary Rowe=get her approval on legal counsel and then do
SIC and referral-the atty mentions the SOL in his letter-could he be planning to sue
the other driver Kaya?
Computer entry on Suffix J
- Payment of $298.19 to Bomeville Collection
- Reason - 010 (Kempczenski) - Bad Faith

I

Ex 277
W2144-2145

Ex 278-279
W2148-2149

/

I

08/25/04

Letter - Cantrill to Bistline - Enclosed is a copy of computer pmt to the collection
firm fiom Prudential. Note: Computer printout says reason 010 - Bad Faith

O9/lOiO4

Letter - Pierce to Cantrill - Understand your client has an interest in paying the
balance of med bills. Here they are. Lists bills with collection agencies.

J

4

Letter - Quinn to Bistline - Enclosed is check for YMCA membership for Sarah
($264.57) and check.

I

000390
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Exhibit
No,

1

I

Event

Date

,

09/29/04

1

Letter - Gantrill to Bistline expenses as outlined in your 9110104 letter.

requesting additiomj rned

Weinsteins evaluates Sarah's injuries to be worth $60,000 in addition to what has

Mid-West Health Insurance Policy

/ UM & UIM Motorist Claims and the Process of Good Faith Claims Handlers

/ Pages PRU002-PRU407 OF DEFENDANTS CLAIMS HANDLING DOCUMENTS 1
/ Pages PRU408-PRU865OF DEFENDANTS CLAIMS HANDLING DOCUMENTS I
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PRU 001 371 -

PRU 598-600

I

responsible party
1 0 0 0 8 10/01102 - Log notes showing transfer of file from
PRU 015
Greg Sanders t o Vicki Kempczenski and her notes that
an uninsured motorist appears t o have caused this
multi-car accident
1 0 0 0 9 10/01102 - Jacket for Medical Payments unit file

1

I

1 1

1

1 I

(

I 1

I

PRU 608

10010
PRU 118

1001 1
PRU I2O

1001 2
PRU 797-798

10013
PRU 799

10014
PRU 408

10015
PRU 01 6-018

I

I

I
/

10101I 0 2 - Pat Doyle log note (MP) re: n e w Med Pay
claim
10101 I 0 2 - Pat Doyle log note (MP) re: Idaho being a
Healthleare Primary state
10101102 - Letter from Pat Doyle (MP) t o parents of
Sarah Weinstein re: Medical payments coverage
10101 I 0 2 - Letter from Pat Doyle (MP) t o parents of
Sarah Weinstein re: coordination of benefits
10/02/02 - Casualty transfer sheets assigning the
UMIUIM file t o Vicki Kempczenski
10/02/02 - Vicki Kempczenski log notes re: discussion
about accident w i t h Linda Weinstein. Ms.
Kempczenski explains the various coverages available
under the policy in this conversation.

\1/

I

Mrs. Weinstein. Mrs. Weinstein mentions that she has

PRU 401

1 witness Ernest Jabs.

1

10022 1011 5102 - Dorothy Quinn's log note re: discussions
PRU 026
wfadjusters from other carriers for drivers involved in
accident.
10023 10115102 - Dorothy Quinn's log note re: conversation
PRU 027 - 02*
with Geico representative.
10024 1011 5/02 - Letter from Allied Insurance t o Linda
PRU 390
Weinstein seeking recorded statement.
10025 10/15102 - Dorothy Quinn sends police report t o
PRU 400
Geico representative Scott Roberts
10026 10116102 - Dorothy Quinn log re: her discussions w i t h
PRU 029 - 030
other adjusters who informed her that when they
requested a recorded statement from Mrs. Weinstein,
her husband referred them t o attorney Phillip Gordon.

I

10027

1011 6/02 - Dorothy Quinn log re: her message t o the
Weinsteins outlining her contacts with the other
insurance carriers and that there did not appear t o be
any fault on the driver of the vehicle which struck the
Weinstein station wagon. Ms. Quinn advised Mrs.
Weinstein t o call if there was anything else she
wanted Prudential t o do and that her attorney should
send a letter of representation as this appeared t o be
an UM BI claim.
10028 10115102 - McMillan Medical Center sends medical
PRUo01345
bill to Scottsdale claim office.
10029 10121102 - Scottsdale claim office receives St. Al's
PRU 001389- billing for services provided t o Sarah on 9130102.
001390

PRU 03'

-

32

I

10030 10121I02 - Med Pay unit receives McMillan Medical
Center billing for 1018102 office visit by Sarah.

PRU 629 - 630

Defendants' Exhibit List
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I

I

1 1
I

PRU 121

I
I

Sarah from ~ c ~ i l l ~a ehd i c aCenter,
l
Ada County
Emergency Service for the ambulance. Indicates she
was sent a letter indicating this is a health care

portion of the policy.
10 0 3 5 1 1/05/02 - Vicki Kempczenski log note in which she
PRU 033 reviews entries by Dorothy Quinn and notes that there
is no letter of representation from the Weinsteins'
counsel received t o date. Will await attorney
representation letter t o find out about treatment.
10036 1 1/07/02 - Med Pay unit receives St. Al's billing for
PRU 631 - 633 services on 9 / 3 0 / 0 2 for Sarah. Medical records
supporting billing are attached,
10037 1 1/ I 1 / 0 2 - Vicki Kempczenski log note re:
PRU OJ5 - 037 conversation wlMrs. Weinstein. Mrs. Weinstein was
stating that she felt Ransom Kaya was at fault
because he did not have his seatbelt on. Mrs.
Weinstein said that Sarah was still treating and Vicki
indicated she would send them a medical authorization

I

I

1

1

I

1

1 111 1I 0 2 - Letter from Vicki Kempczenski t o t h e
parents of Sarah Weinstein requesting medical
expenseslreports and enclosing a Medical
Authorization form.
1 0 0 3 9 11/11 I 0 2 - Fax cover sheet from Linda Weinstein t o
PRU 391 Vicki Kempezenski. (Police report follows in file)
11/15/02 - Letter from Vicki Kempczenski t o Allied
Insurance setting forth argument that Ransom Kaya
was traveling too fast for the conditions and failed t o
maintain control over the vehicle he was driving.
11/15/02 - Pat Doyle (MP) log note acknowledging
PRU 122
receipt of St. Al's bill for ~ a r a hfor date of service of
9/30/02. Because this bill had not been sent t o the
health carrier first, Mr. Doyle would send a letter t o
the hospital requesting that t o occur.

1

I
1

1

10038
PRU 815

-

L

Defendants' Exhibit List - 3
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I

1

1 1 1

*-

10042

PRU 634 - 636

10043
PRU 386

denying [Ransom Kaya] that he was liable for the

10044
W2033, PRU 265

10045
PRU 1340, 1338,
1339

10046
PRU 625-626

10047
PRU 123-125

10048
PRU 126

10049
PRU W2035 - 2036

10050
PRU 127

10051
PRU 1336, 1337,
1342, 1343

Medical Center billing for 1 I 129102 date of service for
Sarah Weinstein.
12118/02 - Med Pay office receives McMillan Medical
Center billina for 1 1129102 date of service for Sarah.
01/02/03 - Pat Doyle (MP) log note re: telephone call
t o Mrs. Weinstein, w h o advised that she was getting
threatening phone calls from the ambulance company,
as well as a phone call from hospital, re: bills not being
paid. Advised Mrs. Weinstein that letters had been
sent t o both the ambulance company and the hospital
indicating that the bills had to be submitted t o the
health carrier first, then t o the Med Pay office if any
balance was owed. Ms. Doyle advised Mrs. Weinstein
that if any EOBs were contained i n the letter she had
just received from the health carrier, she could fax
those to Ms. Doyle for payment. She also advised
that even if there was no payment by the health
carrier due t o a deductible, the bills would be taken
care of under the Med Pay provision of the policy.
01 103103 - Pat Doyle (MP) indicates that she received
the McMillan Medical Center billing for Sarah for
service on 1 1/29/02. Because no health care EOB
was attached, she was sending a letter t o McMillan.
01/4/03 - Pat Doyle t o McMillan Medical Center re:
h o w t o file a claim w i t h the health carrier and then
submit the EOB t o Prudential.
0111 6/03 - Pat Doyle (MP) log note re: voicemail from
Star at McMillan Medical Center. She returns the call
and explains t o Star h o w t o submit bills first t o the
health insurance company and then any outstanding
balances t o Prudential.
01 121103 - McMillan Medical Center sends billing for
1/9/03date of service for Sarah Weinstein t o
Scottsdale claims office.

Defendants' Exhibit List
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I

carrier being primary. Ms. Doyle explains that she will
contact the health carrier if Mrs. Weinstein provides
her with a name. Also advises Mrs. Weinstein that if
she was getting any threatening letters t o let Ms.
Doyle know and she would address them for her.
Explained again the process of sending EOBs t o

I

1

attached so sending letter t o provider.
10055 01/29/03 - Letter from Pat Doyle (MP) t o McMillan re:
PRU 808 need t o send bill t o health carrier first then EOB t o
Prudential.
1 0 0 5 6 0211 2/03 - Pat Doyle (MP) log note re: no bills or
PRU I 3 l
health care EOBs received. Called Mrs. Weinstein t o
inquire where the bills/health care EOBs are. Advised
that Prudential needed a denial from the health carrier
and it would then review the bills after the EOB was
received. No EOBs received as of this date.
1 0 0 5 7 0211 2103 - Letter from Pat Doyle (MP) t o parents of
PRU 809 Sarah Weinstein re: the lack of a n y recent medical bills
being presented.
1 0 0 5 8 02/24/03 - Pat Doyle (MP) log note indicating that no
PRU 132 new medical bills had been received as of that date.
1 0 0 5 9 0311 2 103 - Jennifer Phillips (MP) log note indicating
PRU 134 the medical payments unit had received a bill from
McMillan Medical Center for Sarah for an office visit of
12/3/02. No outstanding balance.
1 0 0 6 0 0311 7 / 0 3 - Jennifer Phillips receives call from Mrs.
PRU 136 - 38 Weinstein who sets out various balances after
payments b y Mid West. Mrs. Weinstein will be faxing
several doctor bills t o Jennifer Phillips.
10061 0311 7 / 0 3 - Fax cover sheet from Linda Weinstein t o
5018
Jennifer Phillips of the Med Pay unit.
1 0 0 6 2 03/25/03 - Log note by Jennifer Phillips (MP)
PRU 1 3 9 1 4 0 indicating she received fax from ~ i n d a a n d
describes
her actions t o pay outstanding balances. Refers t o the
billing from St. Al's Ambulatory Rehab Services for

/

1

I I

I

/

1

1 1

1

1

I

1 1

1

'

/

Defendants' Exhibit List

-5

Weinstein v. Prudential, et al.

oncerns she had with the ldaho Emergency
hysicians and PT services biils and EOBs noted in her
I25103 log note. Mrs. Weinstein agreed t o call St.
Al's ambulatory rehab services and get a ledger o f
payments that were her responsibility and forward it

tearing in t h e hip and that another MRI is planned.

PRU 038

Weinstein indicating that he daughter had an MRI
showing a labial tear in the hip and may need
arthroscopic surgery. She's having another MRl this
week. Reserve raised t o $25,000.
1 0 0 6 8 0511 2 / 0 3 - Vicki Kempczenski log note documenting
PRU 039 - 040
her call t o Mrs. Weinstein and learning that t h e second
MRI showed a tear of the cartledge i n Sarah's hip.
She is scheduled for surgery 5/19/03. Mrs. Weinstein
indicated Sarah had been unable t o play soccer since
t h e accident, had missed school, the bills were running
u p and that she w o u l d get t h e information together
and provide it t o Ms. Kempczenski. Ms. Kempczenski
noted that she would discuss a reserve increase w h e n
t h e information f r o m Mrs. Weinstein was received.
1 0 0 6 9 0 5 / 2 1 103 - Statement from Del Stewart t o Weinsteins
W5025
indicating full payment of $ 2 1 9 bill from ldaho
Emergency Physicians.
1 0 0 7 0 05123103 - Statement from Del Stewart t o the
W2046
Weinsteins indicating that Prudential w a s paying t h e
allowed amount o f Dr. Shea's billings for t h e office
visits b y Sarah Weinstein o n 4 / 4 / 0 3 and 411 5 / 0 3 .
Defendants' Exhibit List
Weinstein v. Prudential, e t al.
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00039'1

Phoenix office.

Medicine had been received in the amount o f $538.
N o amount paid b y the health carrier and a letter

10076
PRU 160,159,158

10077
W20u

10078
W2052

10079
- 043

PRU O4'

outstanding medical bills on her daughter. Ms.
Stewart explained that the health care primary portion
of the policy is only for named insureds and not for her
daughter. Will n o w process meds under M e d Pay
coverage.
0 7 / 3 1 103 - M e d Pay payment log shows 1 0 payments
on 0 7 / 3 1 I 0 3 for a total of $3,323.57.
0 9 / 0 2 / 0 3 - Statement from Del Stewart t o t h e
Weinsteins showing payment of $950.21 for the
hospital bill for service o n 511 9/03. Statement
indicates that medical payments coverage benefits
have been exhausted.
0 9 / 0 2 / 0 3 - Statement from Del Stewart t o the
Weinsteins indicating that the diagnostic radiology bill
for Imaging Center Radiologists was not allowed
because medical payments coverage benefits had been
exhausted.
0 9 / 0 2 / 0 3 - Vicki Kempczenski log note re: call from
Mrs. Weinstein and her concerns about lack o f medical
payments coverage. Mrs. Weinstein asked t o pay bills
as they were incurred. Mrs. Weinstein indicated that
collection agencies were after them and that their
credit was ruined. Kempczenski indicated she would
fax a n e w HlPPA med authorization form t o Mrs.
Weinstein so she could get t h e M e d Pay file and order
information from doctors. Mrs. Weinstein indicated
that she did not k n o w w h a t the recovery would be
regarding Sarah's injuries. Mrs. Weinstein said she
would fax t h e medical authorization back t o Vicki
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000398

10080
PRU 286, 285

10 0 8 1
PRU t 369, 256

Authorization for Release of Medical Records.

10082
PRU 045

10083
PRU 289

10084
PRU 044

10085
PRU 257, 001 367,
001 368,001366

10086
PRU 254

10087
PRU 045

10088
- 253

PRU 252

10089
PRU 814

10090
PRU 249

received the medical authorization back from Mrs.
Weinstein but it did n o t include a list of current
medical providers. She called and left a message
asking that Mrs. Weinstein fax this t o her. Also notes
that Ms. Kempczenski faxed the medical authorization
form t o the medpay representative asking for a copy
o f the m e d ~ a vfile asaxl.
-0 9-0 2 / 0 3 - Fax from Vicki Kempczenski t o Del
Stewart requesting Med Pay file.
0 9 / 0 2 / 0 3 - Vici Kempczenski log note re: her review
o f the facts of t h e accident in light of Mrs. Weinstein
saying t h a t Prudential decided n o t t o go after t h e party
that hit t h e m and that such party had insurance.
0 9 / 2 5 / 0 3 - Mrs. Weinstein faxes t o Vicki
Kempczenski a list of medical providers for Sarah
Weinstein.
10110103 - Letter from Bruce Bistline t o Ms. Carol
Stice in the Phoenix, AZ office of Prudential. Letter of
introduction.
10110103 - Vicki Kempczenski log note
acknowledging that the Weinsteins had hired a n
attorney. She called the attorney, left message, and
indicated she would be sending an acknowledgment
letter.
10110103 - Bruce Bistline email t o Carol Stice
indicating some confusion regarding the different claim
numbers and asks for some clarification. He also
mentions that h e understands the tortfeasor and t h e
car owner are not insured and wonders if that was
consistent w i t h her understanding,
10113 / 0 3 - Letter from Vicki Kempczenski t o Bruce
Bistline acknowledging his representation and
requesting complete medical and wage loss
documentation.
1011 5 / 0 3 - Email from Vicki Kempczenski t o Mr.
Bistline indicating she is the main adjuster on t h e case
1 and that Mrs. Weinstein had indicated the vehicle
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1
I

!

I

\

/

I

I or any medical reports. A recent letter of

1

I that he does not represent Linda Weinstein,

I

I

!

I

I

I \

I

/

I

1 1

1

1

I

/ I

/

representation had been received and that it had been

only her

10/28/03 - Letter from Bruce Bistline t o Vicki
Kempczenski w i t h her handwritten notes.
10096 1 1113/03 - Vicki Kempczenski log notes re:
PRU 04* - 050 conversation w/Bruce Bistline in which he requests
payment of medical bills as presented under t h e U M
file. He indicated he would send a letter that includes
his authority and she said she would review it w i t h her
bosses when she got it. She reviews the Med Pay
payments log w i t h him which indicated that Med Pay
had some of the earlier bills, but, not the later ones.
He indicated he would gather the medical bills and
records for her review and she sent him a medical
authorization form so that she could access the
medical payments file.
1 0 0 9 7 1 1/03/03 - Letter from Vicki Kempczenski t o Mr.
816 Bistline confirming that he will provide copies of all
medical expenseslreports, that he would have his
client sign the enclosed Medical Authorization form for
the Med Pay file and provide a list of all treating
physicians.
10098 1 1/05/03 - Vicki Kempczenski log note documenting
PRU 05'
her discussion w i t h Ken Bensinger and Julie
Kippenham about Mr. Bistline wanting of the medical
bills paid as they get them under the U M coverage.
She will call for a legal opinion.
10095

P R U 1360 - 1J65

I
I
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PRU 052

with attorney Lundeen regarding the issue raised by

10100
PRU 053

w i t h attorney Kent Day indicating that he was
unaware of anything- in Idaho that required payment of
bills prior t o settlement. Also stated he would be
happy t o look at any authority provided by the

,,,,,
10101

PRU 812

PRU 054

I

101 03
PRU 147

101 04
PRU 796

101 05
pRU 239 - 241

/

I
101 06
PRU 054

101 07
PRU

101 08

101 09
PRU 055

Orthopedic indicating that they had received the bill i n
the amount of $5000and that the maximum policy
limits for medical expenses was $1000,which had
been exhausted.
1 1 /I 8/03- Martha McLaughlin log note re: mandatory
Mandatory QR Review. She notes that the file was
properly directed with an ongoing investigation into
attorney allegations t o pay meds prior t o U M
settlement. Case is properly reserved.
1 1 11 8/03- Del Stewart log note. Received call from
Foothills PT, explained t o same benefits were
exhausted and that a letter would be forthcoming.
1 1 1 1 8/03- Letter from Del Stewart t o Linda
Weinstein with a cc t o Foothills PT indicating the bill
of $715 for services provided between 9/2/03
and
1011 /03cannot be paid because the $5000 limit for
medical expenses are exhausted.
1 1 1 1 9/03- Letter from Bruce Bistline to Vicki
Kempczenski returning the medical authorization form
for the Prudential medical .payment
unit and indicating
.
that he would secure a copy of the medical records
and provide them t o Ms. Kempczenski.
1 1 /20/03- Vicki Kempczenski log note indicating she
received Mr. Bistline's fax wlmedical authorization t o
get the Med Pay file.
1 1/20/03
- Letter from Vicki Kem~czenskito Del
i
Stewart requesting Med Pay file.
1 1/24/03- Statement from Del Stewart t o the
Weinsteins indicating that the $715 from Foothills PT
could not be paid.
12/03/03- Vicki Kempczenski log note detailing her
conversation w i t h Nationwide adjuster.
- \J
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1 1

1

1

the medpay log. She called "Kathy" back and left a
message with the Med Pay office information and

including update by Dr. Shea from a 12/09/03 office

I

101 19 06/07/04 - Vicki Zempczenski log note indicating she
PRU 057
received a letter from attorney's office on 05/24/04
and that they are still working on getting the updated
records/bills. Sent file t o Ken Bensinger for transition.
10120 06/07/04 - Vicki Kempczenski log note indicating she
PRU 058
discussed Sarah Weinstein's claim with Ken and due
t o her hip surgery and ongoing complaints with long
( walking/running, they were increasing the reserve t o
$75,000.
10121 Ken Bensinger's log note approves the increase t o the
PRU 057
reserve to $75,000.
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- 067

PRU

/

I

I

I
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1 0 1 28
PRU 818,819,232

1 0 12 9
PRU 068

1 0 13 0
PRU

1891

lgO

1 0 13 1
PRU 069 - 070

/
1 0 13 2
pRu 071 - 072

1

case w i t h Julie Kippenhan and Ken Bensinger. During
that discussion, they agreed that she would send a
letter t o M r . Bistline outlining the company's position
that the UM driver appeared t o 1 0 0 % liable for t h e
loss and will advise that defense counsel had stated
they were not obligated t o pay bills that were incurred.
Will also state that offering a payment in advance in
the amount of $10,000 for out-of-pocket expenses,
because Mr. Bistline was claiming there was a
financial hardship. Also discussed having records
reviewed in the medical file especially since Sarah's

I

physical activities might have aggravated t h e injury.
They also discussed t h e reserve and Dorothy
suggested increasing it t o $150,000. She was
advised it would require referral t o t h e home office.
0611 1104 - Letter from Dorothy Quinn t o Bruce
Bistline attaching a Payment in Advance of Future
Injury Settlement document setting forth an offer t o
advance $ 1 0,000.
0 6 / 2 1 I 0 4 - Dorothy Quinn log note re: awaiting
resoonse from attornev t o PIA.
0 7 / 0 7 / 0 4 - Letter from Bruce Bistline t o Dorothy
Quinn indicating his clients rejected the $1 0,000
payment i n advance and had filed suit. (Copy o f
complaint and initial discovery requests omitted.)
0711 2 / 0 4 - Dorothy Quinn log note indicating t h e
referral for reserve increase had not yet been
completed due t o being out of the office and that she
had received a letter from the Weinsteins' attorney
indicating he had filed suit.
0711 3 / 0 4 - Dorothy Quinn entry indicating Sarah
Weinstein reserves were at $75,000.

I

Defendants' Exhibit List
Weinstein v. Prudential, e t al.

-

12

I
11

1
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1 0 133 08124104 - Prudential check loss form showing
of 2 bills i n collection and a diary date o f

PRU 583, 594

I

Cantrill forwarding 2 pages of medical records f r o m
Dr. Shears examination on 611 5104 and t h e Y M C A
0911 0104

-

Bruce Bistline's office t o Tony Cantrill Re

West
Ada County Paramedics
t

ldaho Emergency Physicians
Gem State Radiology

St. Als RMC
Fred Meyer Pharmacy
McMillan Medical Center
St. Als RMC Rehabilitation (STAARS)

I
I
I

lntermountain Medical lmaging

I l l
I l l

I

I

I

I
lntermountain Orthopaedics (Dr. Shea)
lmaging Center Radiologist

I

MRI Center o f ldaho
ldaho Sports Medicine
I

St. Luke's Elks Rehabilitation PT
Foothills PT
Anesthesia Associates
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10153 St. Luke's RMC

13 154 Withdrawn (IDX Pathology)
10155 Dr. Bates

156 04/20/04 - 06115/04 - 09/10/04 Bruce Bistline
spreadsheets
1b157 Spreadsheet with addition errors
10158 Bruce Bistline check t o Mid West
10159 Billed payments and outstanding balances as of
0611 1/04
10160 Weinstein Treatment and Claim History

I

10 16 1 Withdrawn

II

I

I

1

162 Withdrawn
1d l 63 Billed Payments and outstanding Balances at 09/30/03

Weinstein Lien by Intermountain Orthopaedics and
payment receipt
10 165 Mid West File

1

&,

-

1-1

-

1C1164

1
d
I '

*a
-

166 Med Pay File

10169 Bill from lntermountain Orthopaedics (Dr. Shea)

i
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10167 Time Line and payment history of Prudential,
Weinsteins, and Mid West
10168 Dr. Shea's chart note of 06/25/07
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICTOF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
LESLIE WEINSTEIN, and LINDA WEINSTEIN,
husband and wife, individually and as guardians ad litem
for SARAH R. WEINSTEIN, and SARAH R.
WEINSTEIN individually,

Supreme Court Case No. 34970
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Plaintiffs-Respondents-CrossAppellants,
VS.

PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY AND CASUALTY
INSURANCE COMPANY and PRUDENTIAL
GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY and LIBERTY
MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY and LM
PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE,
Defendants-Appellants-Cross Respondents.

I, J. DAVID NAVARRO, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have
personally served or mailed, by either United States Mail or Interdepartmental Mail, one copy of
the following:
CLERK'S RECORD AND REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT
to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows:

ROBERT A. ANDERSON

JAMES E. RISCH

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS

ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENTS

BOISE, IDAHO

BOISE, IDAHO

J. DAVID NAVARRO
Clerk of the District Court

~ ~ A R LEU NTO ~ ~ ~ +
Date of Service:

AUG 0 7 2008

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

BY
Deputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
LESLLE WEINSTEIN, and LINDA WEINSTEIN,
husband and wife, individually and as guardians ad litem
for SARAH R. WEINSTEIN, and SARAH R.
WEINSTEIN individually,

Supreme Court Case No. 34970
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD

Plaintiffs-Respondents-Cross Appellants,
VS.
PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY AND CASUALTY
INSURANCE COMPANY and PRUDENTIAL
GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY and LIBERTY
MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY and LM
PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE,
Defendants-Appellants-Cross Respondents.

I, J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing
record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction as, and is a true
and correct record of the pleadings and documents that are automatically required under Rule 28
of the Idaho Appellate Rules, as well as those requested by Counsels.
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the Notice of Appeal was filed in the District Court on the
2gthday of January, 2008.

J. DAVID NAVARRO
Clerk of the District Court

BY
Deputy Clerk

CERTIFICATE TO RECORD

000407

